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Abstract 
 
In the last decade there has been an explosion of new technologies that enable 
discourse, power and truth formations to be produced, contested and dispersed. As 
communication and information technologies continue to evolve, so too do the ways in 
which individuals construct identities and form communities. The notion of a moral 
panic is utilised to describe those critical moments in time and space when social norms 
are perceived to be under threat. I suggest that the complex interplay of spectacle, 
spectatorship and moral panic involved in such instances can be both conceptualised 
and interrogated as performance. This dissertation draws upon two distinct performance 
paradigms – one theoretical and the other practical – to inform a critical reading of three 
significant ‘social events’ of the last decade: the drug-trafficking trial of Australian 
woman Schapelle Corby in Indonesia in 2005, the end-of-life legal case focused on 
American woman Terri Schiavo, which culminated in 2005, and the race relations 
associated with the ‘Redfern riots’ which occurred in Sydney in 2004. Informed by a 
range of theoretical positions from Michel Foucault, Zygmunt Bauman, Giorgio 
Agamben, Judith Butler, Baz Kershaw, and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, this 
dissertation fleshes out contemporary understandings of mediatised spectacle and 
spectatorship, with the aim of revealing the ways in which they contribute to creating 
and sustaining moral panic. A critical finding of the dissertation is that through both 
subjectification and objectification processes the central players and the spectators 
become indivisible from the spectacle itself, thus maintaining the interweaving cycle of 
spectator, spectacle and moral panic. By exploring the ways in which people interpret 
and respond to social phenomena, the possibilities for performance and social theory 
can be extended. v 
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Life is a constant performance; we are audience and performer at the same 
time; everybody is an audience all the time 
(Abercrombie and Longhurst 1998: 73). 
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Introduction: In the beginning 
The contemporary social and political landscapes of the Western world are a matrix of 
globalisation, media, technology and performance. As Jon McKenzie writes:  
The spectacular development of performance concepts over the past half 
century, the movements of generalization in such divergent areas as technology, 
management, and culture, the patterns of joint performance challenges – all 
these suggest that the world is being challenged forth to perform – or else (2001: 
158). 
The acts of consumption and commodification, identity formation, the rituals within 
everyday life and communicative interaction are enactments of performance today. 
Taking guidance from Zygmunt Bauman, I argue that we are living in liquid modern 
times (2002; 2003; 2006) in which all kinds of performances are circulating. 
Performative acts are intricately enmeshed within networks of discourse and power. I 
am interested in fleshing out three instances of spectacle where communities within this 
technologised performative landscape were propelled to question what the event meant 
for them. Ultimately, the task of this dissertation is to interrogate the role of discourse 
and power in relation to the notions of spectatorship, spectacle and moral panic in the 
twenty-first century.   
 
Performance theorist Richard Schechner suggests that: “just about anything can be 
studied ‘as’ performance”. Something “is a performance when historical and social 
context, convention, usage, and tradition say it is” (2002: 30). Diana Taylor argues that: 
To say something is a performance amounts to an ontological affirmation. ... On 
another level, performance also constitutes the methodological lens that enables 
scholars to analyse events as performance. Civic obedience, resistance, 
citizenship, gender, ethnicity, and sexual identity, for example, are rehearsed and 
performed daily in the public sphere. To understand these as performance 
suggests that performance also functions as an epistemology. Embodied 2 
 
practice, along with and bound up with other cultural practices, offers a way of 
knowing (2003: 3). 
The paradigm proposed by Taylor is a central point of inspiration for the conceptual 
framework of this dissertation. The performance of social iterability – the ways in which 
individuals and communities engage with and understand each other through repetitive 
performative acts – is a form of knowledge. I understand knowledge to be an 
assemblage of discourses that influence how we speak, act and think. To study this 
knowledge, to examine the performances of our daily lives, is to continually investigate 
the machinations of social life. Thus, I assume that not only can social phenomena – 
which include cyber technologies, social media and mediatised spectacles – be read as 
performance but that this is also a useful trope to use in investigating the larger issues 
relating to the contemporary subject within the globalised context. 
 
To begin with, I draw from the aforementioned separate but interrelated components: 
the as and is of performance. The first component (chapters one to four) comprises a 
theoretical examination of the three social events mentioned above as performance. The 
second component (chapters five and six) transforms the notion that an enactment is a 
performance by locating these events in performance in the form of an original 
performance text that responds to each event. A bridging chapter (chapter six) links the 
theoretical analysis with the performance script. Ultimately, I explore the interplay 
between social and political discourses in the manifestation of moral panic in the age of 
information, mediatisation and mass consumerism. I do this via an examination of the 
specific circumstances surrounding these three events that were representative of 
perceived deviations from moral and social boundaries and in the process I explore 
notions of spectatorship, spectacle and subjectification. 
 3 
 
In the beginning…  
The three events examined were of great social and political significance for their 
audiences. The first is the trial of Australian woman Schapelle Corby, who was 
convicted of drug smuggling in 2005 in Indonesia. The second case is the legal debates 
surrounding American, Terri Schiavo, who died in 2005 after fifteen years in a 
Persistent Vegetative State (PVS). Finally I examine the representation of the race-
based riots in the Sydney suburb of Redfern in 2004. I selected these cases because of a 
particular set of responses from audiences that led in different ways to a challenging of 
social normativity, which I believe indicates something greater about the capacity of the 
subject to interpret and respond to social phenomena. 
 
In 2005, I – along with a vast array of Australians – observed the trial of Australian 
woman Schapelle Corby in Indonesia. As I was in the process of developing a thesis 
topic, this case struck me as an excellent example of the behaviour of contemporary 
media audiences and the role of spectacle and performance for these audiences. What 
interested me was not my personal deliberation over her guilt or innocence, but rather 
how the event accelerated into a spectacle. I realised that this spectacle was a perfect 
opportunity to apply performance theory to make sense of this kind of event. Thus, I 
decided to explore two additional events – one Australian (the Redfern riots that had 
occurred the previous year)
 and the other international (the Terri Schiavo case) – to see 
how moral panic played out in other instances.
 1
 
 
                                                           
1 It is important to note that the use of the term ‘riots’ is used throughout the dissertation because this was how the media tended to 
refer to the unrest. 4 
 
As I proceeded, the depth and complexity of each case became more apparent. I began 
to realise that these three social events led to a perceived threat to morality or ‘public 
interest’; a moral panic. The furore over these three examples raised questions about the 
nature of mediatised representation, morality and power, leading me to ask what were 
the social, cultural and political issues that the audiences to these events faced that in 
some way contributed to the eruption of a moral panic? I was also compelled to 
investigate the different ways in which this moral panic played out in each case: these 
responses varied from virulent judgement to rapturous celebration and everything in 
between. These events provided an opportunity to examine the prevailing social, 
historical and political conditions in each context that led to the questioning of 
normative social values. 
 
The consumerist imperative is enmeshed with the impact of globalisation and the 
evolution of technology. Within this context, there is a plethora of instances where 
mediatised events have influenced the nature and role of both spectacle and 
spectatorship. However, not only because of the constrictions of time and space in this 
dissertation, my investigative scope centres on those social events that at the time of 
their enactment had a significant impact on the surrounding social landscape. The 
influence of each event was different from the other, yet what struck me as fascinating 
were the similarities. I discovered that the cases were indicative of the changing nature 
and role of spectatorship. Bauman argues: “The way present-day society shapes its 
members is dictated first and foremost by the duty to play the role of the consumer. The 
norm our society holds up to its members is that of the ability and willingness to play it” 
(1998: 80). As individuals and communities, we are ‘judged’ by our capacity to perform 
to certain social norms and to consume anything and everything from objects to 5 
 
sensations and experiences. I found that the shifting qualities of spectatorship are linked 
to the consumerist imperative and the evolving influence of mediatisation. Thus, I argue 
there is a need to address both spectacle and spectatorship in the consumerist and 
globalised context for contemporary media audiences. As my research progressed, I also 
began to understand that linked to the moral panic expressed by audiences associated 
with each event, were the objectification and subjectification processes of both the 
spectator and the individuals directly involved in the events.
2 Thus, this dissertation 
became not only concerned with the investigation of these three social events 
specifically but also with the very nature of the subject and of spectacle in the twenty-
first century.
3
 
 
Paul Levinson identifies ‘old media’ as print, radio and television, ‘new media’ as the 
Internet and ‘new new media’ as the types of recent technology that not only provides 
information but is a vehicle for the production of information by the user (2009: 1). 
Levinson also points out that many technologies defined as new new media were not 
available five years ago, which is particularly relevant considering that the case studies 
are based on events that took place five or more years ago. Throughout the dissertation, 
I refer to old media and new media only in order to avoid confusion for the reader and 
to acknowledge that many of the social networking devices that are so influential today 
were only beginning to be used at the time these events occurred. However, it is as 
equally important to point out that the predecessor of what might be known as ‘Twitter’ 
today, and other social media devices, was at the time of the case studies, the weblog 
(blog). I was continually faced with a prolific number of blogs, a wide spectrum of uses 
                                                           
2 While I note the complexity of these issues I refer to the objectification and subjectification processes that determine how a person 
might be considered a socially acceptable subject or equally, rendered as an object. 
3 It is important to note that the terms ‘performance’ and ‘spectacle’ are not treated in this dissertation as interchangeable but are 
rather considered as highly significant notions within cultural and social theory. Both terms are recognised as containing potent and 
contested meanings that are extremely useful in this context. 6 
 
(with diverse backgrounds) and content that fluctuated between deliberately 
confrontational messages and engaging critical debate. Thus, I felt it was imperative to 
include as much of these commentaries as research as was possible. This is because not 
only did they provide key information about the cases but the blogs and their users were 
emblematic of the evolving nature of the spectatorship in the construction of modern 
media spectacle. At the conclusion of the dissertation, I bring the notion of moral panic 
up to date in relation to new new media.  
 
In gathering information regarding the conditions of each event, I examined 
predominantly information from the media, including national and international 
periodicals (magazine and newspaper feature articles, editorials and letters to the 
editor), transcripts of Australian radio programs, and webcasts of Australian and 
international television programs.
4
 
 Newspapers evidenced were the Gold Coast Bulletin 
(Queensland), Sunday Mail (Queensland), Courier Mail (Queensland), West Australian 
(Western Australia), Sunday Times (Western Australia), Herald Sun (Victoria), Daily 
Telegraph (New South Wales) and Sun-Herald (New South Wales) in the tabloid 
format, while newspapers such as The Australian (New South Wales), Sydney Morning 
Herald (New South Wales) and The Age (Victoria) are in the broadsheet format. With 
both formats come different readerships influenced by class, gender, age and other 
demographic factors.  
                                                           
4 The majority of media material was accessed via the Factiva full text electronic database. 7 
 
Supplementary material was located on the Internet.
5 They included court proceedings, 
medical and coronial reports, parliamentary discourse, legislation, and published 
speeches by both politicians and interest groups. Other forms of commentary included 
popular biographies of key figures by journalists or autobiographies by the individuals 
themselves. However, as already mentioned, the main sources of internet commentaries 
were cyber conversations among ‘ordinary people’ on weblogs (hereafter ‘blogs’) and 
websites.
6
 
 It is important to note here that I draw from sources that might be considered 
shock-jock journalism with sensationalist and opinionated perspectives alongside 
critically informed engagements of each of the events presented in this dissertation. It is 
not that I do not differentiate between the two but rather that these divergent 
commentaries are in fact diverse sources enabling me to unpack the extent of the moral 
panic in each instance. These sources are interwoven throughout the case studies as 
spectatorial responses to the events and in the performance text as dialogue. In reference 
to the theoretical framing of the dissertation, I drew from disciplines including 
sociology, cultural studies, media studies, gender studies, philosophy, history and of 
course, performance studies.  
Chapter one is a theoretical overview contextualising the mediatised and technologised 
landscape of the twenty-first century; I locate the three case studies within this context 
and the major theoretical points for the overall analysis. The contemporary phenomenon 
of the mass media means that not only is the media intricately linked to the performance 
                                                           
5 The Internet can be traced back to studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) that suggested a network of 
computers could advance simultaneous communication. This proposal was taken up by the United States military investigating the 
potential for this kind of interaction in the event of an atomic attack. From here, the science industries joined the military in 
exploring the possibilities for enormous data collection, as well as advanced communication. What followed was the involvement of 
private enterprise and the Internet was launched by the mid nineteen-eighties. In the late twentieth and early twenty first centuries 
the Internet has become an integral and dynamic information network for most late capitalist Western societies.  
 
6 There was no restricted time frame to the year of publication; anything that seemed of relevance to the case studies was included in 
data collection. Throughout the dissertation, the information from such sources as blogs and letters to the editor is reproduced in the 
original format including capitalisation and spelling. 8 
 
of spectacle and spectatorship, but linked to the creation and proliferation of a moral 
panic.
7
 
 The media continually negotiate subject formation, spectatorship, discursive 
truths and power relations. Media organisations and media technologies are inseparable 
from the contemporary “performative society” (Kershaw 2003: 595), in terms of the 
consumption of sensations, subject formation and the social event as performance. 
Therefore, chapter one explores the nature of moral panic, and the role of the spectator 
and mediatised spectacle in responding to and sustaining this moral panic. I find that 
Michel Foucault’s work on discourse and power is particularly useful in unpacking the 
significance of mediatised performance events and the effect on individual and 
collective spectatorship. In this sense, I understand power to be informed by culturally 
encoded discourse, which as a body of knowledge, enables how we act, think, speak and 
understand things to be true (Foucault 1980). Thus, intricate networks of knowledge, 
discourse, power and mediated representations of truth are at work in each of these 
social events.  
Foucault’s work often involved the exploration of certain fears regarding difference – 
whether concerning the body, criminality, sexuality, or difference of any kind – and it is 
this point that I find particularly useful in explicating the notion of moral panic and how 
it might be made manifest. In chapter one, I discuss the notion of discourse and power 
and briefly explore the reasons why I apply three Foucauldian concepts of the 
‘panopticon’, ‘biopower’ and ‘heterotopia’ to the case studies. I conclude the chapter 
with further questions to be addressed throughout the dissertation on the nature of 
subjectification and objectification evident in all the cases. 
 
                                                           
7 Whilst I note that media discourse might operate within organisations, institutions and technologies, the ‘media’ are not to be 
misunderstood as a homogeneous entity. 9 
 
In chapter two, the first case study, I apply the notion of the panopticon to the 
representation of Schapelle Corby. I explore how the figure of Corby is influenced by 
the surveillance of the media and public and inscribed by discourses of consumerism, 
gender, race and sexuality. I argue that this continual surveillance results in a spectacle 
that surrounds her: where the notion of surveillance and spectacle coexist. However, I 
question the success of this surveillance-as-spectacle by suggesting that Corby is 
capable of moving beyond the position of the subjugated object by deliberately 
manipulating her image, dress and behaviour. The question becomes how effective or 
sustained is Corby’s pursuit of agency. 
 
In chapter three, I examine the Terri Schiavo case in relation to Foucault’s notion of 
‘biopower’ (1980). The chapter explores mediatised statements, opinion pieces, and 
interest groups in their regulation of the ‘truth’ in relation to debates surrounding the 
right to life/death movements, specifically in the USA. This chapter draws upon the 
understanding that biopower is an institutional and discursive form of discipline 
surrounding the regulation and control of populations, of the subject and the value of 
life. In reference to the notion of biopower, Brad Evans suggests that: “the biopolitical 
specifically referred to the political strategization/technologization of life for its own 
productive betterment” (2010: 415). My argument is that the mediated representation of 
Schiavo, and what she came to mean for so many, overtook the situation of the actual 
incapacitated subject herself. Drawing from the work of Giorgio Agamben, I also argue 
that the discourse of biopower can lead to the celebration of some lives in opposition to 
the “states of exception” that render others as ‘bare life’ (1998: 159). Ultimately, the 
Schiavo case reveals the ambiguity of the subject/object relationship and the ubiquitous 10 
 
nature of biopower as a system regulating the value of the subject in the new 
millennium. 
 
In chapter four, I explore the Redfern riots in relation to the representation of the Other 
as criminal and animalistic. Importantly, I understand that the mediatised construction 
that occurred in the days after the riots might have led to an overshadowing of the 
causes of the unrest that took place in the inner city suburb of Sydney in 2004. 
However, while the riots can be read as a space of disruption, they can also be 
interpreted as an opportunity for the transgression of normative social order. A key 
concept for understanding this transgression is heterotopia – sites, events and situations 
that are liminal and ambiguous – as originally formulated by Foucault. Teresa Davis 
argues that: “Heterotopias have a mirror-like quality of reflecting, yet refracting, 
distorting and inverting images of space and time. It is utopian, yet questioning of the 
very utopia it reflects, reflecting both what are real places and what are imagined ones” 
(2010: 663). The riots’ contravention of social normativity and what I refer to as a 
‘memorial of graffiti’, inspired a temporary but subversive heterotopic space where both 
real and imagined space were inverted and thus highlighted. Heterotopia is a useful 
concept for examining the tension between resistance and dispossession in reference to 
the issues surrounding the Redfern riots. 
 
Chapters five and six explore the performative retelling of the three unique events. 
Chapter five, the performance, Three Interrupted Lives, is an original work utilising 
verbatim text and fictional dialogue. In one way, I endeavour to encourage a nuanced 
response to the events as opposed to a replication of the polarised judgements that 
existed for many spectators in the context of the original moral panic. In another way, as 11 
 
I endeavour to represent moral panic itself, this polarisation of opinion needs to be 
present in the performance. Ultimately, the performance piece is concerned with the 
relationship between the performance and the spectator and with fleshing out the 
potential meaning of spectacle and spectatorship in the actual live performance event. 
Chapter six explores the function of performance as a form of social commentary by 
analysing relevant performance practitioners and performance theory in relation to 
particular choices in my writing and the risks taken in a performative representation of 
real life events. Following Diana Taylor’s assertion that performance is an “ontological 
affirmation” (2003: 3) of the act itself and Baz Kershaw’s description of contemporary 
performance as a “spectacle of deconstruction” (2003: 595), I argue that Three 
Interrupted Lives is an attempt at a meaningful expression of spectacle, moral panic, 
and mediatisation in the contemporary global arena. 
 
It is important to realise that these cases studies were significant events at a particular 
point in (recent) history, shaped by specific social, political and historical conditions 
that indicated a much larger machination of discourse, power and normativity. Keeping 
these unique circumstances in mind, it becomes possible to investigate how 
spectatorship, spectacle and moral panic operate today. Thus, the conclusion to the 
dissertation is also a commentary on the technologies available since these events took 
place. I explore the changing media and technological landscape, particularly in 
reference to new new media, and question the impact of these evolving devices, 
networks and processes on the creation and propagation of moral panic.  
 
 12 
 
Conclusions 
I examine how an event can generate particular responses, the social and political issues 
that these responses raise and the nature of mediatisation, spectatorship, spectacle and 
subjectification in the twenty-first century. I explore how each component of these three 
events is interconnected – both producing and reinforcing discursive truths that reflect 
the larger machinations of society. I also ask what performance as a creative mode of 
critical inquiry can contribute to furthering this investigation. Such questions involve 
exploring the role of normalising strategies in the matrices of discourse and power, as 
well as fleshing out how moral panic is propagated within this context. In the 
postmodern instance where there is often no clear or absolute distinction between 
spectator and performer – where the spectator is increasingly actively engaged in the 
social phenomena they observe – I attempt to tease out the notions of subjectification 
and objectification and the nature of agency. Ultimately, I ask questions about how 
social performance is manifested in the Western globalised zeitgeist. 
 13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
…the world is being challenged forth to perform – or else 
(McKenzie 2001: 158). 
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Chapter one: The social event as performance 
The task of this chapter is to demonstrate that spectatorship and spectacle are at times 
intertwined and this along with certain particular discursive conditions can manifest and 
facilitate moral panic. Contemporary mediatised spectacles that lead to moral panic are, 
in fact, microcosms of social normativity believed to be under threat because of the 
prevailing discursive conditions at the time. In this chapter I examine the key issues 
explored in the case studies, particularly the nature of a moral panic, by paying 
particular attention to the characteristics and function of the spectator in social 
performance, the consumption of an event (including the role of old and new media), 
and the nature of spectacle. I also explore important theories relevant to the specific 
analysis of moral panic in the instance of these three social events.  Ultimately, I ask the 
‘what’, ‘how’ and ‘why’ of mediatised social events and examine how possible social, 
political and historical conditions might contribute to the eruption of a moral panic.  
 
Picturing the landscape 
To examine the specifics of mediatised social events and the energised responses to 
them, I need to understand the evolving landscape from which the cases in question 
emerged and were supported. Thus, I must also explore the shifting and developing 
nature of subjectivity and spectatorship within this terrain. Zygmunt Bauman might 
question the capacity for the liquid modern subject to engage meaningfully through 
virtual proximity (2003: 63), however I argue that these events share an engaged and 
active spectatorship and through spectatorial observation and active participation, the 
events are transformed into a type of mediatised spectacle. Secondly, this spectacle 
produces a moral panic provoked by the relationship among the mainstream news 
media, new media and the spectator. Finally, the spectacle is in return sustained by the 15 
 
level of intervention of the spectator and the influence of the moral panic. Thus, I 
explore the manifestation of these three social events to gain a greater understanding of 
larger issues concerning contemporary spectatorship and spectacle.  
 
The contemporary global mass media is an identity-forming device, as well as a 
commercial commodity and communication medium. In this landscape, ‘reality’ is often 
positioned as spectacle, performed and consumed in a range of forms, including 
sensationalist film, television programs and Internet commentaries regarding the 
notoriety of celebrities and their lives. Mediatisation is also political where battles of 
both an ideological and a literal nature are waged in front of audiences influenced by, 
and participating in, a global exchange of information. The mass media, cyberspace and 
associated technologies are a necessary component of determining and maintaining 
power structures. However, the same vehicles that encourage political transparency can 
also be vehicles for the silencing of knowledge.
8
                                                           
8 Please note the challenge of the Internet organisation ‘Google’ to the Chinese government regarding their stringent censorship 
regulations in early 2010. Ultimately, in order to continue to operate in the Chinese market, Google relented to the censorship rules 
and allowed the Chinese government to continue to regulate online information that it considered sensitive. 
 Matrices of power (anywhere and 
everywhere) are intertwined with the ever evolving global mass media and associated 
technologies and both agency and the suppression of agency are located within this 
landscape. Globalisation and the consumerist culture have meant that the advent of new 
new media is enmeshed with identity and community formation. As Bauman contends: 
“the brute unquestionable fact is that one needs to be consumer first, before one can 
think of becoming anything in particular” (2001: 315). The intersection of the nature of 
power, the mass media as a communicative form of representation of this power and the 
processes of subjectification that occur within this mediatised dynamic are critical 
questions for this dissertation.  16 
 
Along with innovations in digital technology, the age of information is truly an era for 
mediatised and mediated technologies, where an individual’s reality can almost be 
produced and reproduced via new new media and social networking devices. The digital 
world is a fluid, ever evolving and transient place where identities and communities are 
formed. Continual innovations in technology have a direct impact on the nature of 
subjectivity, agency and, as I will argue, spectatorship. Tizianna Terranova suggests 
that: “[Every] cultural production or formation, any production of meaning, that is, is 
increasingly inseparable from the wider informational process that determine the spread 
of images and words, sounds and affects across a hyperconnected planet” (2004: 2). 
Meaning itself and the technologies and systems enabling meaning to be produced and 
received are increasingly hybrid, dispersed and ubiquitous. Similarly, cyber culture 
needs to be understood as heterogeneous and transitory, as does the make-up of identity 
formation and subjectivity within this terrain.  
 
If an individual asserts his or her unique social and cultural specificities through such 
media, these technologies are intricately involved in the subjectification process in 
identity formation. It is as though the user of new media becomes ‘somebody’ through 
his or her engagement with these technologically mediated processes and thus also 
becomes a critical cog in the ‘mass’ machine. The subject responding to an event uses 
the event to individualise themselves, thus making and remaking themselves in a quasi-
ontological process. The ‘mass’ of mass media facilitates the construction of networks 
and the building of communities. In other words, an individual is not only called into a 
particular kind of ‘being’ through their engagement with these media, but also in 
relation to others responding to these events. In addition to the formation of collectives 17 
 
hegemony can exist in the ‘mass’ of mass mediatisation.
 9
 
 By this I mean that as the 
contemporary subject, and their communities, are constituted in and through such 
transitory technologies and processes so too does the digital world form its own type of 
hegemony. This interconnected relationship between subject formation, community 
creation and the hegemony of the mass media is integral to understanding how moral 
panics can exist today.  
John Urry addresses the nature of mobility and human interaction in an environment of 
globalisation and virtual proximity when he argues:  
[all] forms of social life involve striking combinations of proximity and distance, 
combinations that necessitate examination of the intersecting forms of physical, 
object, imaginative and virtual mobility that contingently and complexly link 
people in patterns of obligation, desire and commitment, increasingly over 
geographical distances of great length (2002: 256). 
I found all three cases to be situated within a mediatised environment enabling this play 
between proximity and mobility for the contemporary media spectator. In turn, this 
relationship between proximity and mobility helps to create spectacle and facilitate 
moral panic. Thus, the media spectator, in his or her particular form of spectatorship 
aids in the constitution and maintenance of both spectacle and moral panic. The creation 
of spectatorship and readership and how perceptions of a deviation of social norms are 
created need to be addressed in all forms, including the occasions where mobility and 
proximity are questioned. In this sense, it also becomes important to examine 
spectatorship in relation to identity formation and the construction of communities. In 
addition, by exploring an ever evolving spectatorship, a fractious moral panic and the 
                                                           
9 An interesting point comes when the transient individual constituted through their particular responses to an event, and through 
these technologies engages and responds to an event, is also then manifestly involved in creating and sustaining a form of 
hegemony. This is a complex tension that I think exists in a moral panic and one which can be evidenced throughout the case 
studies; that individuals exist within and outside the transient space of new media as well as helping the mass media to exist as 
hegemony.  18 
 
complexities of subjectivity within the changing technologised world, I argue that I am 
also examining contemporary understandings of performance. As Kershaw elucidates: 
When mediatization is coupled to liberal democracy, and to a late-capitalism that 
insinuates the market at the heart of the social, performance becomes both 
ubiquitous and spectacular: politicians perform, shares perform, life-styles 
perform for each other in the streets as well as on the screens (2003: 605). 
If everything is performed and every choice is a performance, we have everything to 
gain from trying to understand these enactments. The nature of spectatorship – which is 
forever adapting to the changing mediated landscape – the conditions of subjectivity and 
the processes of subjectification are located within the performances of the 
contemporary mediated and technologised milieu.  
 
Neoliberalism, choice and the moral absolute 
As the current economic and cultural landscape is determined largely through the 
proliferation of globalisation, it is critical that these three particular events are situated 
within this context. I define globalisation as the cultural, economic and technological 
expansion of hybrid interconnected global networks. Because of the divergence in life 
experiences within these networks, globalisation will have as many negative outcomes 
as it does positive ones and is therefore too difficult a phenomenon to declare succinctly 
as either good or bad. It is, nevertheless, a concept I utilise in addressing the economic 
and consumerist landscape of the early twenty-first century. Throughout this chapter, I 
use the term ‘neoliberalism’, which fundamentally positions most of the Western world 
as determined by a market-driven imperative that favours a consumerist desire over 
social benefit or need. 
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Daniel C. Hallin argues that the past few decades have seen the incorporation of social 
systems into the marketplace and suggests that the “mass media are among the most 
important of those social institutions which have been subject to ‘enclosure’ by the logic 
of the market in the Age of Neoliberalism” (2008: 43). According to Hallin, twentieth-
century Western media bodies were influenced by social forces, such as political 
enterprise, trade unionism, and religion leading to a strong integration with the 
community (2008: 44). In the wake of neoliberalism, these systems became influenced 
by the marketplace – often juggling the dual role of objective commentator with an 
awareness of the influence of consumerism. The traditional role of old media as the 
bastion of the news now exists alongside the pseudo-journalism of the online blog and 
social networking devices. This type of commentary can often be emotive, opinion-
based and aligned to political and/or religious factions. Thus, the mass media involve 
professional and amateur journalism that is both heavily reliant on the readership of 
their audience and the dynamics of the marketplace. The presence of both undoubtedly 
has an impact on the creation and sustaining of media-induced spectacles, as well as the 
changing nature and role of the contemporary media spectator who is no longer 
principally the observer of news but actively engaged with the production of it.  
 
When Bauman argues that “[Ours] is a consumer society” (2001: 311), he is referring to 
the notion that Western society depends on its members being consumers and “first and 
foremost gatherers of sensations: they are the collectors of things only in a secondary 
and derivative sense” (1998: 83). ‘We’ are not only the collectors of things, but of lives, 
experiences and of course consumers of sensation. Globalisation has contributed 
enormously to this dependence on a transient consumerism. The perpetual new-ness of 
new media plays into understandings of identity formation and human connectivity 20 
 
through notions of hybridity, pluralism and fluidity. On the level of social performance, 
our televisions, webcams and Twitter pages continually create and reinforce the 
performance of both the extraordinary and the mundane. Thus, there is an 
interconnection between the consumption of sensations and liquid modernity. Bauman 
suggests that: 
Today’s industry is geared increasingly to the production of attractions and 
temptations. And it is in the nature of attractions that they tempt and seduce only 
as long as they beckon from that far-away which we call the future, while 
temptation cannot survive for long the surrender of the tempted – just as desire 
never survives satisfaction (1998: 78). 
The market-place is not interested in a finite meeting of need but in the continuation and 
furthering of consumption. The very consumption of this desire is evident in each of 
these instances of moral panic. For Corby, there is a desire to consume her presumed 
‘innocence’ as a white, heterosexual woman. In the Schiavo case the moral panic 
existed through the consumption of a spectacle that continually questioned the limits of 
an individual’s life and liberty. The Redfern riots involved the consumption of 
Otherness. Ultimately, all three cases involved the intricately related desire for, and 
consumption of, fear. This is a point that I believe is inherent in any example of a moral 
panic.  
 
The relationship between desire and consumption is also linked to the means in which a 
moral panic is created and sustained. In these cases it is through the technologies of old 
and new media. What does the ‘new’ of new media mean? Is it the technology that 
makes it new or is it that the word ‘new’ gives an edge to a product that consumers 
deem desirable? Kelli Fuery contends that the ‘new’ in new media is not only reflective 
of innovations in technology but also that the consumer wants to be sold something that 
is indicative of a sense of the unknown, of something they have never seen or had 21 
 
before. Fuery argues: “Who speaks for whom? Who is New Media ‘new’ for? Invested 
in these questions is the search for the means by which we, as subjects, are managed and 
controlled by power relations – for truth” (2009: 7-8). Contestations over truth 
formations are imperative to each case study and overall, to mediatised spectacle and 
moral panic in general. What happens when new media is attached to an aesthetic 
sensibility? Is this kind of creative practice remade as inherently more dynamic and 
meaningful because of its association with new-ness? If the ideological and discursive 
origins of these technologies are to be understood, these become necessary questions. I 
argue that this questioning involves an examination of the very nature of the user and 
thus of contemporary spectatorship.  
 
Truth, power and discursive functions existing throughout the interweaving exchanges 
between event and spectator are critical points for examination throughout this 
dissertation. Conceptually they are also instrumental in unpacking contemporary 
mediatised spectacles and other forms of mediated performance. Fuery contends that, 
“[In] our contemporary visual culture of new media we witness what can be called a 
sublime attraction to images – we are both repulsed and compelled by them as they 
form part of us, we form part of them” (2009: 112). For Fuery, the contemporary 
obsession with visual culture and new media – or contemporary mediated social 
performances as I would situate them – is a ‘scopophilic’ gaze. In common with many 
cultural and media theorists, she utilises psychoanalysis, particularly in relation to the 
distinction between looking and browsing social phenomena. Although this distinction 
is interesting and no doubt very useful, I am more concerned with the relationship 
between the looking subject and looked-upon object, rather than with applying a 
psychoanalytic method to this analysis. I would like to add that this notion of the 
looking subject and the looked-upon object is inextricably linked to the visual culture 22 
 
enmeshed with mediatisation and thus also, the constitution of contemporary moral 
panics. Questions I might ask of the subject/object relationship in this context might 
include the following: Does the object – in this sense the event and the subjects within 
the event – change in the process of being looked at? Does the subjectivity of the 
spectator – the one looking – change in the process of looking and does s/he 
inadvertently become a performer? What is at play in the negotiation of real and non-
real and of looking and being looked at? I refer throughout this dissertation to the active 
spectator. This individual is directly engaged with the event by responding to it through 
old and new media and thus, instrumental in the continuation of the spectacle and the 
mobilisation of moral panic. As these events examined were on the cusp of what 
Levinson refers to as new new media (cyber technologies involving social networking), 
which are so prolific today, the nature of spectatorship must therefore be understood to 
shift again. In reference to an early form of reality television Jean Baudrillard explains 
that:  
In this ‘truth’ experiment, it is neither a question of secrecy nor of perversion, 
but of a kind of thrill of the real, or of an aesthetics of the hyperreal, a thrill of 
vertiginous and phony exactitude, a thrill of alienation and of magnification, of 
distortion in scale, of excessive transparency all at the same time (1983: 50).  
It could be argued that a “truth experiment” is also the case of the scopophilic 
consumer, an intensity of observation integral to the contemporary mass media, and the 
notion of the ‘hyperreal’ in postmodernity. I argue that the intense love of looking that 
is prevalent in the Western culture of consumerism (assisted by the global mass media) 
has produced an ambiguous interactivity between subject and object. The spectator is 
actively involved in the communication and representation of whatever it is they are 
interacting with and, as a result, they, and sometimes the object of the gaze, are 
changed. The voyeurism that comes with scopophilia is a kind of hyperreal exchange 
through the pleasure and pain of observing anything from banality to extremes of 23 
 
suffering and/or ecstasy. Baudrillard argues that: “What society seeks through 
production, and overproduction, is the restoration of the real which escapes it” (1983: 
44). Consumerism and voyeurism, coupled with the interactivity of new media, cyber 
technologies/cyber communities, along with the rest of the global mass media 
(television, print, radio etc.), have led to an evolving and ambiguous terrain where the 
‘real’ is continually questioned. Thus, spectatorship, subjectification and the 
implications of social phenomena in this context need to be unpacked.  
 
Limitless choice and the relative mobility of capital can provoke action without thought 
or regard for the real consequences of these decisions. Bauman suggests that there was 
a transformation from pre-modern times (where religion provided moral guidance), to 
modernity (where a set of rules regulated moral and ethical behaviour), and to a post-
modernity (where uncertainty is the only certainty). He argues that: “Moral life is a life 
of continuous uncertainty” (Bauman 1995: 3). Is there a role for morality if postmodern 
uncertainty is directly influenced by an excess of choice? Clearly, most choices made in 
the commercial sense are not of the moral kind nor, in a world of endless choice, is this 
situation the experience of more than a privileged few. However, what happens when, 
within this Western landscape of unlimited choice, individuals and communities make 
concrete moral demands? What happens when excessive consumption and the diffusive 
and fluid landscape of cyber connectivity actually encourages moral absolutism? This is 
where I locate the social phenomenon of a moral panic in relation to these case studies. 
 
Bauman also makes it clear that there is an “uncertainty and ambient fear that saturate 
contemporary life” and that “the maintenance of a steady volume of anxiety and 
apprehension turns into a major and indispensable factor in the self-reproduction of 24 
 
political and economic institutions” (1998: 130). It is my argument that anxiety exists at 
any given time in contemporary society, which is indelibly linked to the consumption of 
sensations, the endless fascination with things/people/events, and the love of looking. 
However, at certain times and in certain places, the interchange of media and 
technology within an interconnected discursive field leads to a particular kind of ‘social 
anxiety’. This social phenomenon occurs, when the interconnected matrix of spectator 
and spectacle, continually responding and informing each other, leads to a perception 
that social normativity is under threat. The next section of this chapter will explore 
further the nature of a moral panic in this context. 
 
Moral panic: A discursive negotiation 
E. Ann Kaplan argues that contemporary media audiences have three forms of response 
to trauma (2008: 3-24). The first is what she refers to as a “vicarious trauma”, where the 
audience becomes temporarily stimulated by the event. The second is an “empty 
empathy”, where the spectator is unable to be moved by the event at all (Kaplan 2008: 
4). The third response is where the event stimulates the spectator to become a witness to 
the event: to be ethically motivated to respond and resolve the trauma (Kaplan 2008: 4). 
Kaplan writes that the global mass media provide a continual stream of information 
about the horrors of war, terror and catastrophe: “images of trauma bombard us daily” 
(2008: 3). She goes on to question what the impact of this might be: “[If] it is true that 
we are surrounded by spectacles of individual suffering, what effect is this having on 
the millions of people consuming these images” (2008: 4). I argue that one such effect is 
the construction of a moral panic. 
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The notion of a moral panic is the most significant element in reading these particular 
social events as performance. Another concept particularly useful, and stemming from 
moral panic theory in this instance, is the term ‘social anxiety’. Social anxiety is a 
recognised term for a psychological condition, sometimes also known as social phobia 
or moral panic disorder, whereby the sufferer can experience extreme (cognitive, 
physiological and behavioural) distress, to various degrees, in social situations: “Social 
anxiety is a specific form of stress centering on social situations” (Reilly and Rudd, 
2009: 227). I recognise that surrounding the term ‘social anxiety’ is a large body of 
work, including studies associated with trauma studies, psychology, psychoanalysis, 
political, social and cultural theory. It is critical that I point out that I am not using the 
term ‘social anxiety’ as a psychological condition but rather through creative license 
analyse the ‘anxieties’ of spectators at a particular point in time responding to specific 
circumstances of a unique spectacle.  
 
I have borrowed the exact terminology – ‘social anxiety’ – from a quotation by Chas 
Critcher: “a central issue for moral panic analysis is why the public apparently exhibits 
a predisposition to panic. The answer given is social anxiety” (2003: 147, italics added). 
In reference to Critcher’s quote, the concept ‘social anxiety is used as a departure point 
only. Certain factors regarding community concern, hostility, community consensus, 
dis-proportionality and volatility are considered critical elements in identifying a moral 
panic and to varying degrees were apparent in each event.
10
                                                           
10 For more information regarding moral panic theory, see: (Critcher 2003), (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994) and (Cohen 1980). For 
interesting and more recent commentaries on fear and panic as a social phenomenon see: (Pile and Keith 1997), (Johansson 2000) 
and (Bauman 2006). 
 However, moral panic 
theory often requires a systematic and structured approach to its analysis and the events 
in question did not entirely meet this formulation. In this sense, as I am not conducting a 
thorough sociological analysis of the events in order to ascertain whether each were 26 
 
truly indicative of a moral panic it is best to only acknowledge that they have certain 
characteristics of a moral panic. What is useful in the term ‘social anxiety’ is the sense 
of a general unease in society relating to the issues to what might have been at some 
stage a frantic moral panic or perhaps of one to come. It is this perception of a deviation 
from social normativity that is inherent in a moral panic, and how I understand ‘social 
anxiety’ to mean in this context. Thus, ‘social anxiety’ or moral panic is quite obviously 
not common to all social events but rather is something that I interpret as being shared 
by these three particular events. In reference to the cultural context of moral panic, John 
Springhall argues: 
The role of individuals, pressure groups and bureaucratic agencies, often 
involved in a complex and shifting pattern of alliances, supports interest group 
interpretations of ‘moral panics’ and social crusades, but only within an 
historical climate of underlying fears and social anxiety (1998: 3). 
Increasingly used to describe many social phenomena whereby a community is 
propelled into debate surrounding a social or moral issue, mediatised moral panics are 
as varied as they are complex. Angela McRobbie and Sarah L. Thorton argue: “[Used] 
by politicians to orchestrate consent, by business to promote sales in certain niche 
markets, and by media to make home and social affairs newsworthy, moral panics are 
constructed on a daily basis” (1995: 560). Rather than understanding a moral panic as 
either an individual experience or socially measurable phenomenon, I understand it to 
be a discursive negotiation between the event and its spectatorship manifesting at any 
level of society but largely proliferated by the global mass media. A moral panic is 
created when the representation of an event and the subjects within it are interpreted as 
somehow dangerous to the moral and social order. Therefore, a moral panic is 
completely and inevitably a product of discourse and power. This final point is 
fundamental to the theoretical framework of each case study. 
 27 
 
Foucault suggests that the role of theory is not to be considered as a ‘system’ but rather 
as an ‘instrument’: “a logic of the specificity of power relations and the struggles around 
them” (1980: 145). The study of discourse as theory and the related institutions and 
techniques of power are fundamental to the exploration of the social and political 
conditions surrounding the creation and proliferation of moral panic in these three 
particular cases. Following Foucault, I understand discourse to exist in multiple forms – 
developing and regulating knowledge by influencing and informing the subject. 
Foucault refers to discourse as “practices that systematically form the objects of which 
they speak” (1972: 49). What we say, the conditions that enable us to speak and the 
impacts of our statements exist within a discursive field that is contextual, contingent 
and determined by socio-historical factors.  
 
Discourse is also productive: it helps shape how a subject behaves, understands 
themselves and how they form communities. The speaking, moving, representational 
subject of Schapelle Corby, the group of subjects that formed the ‘rioters’ and the 
incapacitated body of Terri Schiavo are produced and maintained by an interconnection 
of discourses. Likewise, the active spectators to these events are also discursively 
constructed. This argument suggests that everyone is surrounded and informed by 
discourse. Riki Wilchins succinctly writes that discourse is “a discussion that society 
has with itself” (2004: 59). These three events are emblematic of the notion that 
discourse is a dialogue that society has with its own systems, rules and truths.
11
 
 
Discourse is both the source and the product of a moral panic.   
                                                           
11 The term ‘society’ is used here in direct reference to the Wilchins’ quotation and not as a categorical summation of what ‘society’ 
is or pertains to be. With regard to the social events, it is problematic to define ‘society’ particularly in relation to the fact that 
audiences to each event were widely diverse and dispersed. 28 
 
The primary discourse in each case is that of the media. Media discourse is 
heterogeneous in the dispersal of information and systems of social categorisation 
through diverse institutions, organisations and technologies. For example, a tabloid 
magazine will present information differently from a scientific journal and again 
differently from a television news program. In this sense, discourse is knowledge and 
knowledge is filtered through divergent and yet interconnected systems. In this 
communication process, knowledge can be interpreted as truth, particularly in the news. 
This knowledge-as-truth is an extremely important element of the normalising process 
of discourse and is therefore, crucial to the examination of the events. A significant 
amount of material regarding this knowledge-as-truth has been sourced from new media 
and communication technologies.
 12 As outlined in the introduction, I utilise blogs, 
which raise interesting questions about the notion of truth in relation to online networks 
as sites for a fluid transference of information between bloggers/commentators and the 
role of blogs in creating online communities.
13
 
 I examine discourse and power relating 
to the production, representation and reception of a contested truth-as-knowledge and 
the notion of the subject formed and informed by this truth formation, within the global 
mass media environment. 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri argue that divisions in power and labour operate in 
hierarchies largely because of shifting and often inequitable matrices of economic 
growth, development and globalisation: “global divisions are the results and the objects 
of power struggles” (2004: 165). Just as discourse and power exist together in a 
complex interplay of knowledge formation on a global level, so too does a hierarchical 
                                                           
12 For an interesting examination of information and communication technologies such as blogs, contemporary new media theorists 
and ‘social networking’ see: (Hui Kyong Chun and Keenan 2006), (Giannachi 2007), (Fuery 2009) and (Levinson 2009). 
13 The question concerning online communities and identity formation through new media technologies raises a similar question: 
what role does the blogger play in extending the moral panic when they join a like-minded social collective? I address such 
questions throughout the dissertation. 29 
 
matrix of power and discourse operate specifically within these social events. Each of 
the case studies illustrates examples where many discourses interact. However, at 
certain times one discourse will assume a hierarchy over the others (such as discourses 
of media, race, gender, class, sexuality, religion, science, legal, political and 
consumerism). What is interesting to examine is how, when and why hierarchies shift 
and certain discourses take precedence over others. 
 
According to Foucault, multiple discourses interact with and inform one another in a 
process referred to as “discursive formations” (1972: 31-41). Thus, legal discourse 
might intersect with racial discourse, or media discourse with sexuality, and so on. As 
Foucault clearly argues, “we must not imagine a world of discourse divided between 
accepted discourse and excluded discourse … but as a multiplicity of discursive 
elements that can come into play in various strategies” (1980: 100). Together, the 
hierarchy and interplay of discourse build an interconnected network of knowledge, 
truths and power relations. 
 
Discourse is knowledge understood as truth. What is interesting about examining these 
events and the resulting moral panic is how discourse as truth comes to be understood. 
Foucault contends that: 
I do not question discourse about their silently intended meanings, but about the 
fact and the conditions of their manifest appearance; not about the content which 
may conceal, but about the transformations which have effected; not about the 
sense preserved within them like a perpetual origin, but about the field where 
they coexist, reside and disappear (1991 (1978): 60). 
Discourse is not an innate truth waiting to be revealed. Rather, it is inside, throughout 
and all around each enactment and statement. In this sense, I explore the conditions that 30 
 
enable a discourse to be normalised into a truth formation. I am interested in what and 
how truths are produced, proliferated, represented and most importantly normalised, as 
Foucault contends: “[We] are subjected to the production of truth through power and we 
cannot exercise power except through the production of truth” (1980: 93). A moral 
panic is the result of a perceived threat to normalised discourse. To explore the 
discursive conditions of moral panics is also to explore the make-up of spectatorship 
and spectacle, without which this ‘social anxiety’, in this context, would not or could 
not exist. Thus, throughout the dissertation I investigate what discourses are at play at 
what stage and for what reason. These discursive conditions are bound up with notions 
of power.  
 
Power, like discourse, helps form the subjects at the core of each event and the 
spectator’s response, because as Foucault argues: “[In] a society such as ours, but 
basically in any society, there are manifold relations of power which permeate, 
characterize and constitute the social body” (1980: 93). Likewise, power is instrumental 
in the construction of both the elements that make a moral panic and the notion of 
‘social anxiety’ in the context of these case studies. Both the strategies of discourse and 
power are not only fundamental to these events, but also to the nature of subject 
formation and the operations of society in general. According to Foucault, this is 
because: “the phenomenon of the social body is the effect not of a consensus but of the 
materiality of power operating on the very bodies of individuals” (1980: 55). In this 
context, the enunciation of power is critical to understanding the everyday performance 
of discourse and the ways in which power is inscribed on the bodies – both physical and 
social – of the participating subjects.  
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Examining power is not only about investigating dominant power structures but also 
about exploring the ways in which power produces subjects, how it operates, whom it 
sustains and how it is made manifest. Foucault argues that power “needs to be 
considered as a productive network that runs through the whole social body, much more 
than as a negative instance whose function is repression” (2000: 120). In this sense, it is 
extremely important to emphasise that power is not only the exertion of control of one 
subject over another but rather the many power relations that exist in society and in the 
constitution of the subject. Vikki Bell suggests that the subject is trained to behave in a 
particular way and that “the folding of power into the body is therefore and 
simultaneously an objectification and a subjectification” (2007: 15). To examine power 
is to explore its impacts on the constitution, regulation and productivity of the subject in 
relation to society’s dominant discourses. In such a case, power both enables and 
disables, produces and constrains: “power produces; it produces domains of objects and 
rituals of truth” (Foucault 1977: 194). Just as the subject is objectified by being the 
object of power’s production, so too, is the subject formed and sustained through these 
matrices of power. This concept of mutual subjectification and objectification situates 
the nature and function of discourse and power as critical to the construction of a moral 
panic. 
 
The conditions of a moral panic 
The concept of moral panic relies on the idea that an individual and a community are 
responding to an ambiguous threat that manifests itself through a social event. The event 
and its heightened response do not need definitive categorisation to be considered 
significant or relevant. Cottle’s analysis of media events – events which stimulate 
intense media interest – involves “the added qualification that such cases also appear to 32 
 
tap into deep-seated conflicts that normally remain subterranean” (2006: 419). At times 
this anxiety results in a heightened moral debate that polarises the spectators. At other 
times it leads to a silencing or censoring of the primary subject in the event and the 
reinforcement of the dominant discourse. In this sense, a moral panic exposes what is 
not necessarily transparent in everyday life: a critical juncture where moral boundaries 
are perceived to be threatened.  
 
The particular events in question, provoked by operations of power and discourse that 
are both, at times, ‘subterranean’ and transparent, unequivocally stimulated anxiety. In 
turn this anxiety incited, at times, not only a cause for moral absolutes but also the 
denial of the socio-historical circumstances of the event. In some instances, this anxiety 
only manifested as a sense, or an attitude, in the spectators. However, in other instances, 
there are some very real and tangible outcomes to the moral panic. This can be seen in 
the introduction of government legislation in the USA in response to the Terri Schiavo 
case, and the supposed anthrax attack on the Indonesian embassy that was largely seen 
as a response to the spectacle surrounding Schapelle Corby. The often bigoted 
statements made by the media and public in the immediate aftermath of the Redfern 
riots were certainly vitriolic responses that overshadowed the tragic circumstances of 
riots. In this sense, even though there were parliamentary and police enquiries in to the 
riots at a later stage the initial moral panic was fuelled by an insidious anxiety about 
Aboriginal people. It is important to note that a moral panic is a temporary phenomenon 
and not evident in all social events or media spectacles. What distinguishes each of 
these three events is the presence of an underlying fear of a breakdown in normative 
values.  
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The mass media – whether that involves old, new or new new media – enable 
collectives to form in support of or in opposition to the social and political issues 
brought into question by the event. In the context of the three social events discussed 
here, the media facilitate these responses by extending beyond the reach of the 
individual spectator and appealing to the desires of specific interest groups, contributing 
to the polarisation of responses. The media enact discursive mechanisms that Critcher 
has described as “agenda setting” (2003: 136-137). This can be seen particularly in the 
case of Terri Schiavo in relation to the interest groups of the right-to-life/death 
campaigns, associated political bodies and religious factions. In the Corby case there 
was definitely a sense that Corby was a successful marketable commodity in the tabloid 
journalism arena. The commentaries that were reported in the media after the Redfern 
riots varied according to conservative news websites, tabloid media and the internet and 
news forums more open to critical debate. The media is structured, informed and 
maintained by networks of power, and in the pursuit of capital, can exploit a perceived 
desire for truth. As previously discussed, this notion of truth, particularly in relation to 
discourse and power, is crucial to the entire study.  
 
Stanley Cohen suggests that the media organisations act as “agents of moral 
indignation” (1980: 16). Even if this action does not involve a conscious manipulation 
of the truth, certain media representations “can be sufficient to generate concern, 
anxiety, indignation or panic” (Cohen 1980: 16). On the other hand, a blog is also an 
interesting forum in which individuals can comment, judge, and question an event. 
Often a blog can be an engaging and useful forum in which to share knowledge. As 
diverse as blogs can be, they are devices for identity and community formation and thus 
blogs are a crucial forum in which moral panics are proliferated. What has emerged as a 34 
 
dynamic democratic tool for debate has also led to the materialisation of new media for 
interest groups lobbying for particular ideologies and the uncensored declarations of 
individual opinion. The consumerist imperative for media organisations and 
technologies is thus also at play in the media’s interest in the continuation of this social 
unease. Thus, fleshing out how audience responses are facilitated is critical to 
understanding how the media are able to capitalise on, and mobilise, a community 
experiencing a moral panic.  
 
The very nature of reality and the discursive conditions that help shape our 
understanding of truth are influenced by the organisations, technologies and processes 
of old and new media. In the situation where an event has led to the polarisation of an 
audience and where particular understandings of normativity are questioned, the 
ideologies and belief systems of individuals and communities are often challenged or 
reinforced. Baudrillard argues that: “[When] the real is no longer what it used to be, 
nostalgia assumes its full meaning. There is a proliferation of myths of origin and signs 
of reality; of second-hand truth, objectivity and authenticity” (1983: 12-13). How reality 
(or what discursive knowledge may influence our understanding of truth and reality) is 
played out through media determines the extent, proliferation and impact of a 
mediatised spectacle. To learn more about performance in the twenty-first century is to 
explore what is said about the event, how it is said, what is left unsaid, who speaks and 
the socio-historical conditions of each statement. 
 
To summarise, the case studies are informed by, but not limited to, moral panic theory 
wherein I argue that the moral panic surrounding each event is propagated by the 
discursive conditions of the event. Certain characteristics of a moral panic, while 35 
 
difficult to quantify are, I argue, apparent in each case presented here. If there can be 
any certainty, it is that the conditions of a moral panic can be as ambiguous as the 
performance that it is a part of and that it is the ‘social anxiety’ as I see it in these 
circumstances that sets these events apart from other media-induced events; a sense of 
panic was provoked by an attentive and active audience enmeshed in a complex 
network of discourse, power and notions of truth. It is here that I now turn to unpacking 
the nature of the contemporary media spectator and their role in sustaining a moral 
panic. 
 
The response: Active and diffuse spectatorship 
The audiences to a social event consist of the media as an institution and the public as 
individuals and interest groups. Guy Debord argues that the spectator is a passive 
observer to the spectacle (1994: 22-23). Hans-Thies Lehmann also supports Debord in 
suggesting that the proliferation of spectacle and mediatisation can lead to an “erosion 
of the act of communication” and an inactivity of the spectator, particularly in response 
to violence and ‘terror’: 
[Thus] the continual presentation of bodies that are abused, injured, killed 
through isolated (real or fictive) catastrophes creates a radical distance for 
passive viewing: the bond between perception and action, receiving message and 
‘answerability’, is dissolved (Lehmann 2006: 184). 
I argue that in this context spectatorial responses to these events are, in fact, acts of 
intervention in the performance and that the notion of the spectator as active is critical 
to understanding what distinguishes them from other media events. They are not 
necessarily self-critical or self-referential but are directly implicated in the continuation 
of the spectacle through their actions. Whether it is in the form of a letter, a blog or a 
newspaper article, the making of a statement situates the spectator in the performance. 36 
 
Thus, I utilise the term the ‘active spectator’ throughout this dissertation because of the 
dual role of observation and action. The desire to observe and then engage in the event 
is intricately related to the matrices of discourse and power that inform and constitute 
truth formations. What the active spectator wants and needs to believe, how they 
operate and what knowledge they produce exists within this matrix.  
 
A consumer society relies on participants reiteratively and continually consuming 
anything and everything. The operations of a consumerist society are evident in each 
event not only because of the presence of mass media, digital technologies or the active 
participation of its consumers, but also because for a consumer society to thrive the 
consumer must want to consume: “consumers seek actively to be seduced” (Bauman 
2001: 315). The active spectators in each event want to participate in the spectacle, even 
if it is to criticise it. Nevertheless, it is precisely the spectator’s participation that 
composes the spectacle. In this sense, this notion of consumption moves well beyond a 
need to survive or beyond a need to consume ‘things’, toward a need to consume 
experiences, and, as argued earlier, to consume sensation. To extend this proposition 
further, I suggest that active spectators to the three social events, deliberately or 
otherwise, consume another kind of sensation. The Corby case compelled many to 
comment on how the case made them feel. The Schiavo case mobilised members of the 
right-to-life/death movements. The Redfern riots sparked controversy over notions of 
criminality and to some extent produced vitriolic responses that were highly prejudicial. 
So not only do contemporary consumers consume through necessity but also through a 
double desire to consume sensation and the sensation of consumption and thus also feel 
compelled, in their widely heterogeneous opinions, to consume whole events.  
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The active spectator continually enacts aspects of themselves by identifying with and 
through the consumer society. Roland Munro points out: “It is through their engagement 
with goods, artefacts and symbols, that people create social realities and display their 
identity or express their sense of belonging” (2001: 6-7). By commenting on the 
circumstances of the event, a spectator articulates this belonging as a way of identifying 
or positioning himself or herself in relation to it. In reference to the mass media and 
identity formation, Melanie Stewart Millar writes: “through television, film, 
advertisements, social interaction, the spoken and written word – even the structure of 
language itself – we learn to make sense of our lives” (2000: 24). Understanding the 
notion that consumption informs this sense of belonging is integral to understanding the 
conditions of contemporary spectatorship. Similarly, not only is the active spectator able 
to identify themselves in relation to the event but they are also able to negotiate a role to 
play in the surrounding performance. If the spectator did not actively intervene and thus 
contribute to the outcome of the event, the spectacle itself would not have taken place or 
perhaps not to the same extent. This intervention is not only instrumental in each social 
event examined, but is also reflective of the larger global interconnected communication 
paradigm.  
 
A vast proportion of spectators’ responses examined originated in the form of a weblog 
(blog). Axel Bruns and Joanne Jacobs define the blogosphere as the: 
[totality] of all blogs and the communicative intercast between them through 
linking, commentary and trackbacks, is perhaps unique in its structure as a 
distributed, decentred, fluctuating, ad hoc, network of individual Websites that 
interrelate, interact, and (occasionally) intercreate with one another (2006: 5). 
This interconnection indicates the enormous potential for the building of communities 
and networks that blogs and other social networking sites enable. In this context these 38 
 
technologies facilitate both the subjectification of the individual subject and the 
formation of networks of like-minded people with a significant interest in expressing 
their views and judgment on certain situations. As Bruns and Jacobs explain : “By 
personalizing content, blogs go beyond a purely informative role and provide a platform 
for debate, deliberations, and the expression of personal identity in relation to the rest of 
the (blogging) world” (2006: 5). Thus, one can see how the stimulation, propagation and 
continuation of a moral panic can be enabled within such media. Bruns and Jacobs 
suggest further that:  
[in] a time of redefining our value systems, of competing belief frameworks, and 
of global threats, bloggers have the chance to question their understanding of 
issues, engage in discussion, present their ideas, seek out approval for their 
notions, and grasp some sense of purpose, order, and hope (2006: 5). 
Social networking sites bring people together, activate ideologies and mobilise 
collectives. The active spectator inscribes himself or herself on to the landscape by 
being an active and compelled consumer, and as a result, they become something. Like 
all spectators, they are a consumer of sensations and a producer of meaning in the 
manner and way in which they interpret what spectacle comes to mean for them. In this 
sense, the contemporary spectator to mediatised spectacle is both consumer and 
producer. The subjectification process in constituting the spectator is not only crucial in 
understanding the construction of moral panics and the mobilisation of communities, 
but also in questioning the nature of media induced spectacles in general. 
 
Nicholas Abercrombie and Brian Longhurst suggest that the contemporary media 
audience is ‘diffused’ and that through the advent of mass media this audience is 
immersed in performance: “the world is constituted as an event, as a performance; the 
objects, events and people which constitute the world are made to perform for those 39 
 
watching or gazing” (1998: 78 original emphasis). By this account, the diffused 
audience involves a spectator who both consumes and contributes to the mass media 
spectacle and that, “we are audience and performer at the same time; everybody is an 
audience all the time” (Abercrombie and Longhurst1998: 73). In the global media, the 
distinction between performer and spectator is blurred. The subject at the heart of the 
mediatised spectacle is also simultaneously performer and spectator. As a result of the 
active spectator contributing to the spectacle, the subjects involved in the event become 
both the observed and, at times, the observer of the spectacle surrounding them. In this 
sense the active spectator and the subject of the event are “simultaneously watchers and 
being watched” (Abercrombie and Longhurst 1998: 75). The case studies in this 
dissertation examine this transaction and the ambiguities between the spectator and 
performer: the watching become watched when the watched watch back. These 
slippages of the spectator and performer distinction are situated within a fluid 
performance matrix of globalisation, technology and the media. This reading lends itself 
to support Kershaw’s position that a nuanced understanding of the subject within the 
contemporary mediatised spectacle would be helpful in exploring the nature of subject 
formation, agency and globalisation: 
Because if it is the case that the social itself has become a spectacle, if we are 
really – or even hyper-really – in the society of the spectacle, how might we best 
understand what it is to be commonly human in a world that now constitutes the 
subject through such powerful paradoxes? (2003: 594). 
The “commonly human” in this context is not an essential unified experience but 
instead a question regarding the ethical capacity of the subject. Kershaw asks whether it 
is still possible to make brave decisions in a choice-loaded consumerist landscape and 
whether in the society of the spectacle there is space for a real and tangible fight against 
oppression. He refers to “spectacles of deconstruction” as performances that are able to 
explore critically global cultural phenomenon, so that we may self-consciously “always 40 
 
see ourselves looking” (Kershaw 2003: 606), a notion that I fully explore in chapter six. 
The ambiguities surrounding the spectator/performer divide and the gaze, which is 
produced therein, need to be acknowledged if the significance of these three particular 
events is to be properly explored. I will now examine how this spectatorship influences 
the event itself. 
 
Spectacle in action 
Lehmann argues that in the current environment, spectacle is prolific and that the 
“totality of the spectacle is the ‘theatricalization’ of all areas of social life” (2006: 183). 
This section will firstly explore the broad theoretical terrain surrounding the notion of 
contemporary spectacle, drawing on the writings of Douglas Kellner, Daniel Dayan, 
Elihu Katz, Debord, Baudrillard and particularly Kershaw and secondly establish where 
my analysis differs from these theorists and, finally, which elements of spectacle are 
useful in examining the case studies.  
 
Debord suggests that the “whole life of those societies in which modern conditions of 
production prevail presents itself as an immense accumulation of spectacle (1994: 12). 
Utilising Debord’s platform on the society of the spectacle could be useful in examining 
the case studies in many regards particularly in relation to his analysis of spectacle and 
commodification (1994: 31) and his assertion that “reality erupts within the spectacle, 
and the spectacle is real” (1994: 14). However, a central premise to his argument is that 
all that “once was directly lived has become mere representation” (1994: 12). I argue 
that rather than subscribing to this idea that mediatised spectacles have been reduced to 
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culturally and theoretically significant because they provoke issues and questions about 
the very nature of representation itself. Similarly, the premise by Marshall McLuhan 
that the “medium is the message” – the form of communication rather than the content 
that is critical to understanding the impact of media in society – could be utilised in this 
study (McLuhan 1994). However, like that of Debord’s passive spectator, these case 
studies indicate that the medium is only one element to the constitution of a moral panic 
and that the message is crucial to the reception of a social event and in turn the creation 
and proliferation of a moral panic. What make these events stand out are the extent of 
the spectacle and the role of the spectator within the event’s representation. Thus, the 
spectacle cannot be reduced to “mere representation”, or the importance of the medium 
over the message, when the notion of representation itself means so much. 
 
The role that the media plays in facilitating a spectacle cannot be underestimated 
particularly in relation to how the representation of an event is channelled for particular 
purposes. Stuart Hall argues that media forums are structured to prioritise events that are 
considered newsworthy and that this decision involves a complex power struggle: “The 
media define for the majority of the population what significant events are taking place, 
but, also, they offer powerful interpretations of how to understand these events” (1978: 
57). In this sense, there is a tension between truth formations, what is considered 
newsworthy and the imperatives of particular media organisations and their readership. 
Douglas Kellner argues that media-constituted spectacles are a common and prolific 
practice in contemporary contexts. He believes that: “spectacle itself is becoming one of 
the organizing principles of the economy, polity, society, and everyday life” (2005: 23). 
Kellner identifies ‘megaspectacle’ as an event that results in the media industries 
consumption of an event on a large scale (2005: 25). He uses the examples of the 
marriage and death of Princess Diana, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and 42 
 
the 2000 election battle in the United States of America between Al Gore and George 
W. Bush as “defining events of their era” (Kellner 2005: 24). The three events examined 
here are not megaspectacles by this definition. Nevertheless, the elements of an event 
that make it a spectacle are what interest the media. In turn, it is the media interest that 
generates or compounds the spectacle and assists in the constitution of a moral panic.  
 
It is Kellner’s argument about the link between spectacles and fear that is of particular 
interest. He believes that media spectacles “provide articulations of salient hopes and 
fears, fantasies and obsessions, and experiences of the present” (2003: 27). A critical 
component of each of these three case studies is the consumption of this notion of desire 
and fear: the observing and consuming public extend the social event and propagate a 
moral panic because they are fundamentally engaged with the event itself. In this sense 
the event is emblematic of a concern on a global scale. Kellner goes on to argue that 
exploring the role, nature and impact of media spectacles allows us to grasp better “the 
defining characteristics, novelties, and conflicts of the contemporary era” (2003: 27). 
The flow between the media, the public and their “experiences of the present” (Kellner 
2003: 27) is evident in each of the case studies examined in the dissertation but is 
ultimately characteristic of the larger social phenomenon of the social event as 
spectacle, and thus also as performance. 
 
According to Dayan and Katz, a media event is something that takes precedence over a 
regular media broadcast, because of a live telecast, such as a ceremonial ritual for a 
popular individual, for example, a coronation or a royal wedding (1994: 8). The 2009 
inauguration of President Barack Obama would certainly be considered a ceremonial 
media event. Alternatively, they argue, a media event might also be a ‘celebration’ or 43 
 
consensus, of the hegemonic forces that exist in the society of the day (Dayan and Katz 
1994: 8). In many ways, the national and live televised verdict of Schapelle Corby’s 
trial to Australian viewers suggests that it was a media event, by this definition. I argue 
that the media representation of Corby also involved the “celebration”, or 
reinforcement, of the normative structures surrounding gender, race and sexuality for 
both Corby and her audience. A media event might also rely on the polarisation of 
opinion. The extraordinary media attention surrounding the case of Terri Schiavo, 
particularly during the thirteen days leading up to her death, can also be read as a media 
event. Yet this event was based upon the notion of “conflict” (Cottle 2006: 419). In this 
instance, the media event not only lasted for longer than one broadcast but also the 
media interest and the overall event triggered remarkably varied and disparate opinions 
from the participating spectators. Simon Cottle suggests that conflict events are “singled 
out precisely because such events involve deep conflictive undercurrents, whether those 
of ‘race’, class or gender” (2006: 419). Thus, a media event is not only defined by 
heightened media interest or the celebration and reinforcement of normativity, but also 
by the ideological divergence that it has the potential to provoke.  
 
The case studies explore a multitude of interconnected discourses that are either 
reinforced or transgressed by the spectator’s intervention. It is useful to understand 
contemporary mediatised spectacle in reference to Anthony Lambert’s definition of a 
visual event as “a relationship of and between histories, technologies, powers, 
meanings, actions and ramifications” (2008: 239-240). Kellner also mentions something 
similar when he argues that: “Media spectacles also put on display the politics of 
representation, encoding current problematics of gender, race, and class” (2003: 27). I 44 
 
identify disjunctive instances where operations of power are reinforced or challenged by 
the event and its participants. 
 
Kershaw suggests that spectacle once understood to refer to large-scale events is now 
understood to include a “miniaturization of spectacle” (2003: 596), where digital 
technologies and surveillance strategies have enabled a spectacle to be reached by 
millions at “the click of a mouse” (2003: 604). The connection between globalisation, 
technology and the media has enabled this miniaturisation to occur and with it, Kershaw 
suggests, a “performative society” has evolved (2003: 595). He writes that there are four 
main types of spectacle in the performative society: “spectacles of domination”, 
“spectacles of resistance”, “spectacles of contradiction” and “spectacles of 
deconstruction” (2003: 595). Although these concepts do not constitute the primary 
theoretical frame used in the dissertation, at various points the case studies reflect these 
categories. The intervention of government and politics is evident in all three cases and 
thus the concept of spectacles of domination is a relevant point of departure. Likewise, 
there are elements of a spectacle of both resistance and contradiction in the moments of 
transgression that occur in each case. Spectacles of deconstruction – “spectacles that 
displace the nature of the ‘real’” (Kershaw 2003: 595) – are particularly relevant to the 
performance Three Interrupted Lives (chapter five) and the commentary in chapter six. 
Drawing from these sentiments, I argue that performance can be utilised to explore, and 
deconstruct, social crisis both through a theoretical engagement and in performance 
practice.  
 
These theories of spectacle are useful in examining the location, condition and impact of 
the social events, particularly because of the acknowledgement of the role and nature of 45 
 
the contemporary spectator. Kershaw’s understanding of the profuse interconnections of 
capitalism, digitisation and the mass media together situates performance as everywhere 
and all the time: “performance becomes both ubiquitous and spectacular” (2003: 605). 
Kershaw refers to one definition of spectacle as a person or thing that is exhibited, and 
thus objectified, by a ‘curiosity’ or ‘contempt’ (2003: 593). In this reading, a spectacle 
is enacted through particular aspects of the audience responses. This is a particularly 
useful definition, not in the sense that curiosity and contempt are the only possible 
responses, but that the subject/s are exhibited and objectified by a heightened level of 
fascination within each social event. This notion, along with Kershaw’s suggestion that 
the proliferation of global media through the propagation of a consumerist imperative 
(2003: 605), is the most practical frame to use in questioning the nature and impact of 
the three social events. Theories of consumerism linked to subjectification and 
objectification processes link with Baudrillard’s notion of hyperreality in that the 
spectacle questions what is real:  
The very definition of the real becomes: that of which it is possible to give an 
equivalent reproduction. … At the limit of this process of reproducibility, the 
real is not only what can be reproduced, but that which is always already 
reproduced. The hyperreal (1983: 146; original emphasis). 
These particular events pushed the limits of the real in how the truths of each event were 
discussed, observed and consumed in perpetual reproduction of spectacle. The 
fascination these events provoked – the curious and the contemptuous nature of 
spectacle (Kershaw 2003: 593) – along with the role of active spectatorship, influences 
this hyperreality. It is important to explore these processes to gain a better 
understanding of the relationships among discourse, power and the resulting moral 
panic that is present in each of these events. This dissertation does this, predominantly 
by examining the specific socio-historical context that underpins a moral panic seen in 
each event. In each instance there is a theoretical paradigm – the panopticon, biopower 46 
 
and heterotopia – that is particularly relevant in unpacking the conditions which 
triggered this sense of panic.  
 
Unpacking the panopticon, biopower and heterotopia 
Foucault suggests that a study of power should confront the “strategies, the networks, 
the mechanisms, all those techniques by which a decision is accepted and by which that 
decision could not but be taken in the way that it was” (1988: 104). Throughout this 
study, I explore the techniques, systems, and mechanisms of power and discourse 
associated with each case. I do this through three theoretical devices: the ‘panopticon’, 
‘biopower’ and ‘heterotopia’. The panopticon refers to the system of ‘observation’ 
where the few see many and through this gaze act as a disciplinary force, biopower is a 
similar discourse enacting the control and administration of the body, populations and 
the subject within their community, while heterotopia on the other hard refers to 
alternative spaces to normative society. These theories can be evidenced in all three case 
studies however I have found that they are directly applicable and particularly useful to 
specific cases: the panopticon in the Corby case, biopower to the Terri Schiavo case and 
heterotopia to the Redfern riots. Each notion can be considered at different times 
operational as discourse, immersed within structures of power, while ultimately useful 
conceptually in understanding the circumstances surrounding contemporary mediatised 
moral panics. 
 
The revolutionary design of the eighteenth-century panopticon subjected the object of 
observation to continual surveillance. This observation inevitably led to a self-
modification of his/her behaviour out of fear of this perpetual ‘gaze’ and hence the 47 
 
production of the “docile body” (Foucault 1977: 136). Foucault argues that this point in 
Western history indicated a “synaptic regime of power, a regime of its exercise within 
the social body, rather than from above it” (1980: 39). Rather than the sovereign 
exercising power from above, the populace regulated itself through an understanding 
that power was a system of surveillance that was all-encompassing. For Foucault, the 
panopticon was an assemblage of techniques of power: “By the term ‘Panopticism’, I 
have in mind an ensemble of mechanisms brought into play in all the clusters of 
procedures of power” (1980: 71). In this sense, not only does the notion of the 
panopticon continually encourage self-regulation as a mode of discipline but also the 
object of the gaze is subjected to classification, normalisation and examination. In short, 
the panopticon produces objects from its subjects. The reason why I find the panopticon 
useful is that the media and public, in each event and to various degrees, operate in a 
similar way: the media and the spectatorial gaze exhibit, objectify, and normalise the 
primary subjects. 
 
The panopticon is a productive operation. It produces disciplined and compliant “docile 
bodies” within a system of prevailing “normalizing judgement” (Foucault 1977:136, 
177). This judgement is quite simply the discourses that determine whether or not a 
subject is considered socially acceptable. I argue that not only do these three social 
events present situations where the mass media observe, categorise and normalise 
through discourse, but also that the subjects involved are both objectified and 
subjectified through this process. In other words, the nature of the spectacle in each 
event determines that the subject is both acted upon and active within discourse. The 
compliance of the subject and the reinforcement of normalising judgement are crucial to 
the success of the panopticon. With this acquiescence comes a “docile body” where the 48 
 
body and subject are objectified: “a body is docile that may be subjected, used, 
transformed and improved” (Foucault 1977: 136). Like the panopticon, the docile body 
is also productive in that the individual obeys and reinforces the prevailing social 
hierarchies and structures of power. Kershaw writes of the coercive significance of the 
panopticon:  
For the panopticon may be taken as a paradigm of all the disciplinary systems in 
society where thought and practice are most firmly wedded to each other in an 
attempt to engender ethical conformity in the hearts of the resistant or 
delinquent, to bring the disaffected subject to society’s heel by eliminating 
autonomy and reforming the ‘self’ (1999:131). 
The docile body submits to normalisation which encourages homogeneity and what 
Foucault refers to as “the shading of individual difference” (1977: 184). The ‘norm’ 
standardises according to similarities, whilst also classifying the subject according to 
difference. Thus, the panopticon, like the entire regime of the disciplinary system – the 
penitentiary system, the military, the school system, or (as I argue) the mass media – 
produces objects that conform to a ‘norm’ reflective of the prevailing social conditions. 
Hardt and Negri describe the eighteenth-century era of disciplinary power as that which 
“rules in effect by structuring the parameters and limits of thought and practice, 
sanctioning and prescribing normal and/or deviant behaviours” (2000: 23). One set of 
these social conditions mentioned earlier supports this use of a classification system that 
appropriates difference and identifies ‘deviance’ or Otherness. Judith Butler applies the 
Foucauldian notion of power and discourse to the performativity of gender and 
sexuality, arguing that failure to perform to a “heterosexual imperative” is a socially 
punishable action (1993: 2). Thus, failure to perform to this normative standard disrupts 
the status quo. Both the reinforcement of and failure to reinforce the norm is the 
performance of power. I argue that the media as an instance of panoptic surveillance are 
both successful and unsuccessful in producing docile bodies in each case.  49 
 
Baudrillard suggests that the era of the panopticon has ended because of the mediation 
of hyperreality – causing an ambiguous relationship between active and passive 
subjects. He argues that we are “witnessing the end of perspective and panoptic space”, 
whilst also arguing that we are “no longer in the society of the spectacle” because there 
is no tangible medium in which to create spectacle (Baudrillard 1983: 54). The prolific 
nature of new media interrelated with consumerism and globalisation supports 
Baudrillard’s conceptualisation of hyperreality (1983: 125). Bauman also suggests that 
through the nature of global media and cyber technologies, as products of what he refers 
to as ‘liquid modernity’, the age of the panopticon is over (2002: 11): 
What mattered in Panopticon was that the people in charge were assumed 
always to ‘be there’, nearby, in the controlling tower. What matters in post-
Panoptical power-relations is that the people operating the levers of power on 
which the fate of the less volatile partners in the relationship depends can at any 
moment escape beyond reach – into sheer inaccessibility (2002: 11). 
Liquid modernity has thrown into question any concrete relationship between subject 
and object, the watching and the watched. Similarly, Thomas Mathieson suggests that 
global media have in fact contributed to a synoptic system in conjunction with the 
panoptic whereby the many are able to observe the few (2006: 43). In a way, this 
concept subverts Foucault’s understanding of the separation of spectacle and 
surveillance. I argue, however, that contemporary media technologies, systems and 
modalities allow for spectacle within a unique and heightened moral panic to be 
understood as a form of surveillance. In this sense, the contemporary social spectacle, 
can in fact, be the continual exchange of knowledge between subjects mediated by the 
global media, producing a focus not dissimilar to a disciplinary force. This 
conceptualisation is predominantly applied to the Schapelle Corby case by arguing that 
the mass media, including the ambiguous and transient nature of new media, can at 
times be a powerful force of disciplinary observation. 50 
 
Global media and the continually evolving information and communication 
technologies (ICT) produce self-awareness. This self-awareness is in both the user of 
the technology and also often in the object of the gaze. In chapter two, I argue that this 
self-awareness can lead to an adaptation of the object’s behaviour in response to the 
observation. Whether on reality television, on a cyber forum, or being monitored on 
CCTV, the subject/object is the observed panoptic object, often quite aware of their 
observation. Hardt and Negri suggest that disciplinary power, like that which Foucault 
described, was almost entirely at work in the implementation of capitalism in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries (2000: 23). They also suggest that the disciplinary 
era has transformed into the “society of control”: 
We should understand the society of control, in contrast, as that society (which 
develops at the far edge of modernity and opens toward the postmodern) in 
which mechanisms of command become ever more ‘democratic’, ever more 
immanent to the social field, distributed through the brains and bodies of the 
citizens. The behaviours of social integration and exclusion proper to rule are 
thus increasingly interiorized within the subjects themselves (Hardt and Negri 
2000: 23).  
The ‘society of control’ might be diffused but it is nonetheless significant, particularly 
in the role of the interiorisation of this control, which I link to the panopticon and the 
docile body. In the society of control, discourse and power are normalised to create 
social order and are crucial to the subjectification and objectification processes of 
subject formation. In other words, the subject is both the object of power and the subject 
who internalises normalising strategies in order to exist within the acceptable 
parameters of the dominant paradigm. Hardt and Negri argue that power “is now 
exercised through machines that directly organise the brains (in communication 
systems, information networks, etc.) and bodies (in welfare systems, monitored 
activities, etc)” (2000: 23). This dispersal of power links with Debord’s “society of the 
spectacle”, where the global mass media has contributed to the normalisation of power. 51 
 
The society of control exists predominantly but not exclusively through the global 
media. I argue that if the mass media contribute to the objectification of the subject 
through a panoptic disciplinary power then through the internalisation of this power, the 
subject is constituted and thus also becomes part of the diffuse society of control. I 
suggest that this discipline is intricately linked to the shared authority of another system 
of power: bio power.  
 
Biopower – the concept that life, populations and the body are regulated according to 
systems of power – is linked to theories of the panopticon, the docile body and 
normalising judgement. According to Foucault, a “normalizing society is the historical 
outcome of a technology of power centred on life” (1980: 144). Hardt and Negri 
succinctly argue, biopower is “a form of power that regulates social life from its 
interior, following it, interpreting it, absorbing it, and rearticulating it” (2000: 23-24). 
The last four centuries have witnessed significant transformation in the control of 
populations, and of life itself. John Marks argues that: “Rather than exercising its 
sovereign right to curtail life in periodic, spectacular manner, politics focuses 
increasingly on the fostering and direction – the government – of life” (2006: 333). As 
previously mentioned, Foucault indicates that the transformation from the public 
spectacle of torture to the compliant observation of the panoptic prison is a movement 
toward a discursive system that regulates and manages ‘life’. This administration can 
also be seen in the training and regulating of bodies, the coercive force of discipline and 
the examination and classification of subjects according to discourses such as the law, 
health, welfare and education. Foucault marks the transformation of the penal system in 
the eighteenth century and the development of distinct fields in medicine, psychology 
and the law when he declares that:  52 
 
For the first time in history, no doubt, biological existence was reflected in 
political existence; the fact of living was no longer an inaccessible substrate that 
only emerged from time to time, amid the randomness of death and its finality; 
part of it passed into knowledge’s control and power’s sphere of intervention. 
Power would no longer be dealing simply with legal subjects over whom the 
ultimate domination was death, but with living beings, and the mastery it would 
be able to exercise over them would have to be applied at the level of life itself 
(1980: 143) 
The discursive functions and power relations in ‘biopower’ are critical to investigating a 
moral panic. Biopower is often considered a limitless and boundary-less technique of 
discourse and power, a regulating formation that Hardt and Negri refer to as 
‘administrative’. In relation to biopower and contemporary warfare, they are argue: 
In order for war to occupy this fundamental social and political role, war must 
be able to accomplish a constituent or regulative function: war must become 
both a procedural activity and an ordering, regulative activity that creates and 
maintains social hierarchies, a form of biopower aimed at the promotion and 
regulation of social life (Hardt and Negri 2004: 21). 
Biopower (and biopolitics) are an instrumental force of modernity. According to 
Mathew Gandy, during the period of Western industrialisation, “the body became a 
focal point for a plethora of different concerns ranging from the need for productive 
labour to anxieties over the control of human behavior” (2006: 498). Contemporary 
understandings of biopower are wide and varied. However, I draw predominantly on the 
notion of biopower in relation to self and state governance in the case of Terri Schiavo. 
The intensity of the case, the polarisation of her audience and the profound questions 
raised regarding the nature of subjecthood, can be interpreted as existing within the 
machinations of biopower. Agamben’s notion of “bare life” explores biopower and the 
exclusionary tactics of the state (Agamben 1997; Agamben 1998). An interesting 
parallel arises between the notion of bare life – a subject’s life reduced to a ‘bare’ 
existence, without social value or citizenship status – in relation to the ‘war on terror’ 
and the extraordinary significance of what the incapacitated body of Schiavo came to 
represent for so many. As Gandy argues:  53 
 
For both Foucault and Agamben the term ‘bio-politics’ denotes not merely a 
blurring of the epistemological strategies of the life sciences and the human 
sciences but a cumulative process by which human life itself becomes 
incorporated within the aegis of the state (2006: 500). 
As a theoretical trope, I find biopower a useful means by which to explore the 
conditions of moral panic in the twenty-first century. In addition I draw a parallel 
between Kershaw’s suggestion that spectacle is concerned with a fascination toward an 
observable object/subject and Hardt and Negri’s argument that fear is the ultimate 
weapon of the society of the spectacle: 
Although the spectacle seems to function through desire and pleasure (desire for 
commodities and pleasure of consumption), it really works through the 
communication of fear – or rather the spectacle creates forms of desire and 
pleasure that are intimately wedded to fear (2000: 323).  
Thus, the question remains that if the ‘society of the spectacle’ is deeply entrenched 
within the ‘society of control’ where can there be moments of resistance? Hardt and 
Negri contend that: “It seems as if there is no place left to stand, no weight to any 
possible resistance but only an implacable machine of power” (2000: 323). If there does 
happen to be a mode of resistance, is it real and lasting or is this resistance the 
rearticulation of a de-territorialised system of power: power rearticulated in another 
form or place? I argue that there can be genuine sites of resistance, which I refer to as 
‘heterotopia’. 
 
Heterotopic spaces contain multiple meanings, are divergent from the ‘norm’ and 
challenge the social and political conditions from which they emerged. According to 
Foucault, heterotopia exist in any and all cultures; at different points in history they 
shifted from being spaces of crisis to spaces of deviation (1986: 24-25). Offering the 
example of the theatre as a site in which multiple spaces can exist in one single place, he 
argues that heterotopia can be transformative and “capable of juxtaposing in a single 54 
 
real place several spaces” (Foucault 1986: 25). Drawing on the image of the mirror, 
Foucault argues that heterotopia are both real and unreal; there is an obviously 
demarcated place where the mirror exists, yet simultaneously, there is a sense of 
displaced space between the notion of the real and the reflection:  
The mirror functions as a heterotopia in this respect: it makes this place that I 
occupy at the moment when I look at myself in the glass at once absolutely real, 
connected with all space that surrounds it, and absolutely unreal, since in order 
to be perceived it has to pass through this virtual point which over there 
(Foucault 1986: 24).  
Foucault suggests that a home for seniors, a prison, a garden and the cemetery are 
examples of heterotopia because of the effects of similar principles of displacement and 
transformation (1986: 23-24). Heterotopia also relies on a temporal displacement 
whereby “men arrive at a sort of absolute break with their traditional time” (Foucault 
1986: 26). The participants in such spaces are often the only ones who can understand 
and contribute to what occurs within the space (Foucault 1986: 26). He argues further 
that: 
Either their role is to create a space of illusion that exposes every real space, all 
the sites inside of which human life is partitioned, as still more illusory. … Or 
else, on the contrary, their role is to create a space that is other, another real 
space, as perfect, as meticulous, as well arranged as ours is messy, ill 
constructed, and jumbled (Foucault 1986: 27).  
Many theorists have utilised the term ‘heterotopia’ to encapsulate points of resistance, 
whilst others suggest that this was not entirely what Foucault meant it to refer to. 
Nevertheless, I find it a useful conceptual model.
14
                                                           
14 For an analysis of the various theoretical uses of heterotopia as a concept, see: (Johnson 2006:75-90). 
 Heterotopias are spaces where 
marginalisation and dislocation can be given weight and where difference is rendered 
prevalent. The Redfern riots produced a liminal space where the ‘grievances’ of 
Aboriginal people were foregrounded. In this sense the people who experience 
heterotopia are the rioters participating in the riot and the people involved in marking 55 
 
the place where Hickey died, with graffiti. Heterotopia is useful in fleshing out how a 
resistance to normative social order revealed a temporary space of radical Otherness, 
whilst the memorial of graffiti was an imprint of this transgression.
15
 
  
A final note on performance 
As I am writing about the intricate and complex relationship between discourse and 
power, I am ultimately arguing that the cycle of spectacle, spectatorship and moral 
panic is an acutely performative enactment. By this, I mean the discursive formations 
operating within the spectacle, which influence the spectator and facilitate moral panic 
are enacted performatively: what is said is also enacted. However, I am also suggesting 
that the entire social event – the event, response, and the moral panic – can be read as 
performance because of the nature of the global mass media operating as spectacle and 
the readership of the active spectator. This is where the social event (through its 
interactivity between spectacle and spectator) can be seen as performance. 
 
The case studies are only one way in which these three events can be read as 
performance. But how can these events then be understood in performance? Chapter six 
acts as a commentary and link between the theoretical analyses in the case studies and 
chapter five, the performance text, Three Interrupted Lives. In chapter six, I explore 
how the performance practitioner can negotiate the complexities surrounding the event, 
response and the resulting moral panic by creating a reflective social commentary. I 
endeavour to produce a performance text that can be both affecting and challenging. I 
explore what performance can come to mean in this context – principally in relation to 
                                                           
15 It is critical to note that the capitalization of the term of Other (and Otherness) is a deliberate reference to not only the large body 
of post-colonial and literary theory devoted to the subject but also the objectification of the Other. In this sense the capitalization is 
not a rendering of the subject as mere terminology but rather draws attention to forces that occur within a moral panic that creates 
Otherness.  56 
 
the performer-audience relationship. The performance draws from Kershaw’s 
understanding of performance as “spectacles of deconstruction” as enactments that 
“displace the nature of the ‘real’” (2003: 595). In this sense, the role of the performance 
maker in the creative process intersects with the role of the performance theorist as an 
analytical paradigm: both are commentaries on the significance of these three social 
events, moral panic and the contemporary globalised landscape. According to Elin 
Diamond, an investigation of performance as the enactment of discourse is both 
necessary and enlightening: “Viewing performance within a complex matrix of power, 
serving diverse cultural desires, encourages a permeable understanding of history and 
change” (1996: 2). I argue that if the three elements of spectator, spectacle and moral 
panic are critical to the original events, all three elements need to be present as points of 
departure in the performance text. The performance becomes an important vehicle to 
reflect on larger social performances and what the intimacy and immediacy of live 
performance can mean in ‘deconstructing’ the performer/audience relationship. 
 
This dissertation is primarily focused on three events that occurred at a particular point 
in history. In the conclusion to the dissertation, I briefly explore the advances in 
technologies and social network devices that have occurred since these events took 
place and what they might mean for global media, the nature of spectacle and the 
mobilisation of the contemporary media spectator. Hence, the final question is what the 
manifestation of new new media might mean for spectacle, spectatorship and moral 
panic today and in the future. 
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Conclusions 
The model of reading a social event as performance examines how the socio-historical 
and discursive conditions of an event can be confronted. I investigate the event as 
spectacle, the response as active and diffuse, and the resultant moral panic as a form of 
discursive negotiation between the two. Each case study has a particular focus on the 
specific socio-historical landscape of each event. The theories outlined here aid in a 
detailed exploration of the social conditions of each event. Ultimately, I examine the 
discursive formations and power relations that shape the representation of the subject, 
and explore how the subject is both objectified and subjectified by a spectacle of intense 
interest. Foucault argues:  
The relationship between power, right and truth is organised in a highly specific 
fashion. If I were to characterise, not its mechanism itself, but its intensity and 
constancy, I would say that we are forced to produce the truth of power that our 
society demands, of which it has need, in order to function (1980: 93). 
These three events should not be considered in isolation from the socio-historical 
conditions from which they emerged, but rather as a microcosm of the ways in which 
society demands particular truths, perceptions and responses. The events analysed here 
not only tell us how certain responses propagate moral panic and reflect the moral 
consciousness of a community in crisis but are also unique moments where the 
machinations of the contemporary mediatised world can be scrutinised. The following 
chapter is the beginning of this explanation with the first of the three case studies. It 
focuses on the case of Australian woman, Schapelle Corby. 58 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Power is only concerned with ensuring that the subject will misrecognize its 
subordination as self-determination 
(Cavallaro 2001: 84). 59 
 
Chapter two: Discipline in the performance of the Schapelle Corby case 
 
 
Figure 1: Parting shot (Pennells 2008) 
This chapter analyses the spectacle surrounding the trial and incarceration of Schapelle 
Corby as performance. The performance is not of Corby herself – the young Australian 
woman convicted of drug smuggling in 2005 and sentenced to twenty years jail in a 
Balinese prison – but an intense initial response to her situation that, in turn, ignited a 
sustained moral panic. As one commentator declared, it was a “case that spawned a 
crusade” (McMahon 2005). My interest is in the examination of the discourses, power 
and constructed truths embedded in this mediatised performance, including an analysis 
of the ambivalent space that Corby occupies. 
 
The chapter begins with an outline of the Corby case, detailing the microcosm of a 
courtroom drama. Secondly, it explores the links between the spectacle surrounding 
Corby (during and in the immediate aftermath of the trial) and processes of 60 
 
commercialism and commodification. As Anthony Lambert argues, “Schapelle has 
become national and regional property” (2008: 246). I then explore the notion that the 
intervening media and public operate as a panopticon producing a form of surveillance-
as-spectacle. This surveillance is a type of discipline. Drawing on Foucault, I argue that 
this ‘surveillance’ results, at times, in a “docile body” (1977: 183) constructed through a 
“normalising judgment” (1977: 177) that polices how she is represented in the media. 
Finally, I examine the resulting moral panic in relation to this surveillance through 
reading the interplay of discourses of race, gender and sexuality.
16
 
 I believe that the 
mediated representation of Corby that led to a sustained moral panic was the 
manifestation of the subjectification/objectification processes of the media and public’s 
‘panoptic’ gaze. I suggest that the spectacle continually evolves with its shifting 
audience periodically calling into question the nature of agency. 
The case of Schapelle Corby  
Schapelle Corby was born on 10 July 1977 and lived most of her life on the Gold Coast 
in Queensland, Australia. She was a beauty school student until she left her studies to 
care for her sick father, Michael. In 1998, she moved to Japan and married a Japanese 
man named Kimi, whom she met in Australia. They separated in 2000. Corby travelled 
to Bali on numerous occasions to visit her sister Mercedes, who lives there with her 
Indonesian husband and family. It was on a visit to Mercedes that Corby was arrested in 
Denpasar on 8 October 2004 and charged with transporting 4.1 kg of marijuana into 
Indonesia (concealed in the sleeve of her boogie-board case). After a highly publicised 
trial, she was found guilty on 27 March 2005 and sentenced to twenty years in jail. To 
this day, she pleads her innocence and remains in Kerobokan Jail. However, her transfer 
                                                           
16 It is important to note that discourses surrounding ‘class’ could also be analysed extensively in this case however, I felt that how 
class operates in this instance (particularly in relation to how Corby is positioned in relation to her family, her audience and the level 
to which she is commodified throughout the spectacle) would be too large an examination for the restrictions of this dissertation.  61 
 
to another Indonesian jail is possible at any stage.
17 During the whole process, 
Mercedes Corby has been her sister’s spokesperson and firmest supporter, along with 
her mother Roseleigh, father Michael and other family members.
18
 
 At the time of 
writing, the Corby legal team had exhausted all possible legal avenues of appeal. 
The significance of the Corby spectacle is interconnected with a fear of the unknown in 
its Western audience. I argue that this ‘fear’ is closely linked to the worldwide anxiety 
experienced in the post-September 11 landscape. In Australia, this anxiety is also 
connected to the memory of the Bali terrorist attacks in 2002 and 2005, the Australian 
Embassy bombing in Jakarta in 2004 and, since then, the Marriot and Ritz-Carlton hotel 
bombings in Jakarta in 2009. Lambert argues that: Indonesia became “both the site and 
the perpetrator of terror against Corby as the visual symbol of Australian identity and 
values” (2008: 244). As discussed in Chapter One, terror and fear on a social level are 
conceptually ambiguous terrains linked to perceived threats to morality tending to result 
in conservative responses. Thomas Johansson describes moral panic as the situation, 
“When significant boundaries are threatened one way or another, the outbreak of a 
moral panic signals an attempt to defend the boundary in question” (2000: 24). 
Understanding moral boundaries involved in the spectacle surrounding Corby helps in 
examining this moral panic. This understanding includes race, gender and sexuality and 
how an interplay of these discourses shapes what Corby comes to represent for her 
audiences. However, before I examine the matrix of discourses involved in this event, I 
need to explore the commercialisation of the case. 
 
                                                           
17 At the time of writing, the Australian Government is reportedly discussing a prisoner transfer arrangement with Indonesia so that 
eligible Australian prisoners, such as Corby, can carry out their prison sentences in Australia (Australian Associated Press 2010: 
20). 
18 Michael Corby died of cancer on 18 January 2008, three and a half years after his daughter’s arrest. 62 
 
Creating spectacle through controversy 
At the time of Corby’s trial (in 2005), the reaction to the Corby case, particularly in 
Australia, was one of intense interest. This response was partly inspired by multiple 
controversies that accelerated the media attention and commercialisation of the entire 
case. The trial verdict was broadcast live across Australia on (free-to-air) Channels 
Seven, Nine and (Pay TV) Sky News. It was reported that over one million viewers 
watched the courtroom drama unfold (Schwartz 2005: 139-140). Illustrative of the 
continuing media interest in the case were several more recent television ‘events’, 
including the series of television interviews with Corby’s former friend, Jodi Power. 
The original interview with Power on the Channel Seven programme Today Tonight, 
shown on 12 February 2007, included a provocative claim that Corby and her family 
were, in fact, drug takers and smugglers. This interview was watched by over two 
million viewers. It was followed by an interview with Margaret Power, Jodi’s mother, 
who agreed with the claim on the 13 February 2007 on the same programme. Another 
one million viewers watched the Corby family’s rebuttal of this claim on A Current 
Affair on the third night of Corby-related programming (Elsworth 2007).
 The initial 
interview with Power was filmed the previous November but was not screened until 
February 2007 at the beginning of the official television ratings period. This timing 
decision reflected a deliberate commercialisation of the case (Cubby and Forbes 2007). 
The Jodi Power saga continued into 2008, when Mercedes Corby pursued, and won (on 
29 May 2008), a defamation case against Channel Seven, Today Tonight and Jodi 
Power. All parties agreed on an undisclosed financial settlement soon afterwards. In 
June 2008, after Corby had exhausted all legal avenues, Channel Nine presented an 
‘impartial’ two- part documentary, called Schapelle Corby: The Hidden Truth on June 
22 and June 24, 2008. It included interviews exposing friction among Corby, her family 
and the defence team, deliberate media ‘spin’ and questions surrounding the motives of 63 
 
many of the parties connected to the case. What this media attention continues to reveal 
was that several years after the trial, Corby remains a popular figure with Australian 
mainstream media audiences. As Anthony Lambert argues, Corby, was (and still is to a 
lesser extent) “an Australian cultural event of monumental proportions” (2008: 238). 
 
Other controversies included Corby undertaking a pregnancy test (which returned 
negative) after local media claimed she was pregnant, implying she had had sex while in 
prison (Australian Associated Press 2005). More recent allegations relate to her being 
permitted to leave prison on occasion to visit local Balinese nightclubs (Wockner 2007: 
5). After her final appeal was denied in June 2008, Corby spent some time in a Balinese 
Hospital, reportedly suffering from depression. She was allowed to go to a hairdresser 
and beautician before she returned to jail. 
 
Debate on journalistic ethics stemmed from claims that Mercedes Corby was ‘tricked’ 
into meeting a camera crew from the Australian television program Today Tonight when 
they reportedly lured her to a local restaurant by hiring a private detective to promise 
her access to restricted government information. Mercedes claims she was told the 
information came from Australian diplomat, Liz O’Neil, who had been killed in the 
Garuda Airlines crash of March 2007, only days earlier. When Mercedes appeared at 
the arranged meeting place, she was ‘ambushed’ by a cameraman, a reporter and a 
private investigator, who demanded that she take a lie-detector test regarding allegations 
she had used drugs (Weaver 2007). 
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As these examples of controversy attest, most of the media coverage of the case was 
produced within a framework of tabloid journalism and thus was often presented in a 
sensationalist manner. For spectators aware of such media commentaries, Corby and 
other figures associated with the case were represented as celebrities. As well as the 
celebrity status of Corby herself, it appeared that the spectacle had become a quasi-
reality television program enacted as a “courtroom drama”. The attention given to 
Corby was referred to by reporter Neil McMahon as “the making of a martyr” (2005). 
Mercedes Corby was also accorded celebrity status; she was described as an “Angel of 
Bali” for her assistance to the victims of the 2005 Bali attacks (Wilson 2005: 2). She 
was most recently photographed for the men’s magazine, Ralph, in the January 2010 
issue. Hotman Paris Huteupea, formerly a leading lawyer in Corby’s defence team, was 
represented in the popular media through references to his alleged sexual prowess and 
taste for expensive suits, diamonds and hand guns. At the time of the trial, the 
celebritisation of the case and its players furthered the media frenzy and 
commercialisation of the accelerating spectacle for Australian media audiences. 
 
Corby’s media status was also strengthened by support from other well-known and 
popular figures. According to the Australian newspaper The Sunday Times, celebrities 
such as John Jarratt, Alan Jones, John Laws, and Barry Gibbs supported furthering the 
Corby cause (Editor 2005: 11).
19 Sian Powell of The Australian Magazine noted that 
popular figures as vastly different from each other as Russell Crowe and Lindy 
Chamberlain had also declared their sympathy (2005: 1).
20
                                                           
19 John Jarrett is an Australian actor, Alan Jones and John Laws are Australian media broadcasters and Barry Gibbs is a musician 
with the Bee Gees. 
 This linking of the notion of 
20 Russell Crowe is an Academy-award-winning actor and Australian resident. Lindy Chamberlain-Creighton (formally Lindy 
Chamberlain) is an Australian woman convicted of killing her child while on holiday at Ayers Rock (Uluru) in the Northern 
Territory. She was convicted and sentenced to life in prison on 29 October 1982 and on 26 February 1986 was released from prison 
after a vital piece of evidence (her daughter’s matinee jacket) was found. In September 1988, her conviction was overturned. There 65 
 
celebrity to the realm of commodification and capital production in the creation and 
sustaining of a spectacle raises interesting questions discussed in the next section.  
 
Creating the surveillance-as-spectacle: The commodification of Corby 
Representations of the Corby case continue to span across print and television 
journalism, Internet sites, web chat rooms and merchandise. At the time of writing, the 
Internet had approximately 163,000 references to Schapelle Corby. Each of these 
representations contributes to the spectacle of the case and, in particular, to a 
commodification of Corby herself. Steve Pennells, writing in The West Australian 
argued in June 2005 that Corby’s image “has been hijacked and used for everything 
from G-strings to mousepads” (2005: 8). Other examples discussed by Pennells include 
a Sydney man applying for copyright of the name ‘Schapelle Corby’ for book, 
television and film deals and a Queensland man applying for copyright to the name 
Schapelle to cover such items as paints, varnishes, clocks and fruit and vegetables 
(2005: 9). A Victorian man applied to register the name ‘Corby’ for an exclusive range 
of luggage titled “The Corby Case” (2005: 9). I argue that Corby’s productivity as a 
marketable commodity is, however, entirely dependent on her performing to a 
prescribed socially acceptable representation, principally as a presumed innocent white, 
heterosexual woman. Further, how Corby’s audience makes sense of her – and this 
audience is not a homogeneous entity – is inextricably linked to how she is valued both 
as a person and as a commodity. Each of the many spectators to the event, including 
media audiences, media producers and capitalist opportunists, determines Corby’s 
‘value’ as a product, and as a subject. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
was an extraordinary outcry by the Australian public and media to the case, which particularly focused on Chamberlain’s emotional 
behaviour and apparent lack of grief. This notion, in relation to Corby, is discussed later in this chapter. 66 
 
Another key figure in the Corby case was Ron Bakir, a Queensland man, who provided 
the primary funding for her legal case. Bakir was also the sole shareholder and 
chairperson of Schapelle Corby Pty Ltd, with alleged intellectual property rights to the 
use of her name. He also registered the website, www.schapellecorby.com.au , as a 
means of raising funds for the Corby family. Both the company and website were 
disbanded following the guilty verdict, amid threats of investigations by the Queensland 
Department of Fair Trading and the Australian Taxation Office. Bakir is no longer 
assisting the Corby family. Another website, www.dontshootschapelle.com, initiated in 
the United Kingdom by a distant cousin of the Corby family, has suggested that the site 
raised a sum of twelve thousand dollars, although the validity of this claim and the 
whereabouts of this money remains unknown to the Corby family (Pennells 2005: 8).  
 
The commodification of the case also fits appropriately with what Baz Kershaw 
describes as the paradigm of the curiosity or contempt of spectators toward spectacle 
(2003: 593). Although now largely considered to be a hoax, the following example of a 
website advertising a tour of Kerobokan jail positions Corby and her situation as a 
perverse exhibit. The tour advertises a “feeding time” when participants can watch 
Corby eat, take photos with Corby in her ‘cage’, and for an extra fee “feed Schapelle 
yourself” and “watch her face light up as you throw various pieces of food to her” 
(Hutauruk 2007). It describes an optional “Up Close Tour”, whereby visitors can spend 
thirty minutes in the cell with Corby, for photographs and conversation. However, it 
declares that, “For safety reasons Schapelle must be chained up during all cage visits, 
and should not be approached under any circumstances” (Hutauruk 2007).  
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One assumes this website is a parody of the popular spectacle surrounding Corby if only 
because it would be utterly offensive if the tour were actually to exist. This example, 
even as a hoax, illustrates the level to which Corby was commodified by utilising a 
voyeuristic desire similar to a nineteenth-century “freak show”. Whether as the 
reinforcement of an extreme objectification of women or as parody of the spectacle 
surrounding Corby, the Schapelle Corby Tour, nevertheless reflects of the consumption 
of the Other and participates in the production of the Corby spectacle. Yet, whether 
there is support, criticism or parody, the intervention of the spectator nonetheless 
contributes to the intensity of the overall spectacle and the objectification of the “thing 
exhibited as an object in either curiosity and contempt” (Kershaw 2003: 593). The 
disparities of opinion and the myriad voices form a spectacle resulting in the continual 
surveillance of the subject as object. These websites – such as the Schapelle Corby 
Tours and www.dontshootschapelle.com – are indicative of the transient flow of global 
information and capital and indicate the Internet’s role in the creation of contemporary 
spectacles. In this situation, Corby as a celebrity is commodified, fetishised and 
objectified. This process is indelibly linked to the potential for profit and is emblematic 
of the ways in which economic exchange functions in media-fuelled spectacles.  
 
The relationship among the notions of performance, efficacy and consumption is 
influenced by cultural, economic and technological trends. As mentioned above in 
chapter one, “the world is being challenged forth to perform – or else” (McKenzie 2001: 
158). McKenzie indicates that the concept of performance can be extended to include 
the cultural, organisational and technological modes of performance. The drive to 
perform separates the ‘productive’ performing subject from the non-performing subject. 
I argue that in the “consumer society” (Bauman 2001: 311), the non-performing subject 68 
 
is positioned as the Other – disciplined, and often punished, for non-conformity. The 
mainstream media function in this case as a consumerist machine promoting a discourse 
of exclusion to maintain the profits involved in covering the case. Within the discursive 
interplay of race, gender and sexuality, a similar process to the consumerist discourse 
occurs. Quite simply, the representation of Corby as a beautiful fragile woman 
‘wronged’, defenceless and in a hostile and threatening environment, sells. If Corby or 
the people close to her are unable to perform to this social norm, her profitability, as 
well as her social acceptability, might be questioned. The discursive undercurrent of this 
spectacle links to Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz’s argument that some media-induced 
spectacles involve the celebration and thus reinforcement of hegemonic dominant 
discourse (1994: 8). If power, discourse and knowledge are interconnected in the 
representation of normative truth, as discussed in chapter one, then the participating 
spectators in the Corby spectacle are the players within this intricate matrix. 
 
The active spectator in the surveillance-as-spectacle 
A necessary component of making Corby valuable is making her visible. This visibility 
promotes her consumption, and ultimately, objectification. The spectators who directly 
contribute to creating and sustaining the spectacle surrounding Corby enact a quasi-
surveillance operation within the very enactment of consumption. Moreover, as long as 
Corby can attract this audience, there will be a market for the spectacle to continue. 
Likewise, while there is a spectacle, there will continue to be a surveillance of Corby 
and her story. Whether in a news forum providing information about the trial or a blog 
uniting supporters of Corby or on a tabloid Internet site discussing the merits of a 
particular hairstyle or lip gloss chosen by Corby, the media continue to contribute 
significantly to her surveillance. The notion of communication and information 69 
 
technologies of both old and new media assisting a panoptic observation is imperative 
to this argument about the surveillance of Corby.
21
 
 
The confluence of spectacle and surveillance can be read, considered by Foucault as 
indicative of separate historical transformations, to exist together quite freely in this 
context. Until the eighteenth century, Western forms of punishment – public torture and 
executions – were the jurisdiction of the sovereign power. With the notion of the 
panoptic penitentiary, in conjunction with a normalising judgement ordering the societal 
value of a subject, a system of self-regulatory discipline emerged. Foucault’s reading of 
this historical transformation separated the two forms of discipline into spectacle and 
surveillance. My argument extends this notion of the division into spectacle and 
surveillance by suggesting that through the current mediatised landscape and the fluidity 
of liquid modernity, Corby, and other individuals associated with the case, are subjected 
to a spectacle that, in turn, acts as an objectifying surveillance mechanism. This is a 
situation whereby surveillance and spectacle coexist. In this sense, Corby can be seen to 
be disciplined within the panoptic surveillance of her own ‘spectacular’ visibility. 
 
Foucault’s reading of the panopticon is very useful in exploring the Corby case. 
Principally, panoptic discipline operates through the idea of surveillance even if it is not 
literally enacted at all times. The inherent violence of the panopticon occurs through the 
present threat of an all-seeing and all-knowing observer. The panopticon can be seen to 
operate within many contemporary processes of legality, civil health and safety, capital 
efficacy and productivity, and entertainment. In the literal sense of being in prison, 
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Corby is subjected to the surveillance of all things associated with a jail. Yet the 
observation by her audiences can be considered a disabling surveillance tactic 
compounding the impact of her actual incarceration.  
 
Clay Calvert describes the USA in particular (and by implication, any Western society 
heavily influenced by the mass media), as a culture “of mediated voyeurism” that 
“values watching electronic images of other people’s private and revealing moments, 
especially those that are sordid and sensational or simply strange and unusual” (2004: 
20). This notion of voyeurism links with Bauman’s point about the consumption of 
sensations (1998: 83). In the Corby case, a consumption of sensations functions in 
conjunction with the seemingly insatiable consumer appetite that views Corby as an 
object of beauty, innocence and presumed (in)justice. The access the media and public 
had to Corby was limited during the trial and subsequently during her prison sentence, 
which I argue, could only compound this fascination. This mediated perception of her – 
as the innocent ‘girl next door’ trapped in an unfamiliar and hostile environment by the 
unknowable Other – doubly incarcerates Corby as the object of a panoptic audience 
observation, as well as the literal prison that houses her. 
 
The processes that contribute to the surveillance of Corby preceding and during the trial 
include the continual reporting on her emotional and behavioural ‘state’ reported in 
magazines, newspapers, television interviews, and radio talk shows. Other surveillance 
strategies involved the live telecast of the verdict, commentaries of government officials 
and politicians, protest rallies by supporters and the contributions of celebrities. In a 
reference to the extraordinary scale of the Corby spectacle, reporter Mark Burrows 
(interviewed in 2005 by Sian Powell) relates Corby to another spectacle: the death of 71 
 
Princess Diana. He says, “I was in London for the death of Diana and Diana pales 
compared [with] what’s going on here.... You can’t file enough stories about Schapelle 
Corby” (Powell 2005: 15). Although the attention toward Corby has shifted, as has her 
audience, at the time of writing there is still a market interested in her situation. This 
fascination is particularly apparent in the Australian tabloid magazine industry, which I 
discuss later in this chapter. However, at the time of her the trial the Burrows’ quotation 
reveals, from the point of view of the Australian media, the height of Corby’s celebrity 
status, the profitability of her situation and the scale of the spectacle that continued to 
develop. 
 
As briefly discussed in chapter one Thomas Mathiesen argues that, to Foucault, 
“panopticism represents a fundamental movement or transformation from the situation 
where the many see the few to the situation where the few see the many” (2006: 43). 
Parallel to the panopticon is the contemporary emergence of the mass media as a 
‘synopticon’. This synopticon is essentially where the globalised media technologies 
have again enabled the many actively to watch the few: 
Increasingly, the few have been able to see the many, but also increasingly, the 
many have been enabled to see the few – to see the VIPs, the reporters, the stars, 
almost a new class in the public sphere. ... In a two-way and significant double 
sense of the word we thus live in a viewer society. ... As I have said, the 
panoptical and the synoptical structures show several conspicuous parallels in 
development, and they together, serve decisive control functions in modern 
society (Mathieson 2006: 45). 
Similarly, I argue that as surveillance and spectacle coexist within the mass media, the 
many see the few and the few see the many. This coexistence amounts to a spectacle 
that is itself a continual cycle of surveillance. According to Gary Marx, the surveillance 
system of the twentieth century produces an exchange of observation: “Not only might 
anyone be watched; everyone is a potential watcher” (2006: 8). Interestingly, Mathieson 72 
 
wrote of the mass media as synoptic in 1997 and Marx was reflecting on the evolution 
of surveillance techniques in 1985, well before the advent of new new media that has 
arguably accelerated and deepened the situation of the watcher and the watched. In this 
context, a diverse audience watches, at times participates and at other times is watched, 
by Corby, in return. Ultimately, this conflation of spectacle and surveillance leads to 
both the objectification and subjectification of Corby. 
 
Foucault points out that the panoptic surveillance system was designed “to induce in the 
inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic 
functioning of power” (1977: 201). So like the prisoner disciplined by the ever present 
gaze of the panoptic tower, Corby is not only regulated by the media and popular gaze, 
but is also made aware of this surveillance. Her appearance in court (including her 
tailored shirts, manicured hands, well-maintained make-up and hair) signified her 
attention to the presentation of the body. By writing her biography, dressing to certain 
standards and making comments to the media, she performs to this audience. She is 
forever being disciplined through both the literal observation of the court and the gaze 
of her audience. She was, and to some extent still is today, in a state of what Foucault 
calls “conscious and permanent visibility” (1977: 201), evidenced by the continued 
attention of the media and the cyber forums as sites for devotees of the ‘truth’ 
surrounding Corby.
22
 
  
Fundamental to Foucault’s discussion of discipline and this notion of self-conscious 
visibility is the notion of the “docile body”, which has been shown to have limitations in 
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relation to feminism. This tension is fundamentally concerned with whether the post-
structuralist deconstruction of the nature of power, truth and knowledge is also capable 
of allowing for difference and the specific struggle for empowerment.
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 I borrow from 
the notion that the subject is constituted by socio-historical formations yet continually 
performs the subjectification process and is thus changeable. I also suggest that both 
agency and disempowerment should be examined together. The concept of the docile 
body is useful in this particular context because of the important notion that the docile 
body “may be subjected, used, transformed” (Foucault 1977: 136) and that through 
current technologies, identity formation and subjectification processes are continually 
shifting and evolving. The representation of Corby is influenced in just this manner. 
However, in this situation the question is not whether she has agency but rather whether 
the pursuit of agency can ever be truly successful.  
This concept of the surveillance-as-spectacle is complex because on one level, Corby is 
subjected to the regulative forces that produce the docile body, and on another level, she 
has agency. The docile body requires complicity with the dominant discourse, an 
acknowledgment by the subject that they will obey the rules of this social norm. Thus, 
in many ways Corby is the docile body because she consciously and actively self-
regulates according to what the media and public want to see. In another way, 
particularly during the trial, she actively used the media to appeal directly to her 
audience. It could be argued that to gain popularity and sympathy, self-consciously 
using the very instances of power that constrain her might indicate a level of agency on 
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her part. The question then becomes whether this agency can actually disturb the 
panoptic gaze. 
 
The process of normalisation is what positions discursive knowledge as truth. 
Behaviour and activity that do not fit into this perceived notion of social normativity are 
potentially punishable for pushing those boundaries. Discipline (and order) polices 
behaviour and action according to this imposed ‘normative’ function. Foucault suggests 
that the “power of normalisation imposes homogeneity; but it individualises by making 
it possible to measure gaps, to determine levels, to fix specialities and to render the 
differences useful by fitting them on to another” (1977: 184). In this argument, 
difference is only acceptable within the boundaries of normativity and not what is 
considered to be absolutely Other. In this sense, the identification (and classification) of 
someone behaving outside of these rules does not derive from an a priori or naturalised 
characteristic but from a codified practice determined by discourse that fixes, measures 
and so on. Normalisation is what maintains and regulates dominant discourse and thus, 
has a profound impact on the nature of subject formation, social acceptability and the 
notion of deviance.  
 
If Corby is unable to conform to what might be considered normal social standards, her 
discursive status becomes ‘abnormal’. Similarly, if her family behaves in a manner 
considered socially inappropriate by her audience, they, and Corby, are classified and 
punished by this spectatorship. As a result, Corby and those close to her are measured, 
regulated, and classified according to the dominant discursive paradigm. Lambert 
argues that: “[Schapelle’s] image is able to mask, dramatize and normalize a range of 
familial, domestic and international behaviours by reconstituting Australianness as a 75 
 
‘damsel in distress’, through whom the nation’s historical and recent coalitions are 
reaffirmed” (2008: 240). This mediated and mediatised representation is loaded with 
socio-historical significance that operates as a form of discipline that continually 
objectifies her.  
 
Corby’s visibility is something that both helps promote her case to a wide audience and 
hinders her situation by continually subjecting her to an observation somewhat outside 
her control. Corby as a subject is constituted and produced through the same attentive 
gaze by which she is constrained and objectified. In this sense, the spectacle that is 
created, the Corby ‘event’ itself, is of a woman who is both subject and object, viewed 
with curiosity and contempt, revealing both hierarchical and interconnected networks of 
discourse and power as truth formations.  
 
According to Foucault, disciplinary power “is exercised through its invisibility; at the 
same time it imposes on those where it subjects a principle of compulsory visibility” 
(1977: 187). In other words, techniques of discipline are dispersed and diffused while its 
subjects (those objectified by disciplinary power) are made inside, and outside, of power 
itself and thus, are subjected to this gaze. As Foucault explains, “it is the subjects who 
have to be seen. Their visibility assures the hold of the power that is exercised over 
them” (1977: 187). Foucault also suggests that the ‘parade’ (military, penitentiary, 
scholarly etc.), is an example of the ceremonial exercising of disciplinary power where 
each subject is subjected to an examination concerning levels of acceptability. The 
surveillance-as-spectacle, the panopticon of Corby’s fascinated audience compelled 
through either curiosity or contempt, is the examiner in this sense, always watching, 
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[the] examination is the technique by which power, instead of emitting the signs 
of its potency, instead of imposing its mark on its subjects, holds them in a 
mechanism of objectification. In this space of domination, disciplinary power 
manifests its potency, essentially by arranging objects. The examination is, as it 
were, the ceremony of this objectification (Foucault 1977: 187). 
Thus, in this process Corby exists as both subject and object. She is the object being 
acted upon and the subject acting within this network of discourse and power. In a 
contemporary environment where technologies of surveillance operate continuously, 
Foucault’s argument needs to be extended: regarding the object of the panopticon being 
“the object of information, never a subject in communication” (1977: 200). However, 
this argument implies that Corby can only ever be an object of the media and popular 
observation, and never a subject with the capacity to communicate within these 
mediums. In the case of Corby, there are significant instances where she returns the 
gaze of her panoptic surveillance and thus blurs the distinction between the observed 
and the observer.  
 
On 23 February 2008, Pennells recalled the circumstances surrounding taking a 
photograph of Corby:
24
It was the first day of Schapelle Corby’s trial, before the whole Schapelle 
phenomenon really took off. She put on lip gloss for the picture. I remember 
thinking it was strange thing to do for someone facing the prospect of a firing 
squad. She put her hand through the bars and made me curl my little finger 
around her in a “pinky promise: that I would make her look good (2008: 30). 
 
Corby’s self-awareness suggests an understanding of the possible media response to her 
situation and in a way predicts the panoptic surveillance-as-spectacle that surrounds her. 
This argument acknowledges that her visibility enables, to a certain extent, a 
manipulation of her own surveillance. This awareness is, as mentioned earlier, both the 
issue of the spectacle and surveillance coexisting, as well as the ambiguous relationship 
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between the subject objectified and the subject attempting to subvert such observation: 
where the watcher is watched and the watched watch back. 
 
Corby requires the attention the media (and the wider public) provide to sustain a 
perception of her ‘innocence.’ The awareness of this spectacle is where she attempts to 
reclaim agency. Perhaps the most significant example of such a manipulation is in the 
documentary, Schapelle Corby: The Hidden Truth screened on Channel Nine on June 
22 and June 24, 2008 Corby is filmed agreeing with her defence team to a ‘media spin’, 
whereby she would appeal directly to the Australian people. The next image is of her 
handcuffed and surrounded by the media. She is tearfully appealing to Australia for 
help. Both Corby and her defence team were intimately aware of the power of a 
spectacle that saturated the media. A blogger named “Blankie” responded to this 
documentary by saying that he “was amazed to find out that it was all an act by her” 
(2008). There is a sense of disappointment here, in the realisation that Corby’s 
representation was at least partly manufactured, that somehow the actions of Corby, her 
family and legal team had let down her audience. Yet the representation of Corby 
throughout the entire spectacle is continually and actively shaped, either consciously by 
her or by the numerous media or individual spectators.  
 
According to Foucault, “It is the fact of being constantly seen, of being able always to 
be seen, that maintains the disciplined individual in his subjection” (1977: 187). Gary 
Marx suggests that those “watched become (willingly and knowingly or not) active 
participants in their own monitoring” (2006: 7). Whether the reasons were financial 
necessity (in the case of the A Current Affair interview by her mother Roseleigh, 
directly after the verdict) or to aid the construction of a public awareness campaign, 78 
 
“Team Corby”, like Corby herself, is clearly conscious of the power of a media 
spectacle and of a popular response by the public. By manoeuvring the surveillance that 
continually observes her, Corby exists between coercion and agency. The media and 
popular spectacle surrounding the case ensured that she was under constant surveillance 
in an attempt to construct value from her representation and it is precisely this visibility 
that Corby attempts to control.  
 
Corby is disciplined by both a panoptic self-regulating gaze and a public spectacle. In 
this sense, she is the manifestation of the many watching the few (where discipline is 
induced by spectacle) and the few watching the many (where discipline occurs by 
surveillance). According to Foucault, discipline is fundamentally a question of the 
subject in ‘enclosure’ (1977: 141). Corby is enclosed by both literal and symbolic 
surveillance. At times, this enclosure is temporarily broken or called into question when 
she resists the media gaze. Recently, news spread rapidly throughout the Australian 
media reporting that Corby had spontaneously thrown two glasses of water at journalists 
in Kerobokan Prison. Perhaps the distressed Corby was exhausted by the continuous 
attention and lashed out? Her behaviour accompanies recent reporting of her emotional 
and psychological well-being (Cassrels: 3). Ironically, the very media she is ‘attacking’ 
for their continual examination is profiting from her responses. Whether she is 
considered brave, beautiful or insane, while there is still an audience deeply fascinated 
by her situation, Corby will be continued to be exhibited in such a manner. While this 
occurs, Corby can only be aware of this fascination. Thus, she is not only disciplined by 
this gaze but is also sustained by it. 
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Butler argues that social norms are continually reiterated into normativity and that this 
repeatability is crucial to subject formation. However, agency occurs in the variation to 
this pattern: “the task is not whether to repeat, but how to repeat or, indeed, to repeat 
and, through a radical proliferation of gender, to displace the very gender norms that 
enable repetition itself” (Butler 1990: 148). It could be read that Corby disrupts the 
gender norm by consciously manipulating the gaze that subjugates her. Yet, how 
subversive can this be if it means maintaining the very surveillance that polices her? As 
Foucault argues, the subject of visibility is inscribed by power and “becomes the 
principle of his own subjection” (1977: 203). Even when Corby participates in the 
spectacle, this agency is still within the parameters of an enforced intelligibility: in 
moments of what seem to be enactments of genuine agency, when she actively subverts 
the gaze, she nevertheless, feeds into the spectacle that maintains her surveillance. 
Peggy Phelan argues, “[Visibility] is a trap … it summons surveillance and the law; it 
provokes voyeurism, fetishism, the colonialist/imperial appetite for possession” (1993: 
6). Ultimately, whether Corby manipulates or is quietly coerced by the spectacle that 
surrounds her, it is her audience’s interest and the visibility that this interest brings, 
which reinforce her subjugation. What can be deciphered from this negotiation between 
spectacle and surveillance is that the pursuit of agency is ultimately limited by the 
perceived threat to normative order. In other words, even when one attempts to override 
the discursive force of social norms, by having no choice but to use the same tools as 
the status quo, the subject remains regulated by it. 
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Moral panic and discourses of race, gender and sexuality 
i dont think indonesia really cares if schapelle was innocent or guilty, in my 
opinion indonesia used her as an example to show australians what not to do and 
let us know that they have the power and they will use it. … Even if you are 
innocent indonesia says you are guilty (Andrea 2005 ). 
 
Reactions to the Corby case were clearly shaped by discourses of race. Prejudicial 
language and cultural generalisations were apparent, particularly during the trial. During 
this time, commentary regarding the cultural and political make-up of Indonesia was 
widely published in print and on the Internet and supported in part by sensationalist 
media commentators. Some of these sentiments included a call for Indonesia to return 
the financial aid given in response to the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami and for boycotts of 
tourism to Bali. Louise Vickers, a member of the public, wrote, “Millions of dollars 
provided to the Indonesians after the Tsunami disaster should have at least bought her a 
fair trial. I will be boycotting anything Indonesian” (2005: 7). Some responses exhibited 
a sense that Indonesia had an ‘obligation’ to support Corby as though collective 
humanitarian responses to a natural disaster were in some way a bargaining chip for 
justice. There was even a suspected anthrax attack on the Indonesian embassy in 
Australia (Nicholson and Murphy 2005). Acknowledging both the symbolic status of 
the beach to Australian national identity, and the history of Australian tourism to Bali, 
Lambert contends that: “Schapelle occupies the place of the mythical Australian beach 
girl (the daughter who is Australia) now trapped in a ‘strange’ land, in non-white hands, 
and at the mercy of foreign systems and institutions” (2008: 241). The central theme in 
this racialised response was that Indonesia was considered a ‘foreign’ and inferior Other 
to Australia.  
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There was public outcry after an emotional plea by Corby late in her trial when one of 
the judges appeared to be reading a book. However, Krishna Sen notes that part of the 
title of the book was in fact “pidana seumur hidup”, which translates to ‘life sentencing’ 
(2006: 73), adding that: “[Clearly,] the judge had not been reading a Mills and Boon 
novel” (2006: 73). In controversies such as this, cultural difference became the subject 
of media and public scrutiny. According to Lambert, in reference to the Corby case: 
“the body of the white female persists as the unit of exchange in an aggressive 
adherence to historical tropes of nationalism” (2008: 241). This concept of the socio-
historical inscription of nationalism is certainly one of the most significant and lasting 
legacies of the case. Some of these racialised comments by members of the public 
included Matt Rodman’s statement in The Herald Sun newspaper that Corby’s sentence 
was ‘outrageous’ and “the best support we can give is to boycott Indonesia. A boycott 
along with the cloud of terrorism would send a strong message from a more civilised 
world” (2005: 4). In the same newspaper article, Kerry Blythe wrote that: “I feel 
Schapelle was a sacrificial lamb. Her sentence was far too harsh, cruel and characteristic 
of only barbarians. I encourage all Australians to support this family to bring their 
daughter home” (2005: 4). Many comments were made shortly after the reduction in 
sentence for Abu Bakir Bashir, the alleged spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiah.
25
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from Southport declared in the Gold Coast Bulletin: “2yrs 4 the murdering muslim Bali 
Bomber. 20yrs 4 an Aussie Christian ‘accused’ of smuggling pot. Bullshit, send in the 
SAS” (2005: 7). Abu Bashir Bakir was accused of masterminding the attacks. However, 
with little proof, he could only be convicted by association. This did little to curb the 
opinion of many, as public contributor to the Herald Sun S. Conner exclaimed, “I think 
this is just totally wrong. How can they give her 20 years for this when the pigs who 
killed more than 200 in the Bali bombings are getting only five odd years. We need to 82 
 
make a stand now and boycott this country (2005: 4). The traumatic Bali bombings in 
2002 and 2005, the alleged role of Abu Bashir Bakir in these attacks, and an 
emotionally charged spectacle surrounding Corby fuelled proclamations of illegitimacy 
and injustice. L. J Charles wrote in the Gold Coast Bulletin: 
Schapelle is imprisoned in a country where the laws have let smiling terrorists 
off for killing many hundreds of people, including Australians. This same 
system is then looking to sentence a person such as Schapelle to death. Where is 
the justice? Don’t let the fate of one of our fellow Australians be left in the 
hands of such an unjust system (2004: 16). 
The “smiling terrorists” refers to the convicted terrorists involved in the 2002 Bali 
bombings. Mukhlas, his brother Amrozi and Imam Samudra were executed on 8 
November 2008 for their involvement in the 2002 Bali nightclub bombings. However, 
at the time this comment was made, the trauma from the bombings was still very real. 
The terror attacks seemed to have translated for many into an opportunity to defend 
cultural and racial isolationism. These statements articulate a discourse of race that 
positions Indonesia as the “unintelligible” Other: illegitimate, corrupt and unjust. Jason 
Sternberg of Queensland University of Technology was quoted in an article by Mark 
Todd in the Sydney Morning Herald as saying:  
The Australian public has almost taken what's happened to Schapelle Corby as a 
personal affront. ... The perception is that she is going through a kangaroo court. 
What is happening to her speaks to a deeply, deeply racist undercurrent that runs 
through Australian culture at the moment. It plays on the fear that we are 
suddenly, somehow unexpectedly under threat from Asia again. All these 
transnational tensions are being played out through this one poor woman stuck 
in prison, facing life in jail (Todd 2005: 15). 
This fear that Sternberg acknowledges, as if Australia was in some way under attack, is 
a complex machination of discourses of racial and cultural elitism. Eric Ellis argued in 
reference to the Corby spectacle that: “there’s a strong, almost reflex whiff about her 
plight that speaks to the lurking suspicions held deep in the middle Australian psyche 
about Indonesia: that it’s bad, unsafe and corrupt” (2005). Blogger “CJ” reflects this 83 
 
view when s/he writes: “All I can say is I will never, ever go to Bali. Between the 
bombings and this, I can’t imagine why a westerner would” (CJ 2005). Another blogger, 
Daniel, says, “Boycott Bali they’re the real terrorists. Let our Schapelle go” (Daniel 
2005). Not only do these comments reflect a discourse of cultural superiority but also 
they position Corby as a single and isolated ‘us’ surrounded by a foreign and inferior 
‘them’. Lambert declares that the “Schapelle event becomes the symbolic mobilization 
of the vulnerable western self, and its attendant resurgence of orientalist otherness” 
(2008: 244). These public responses and cyber conversations are discursive utterances 
of a racial and cultural intelligibility that projects difference as Otherness. 
 
Such suspicions of Indonesia also included an outcry that English was not the official 
language used in the courtroom, as well as some absurd racial insults about cultural 
difference. Malcolm T. Elliott, an Australian radio commentator on Sydney station 
2GB, declared in 2005: “The judges don’t even speak English, mate, they’re straight out 
of the trees, if you’ll excuse my expression” (Ellis 2005: 19). Ellis notes, concerning 
Elliott’s on-air comments that, “in a Schapellised Australia, it barely raised an eyebrow” 
(2005: 19). Ellis reports, in another article concerning Corby, on the incongruity 
between the emotive responses of Australia and Indonesia: “The Bali expats and 
intelligentsia are disgusted by Australia’s racist reaction. The other 230 million 
Indonesians ask, ‘Schapelle who?’” (2005). John Schwartz refers to a prominent and 
controversial Australian radio commentator, Alan Jones, when he writes: 
Alan Jones on 2GB was furious that the Indonesian judges: ‘….don’t speak 
English and won’t get a translation of Schapelle’s comments until today. What’s 
that say about justice Balinese style? I thought she did brilliantly in very difficult 
circumstances.’ These comments reflect almost total ignorance and smack 
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Jones and Elliott were not only disrespectful of cultural difference but also implied that 
Corby was innocent purely because of a presumed cultural superiority. Lambert writes: 
“The judges were subsequently represented in most media as incompetent, disinterested, 
corrupt in the extreme and finally heartless and barbaric for failing to register the 
significance of ‘our Schapelle’s’ tears” (2008: 244). Eric Ellis argues that Elliott “gave a 
flavour of white Australian prejudices when he asserted on air that Indonesian President 
Susilo Bambag Yudohoyono – or “Wham Bam Thank You Mam Yiddi-yonnio”  as 
Elliott called him – and the Corby judges were monkeys” (2005: 18). According to 
Ellis, Elliott’s exact words were: “I have total disrespect for our neighbouring nation, 
my friend. Total disrespect ….Whoa, give them a banana and away they go” (2005: 19). 
In one move, Elliott manages to vindicate Corby, subjugate and alienate Indonesia and 
help to reinforce a moral panic, in the mainstream media and Australian public, by 
connecting Corby’s situation with normative ideas concerning race and national 
identity. 
 
In 2007, after investigating the comments made by Elliott following a complaint from a 
concerned radio listener, the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) 
found that Elliott had breached clause 1.3(e) of the Commercial Radio Australia Codes 
of Practice 2004:  
ACMA considers that the ordinary, reasonable listener would have understood, 
from the cumulative effect of these comments, the program to impute that 
Indonesian judges and, as explained below, Indonesian people are to be likened 
to sub-human primates who have no proper language or culture, and who are 
racially inferior to Australians ... ACMA therefore finds that the program was 
likely to vilify Indonesian judges and Indonesian people (2007: 10). 
Along with 2GB presenters Jones and Brian Witshire (for comments concerning 
Australians of Middle Eastern descent in reference to the Cronulla beach riots), the 85 
 
radio station was ordered to undergo “new training procedures” to ensure that such 
racial vilification was unilaterally condemned. According to the ACMA Elliott is no 
longer presenting on 2GB and an apology was issued to the Indonesian Embassy 
(Australian Communications and Media Authority 2008). The ‘dealing’ with these 
media entities by the state-operated media regulatory body (the ACMA) indicates the 
performative power of the state. Judith Butler argues that the utterance of hate speech 
reveals certain hierarchies of power: 
If hate speech is a kind of speech that no citizen ought to exercise, then how 
might its power be specified, if it can be? And how are both the proper speech of 
citizens and the improper hate speech of citizens to be distinguished from yet a 
third level of performative power, that which belongs to the state (1997: 821). 
The responses of individual spectators, representatives of media organisations and the 
state that were definitively racist or implied a sense of disapproval of Indonesia reveal 
underlying social and political issues. There is an act of doing in the utterance of the 
statement; in the enactment of all forms of hate speech, and in the punishment given for 
racial vilification. It seems that Jones’s comments about “justice balinese style” were 
not inflammatory enough, as he was reprimanded for comments concerning the 
Cronulla riots, rather than for these comments. The absence of condemnation suggests 
the state has in some manner sanctioned less explicit statements than, for example, the 
comments made by Elliott. Thus, in doing so the ACMA has upheld the sentiment of the 
statement by Jones. When racialist statements are tolerated, the statement’s meaning is 
reinforced through the performative and iterative power of the comment. Elliott’s 
comments were too explicit and culturally insensitive to ignore and thus, there had to be 
a punishment. However, I argue that perhaps the damage had already been done when 
people in positions of power, such as Elliott and Jones, bolster what was certainly an 
ignorant display of cultural and racial generalisation. 
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The appropriation of the ‘intelligible’ subject as inherently superior is deeply imbedded 
in the fear of the Other. For example, in a blog commentary John Simmons asks: “What 
do we do with these backward, primitive, poor, uneducated nonsecular nations like 
Indonesia, when they try to impose their very different values on one of our own?” 
(2005). It could be argued that this is an ironic statement in that Simmons imposes his 
values when he positions Indonesia as innately inferior to a superior Australian (white) 
value system. The very operations of racial oppression and cultural reductionism are 
reinforced by a blogger named “Sam Boogliodemus”: “Aussies are soooooo phony and 
obnoxious. If she were a fat black abo, nobody would have cared. People are only upset 
because she's a reasonably attractive white surfer bimbo” (2005). This blogger criticises 
the Corby spectacle yet simultaneously insults Indigenous Australians, as well as Corby 
herself. Ultimately, the comment reflects the multiplicity of interconnected discourses 
that are in operation in the Corby case and that exist in the contemporary Australian 
context. Lambert argues that:  
Schapelle functions as the Little Red Riding Hood of counter-terrorist discourse. 
… Apparently unaware of the ‘goodies’ she is carrying, she is interfered with en 
route and taken into captivity by an Other who neither respects or acknowledges 
her virtue or innocence (2008: 244). 
 
What is particularly interesting regarding both Lambert’s use of symbolism in the 
reference to Little Red Riding Hood and the following comment by a blogger is the 
discursive interplay among race, sexuality and gender: 
I saw an article about the prison she's bound for, after the sentence was handed 
down, which made it clear that it's a typical Asian hellhole, that the average 
lifespan of a long-term prisoner therein is about ten years, and that people you 
wouldn't even want to think about are going to be waiting for the nice middle-
class Aussie girl to arrive. So naturally, much blood is boiling for the damsel in 
a hell of a lot of distress (The Western Breed 2005). 
 
Emotive commentaries such as these not only reinforce the objectifying spectacle and 
reflect the nature and role of the interventionist spectator but also trigger a ‘social 87 
 
anxiety’ surrounding the case. The implications are that discourses of racial and cultural 
exclusion function as a normalising judgment: by rendering Indonesia and its peoples as 
the inherently inferior Other and representative of terror and injustice. 
 
A significant aspect of the mediatised spectacle surrounding Corby is related to her 
image as a young Australian woman. Men’s magazine FHM revealed that at the time of 
her trial, Corby was voted by its readers as one of one hundred ‘hottest’ women (Warner 
2005: 4). Editor John Bastick declared, in reference to a potential photographic spread 
of Corby, that, “At the time she was on trial and potentially could have been executed. 
… So it may have been considered in poor taste. ... By the time she comes out she might 
be 50 so they might not be so interested then” (Warner 2005: 4). Ralph and Penthouse 
magazines also expressed interest in photographing Corby. Ralph editor Michael 
Pickering said: “She’s an attractive girl in a distressing situation and its probably 
tugging at a few blokes’ heartstrings” (Warner 2005: 4). According to Derryn Hinch, an 
Australian television personality, “Corby has been getting this attention because she is 
young, white, pretty, and has big boobs” (Yeaman 2005: 4). Anthony Lambert writes 
that: “[her] breasts have been the focus of photographers, of bloggers and news editors 
alike. In 2005, men’s magazine FHM bestowed on her the title of second-best rack” 
(2008: 249).
26
 
 These comments suggest that the media and popular representation of 
Corby was not only focused on her decorum and emotional vulnerability but also in 
observing and classifying her in relation to her sexual value.  
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Critical to the success of discipline-producing complicity in the docile body is the role 
of the ‘examination’. Foucault suggests that the “examination combines the techniques 
of an observing hierarchy and those of a normalising judgment” (1977: 184). In this 
instance, the hierarchy is the observing media and public audience, whilst the 
normalising judgment consists of a subjugating gender discourse objectifying women. 
The examination itself is every newspaper article, blog entry and magazine poll that 
classifies and positions Corby in that manner. Foucault goes on to say that in the 
examination “are combined the ceremony of power and the form of the experiment, the 
deployment of forces and the establishment of truth” (1977: 184). The examination of 
Corby is evidenced by her treatment as an experiment and an object of power; she 
becomes a canvas on which truth formations are inscribed. These processes reinforce a 
dominant gender discourse through the media and popular panoptic gaze, thus also 
furthering the objectification of Corby. This gender gaze is made particularly evident 
when FHM can only award her breasts second place in a national poll for ‘best rack’. I 
am not suggesting that Corby is unique in this sense; it could be argued that in any case 
where a woman is on display for public consumption, a form of sexualisation occurs. 
However, a gender discourse is both conspicuous and critical in sustaining the spectacle 
that surrounds her. 
 
McKenzie writes that, “gendered subjectivity is itself constituted through compulsory 
performances of social norms” (2001: 166). Corby, disciplined by the surveillant gaze 
of the mass media and attentive public, is subjected to a similar performance in order to 
be considered socially intelligible. Riki Wilchins argues that, “we are subjected in daily 
life to a continuous dressage of gender” (2004: 69). These gendered codes are 
instrumental to subject formation and the social acceptability of the subject. However, 89 
 
for Corby this is a heightened experience. To gain what Butler refers to as “cultural 
intelligibility” (1993: 2), Corby is constituted in and through this hierarchy of 
interconnected discourses. She must perform to certain social norms to continue to be 
considered worthy of her audience. Thus, she is shaped and regulated according to a 
gendered discourse that as a result produces a kind of Foucauldian docility (1977: 136). 
Nancy Bates, editor of the Fraser Coast Chronicle, argued, on 4 July 2008 that: 
Our perceptions of guilt and innocence are easily tempered by image. Ugly, 
unrepentant, foul-behaved people are more easily judged guilty by the 
community than beautiful, pleading people of vulnerable appearance. Would 
Schapelle Corby have won as much attention and convinced so many of her 
innocence had she been unattractive and behaved repulsively? (2008: 8) 
An interesting parallel to the intelligible femininity of Corby is the representation of 
Lindy Chamberlain.
27
It can be argued that Corby’s open and frequent displays of emotion, with tears 
and bouts of fainting, worked in exactly the opposite way to the more stoic 
display of defiance shown by Chamberlain in 1981-2. Corby’s behaviour was 
more consistent with the melodramas so often seen on television, in which a 
vulnerable and wronged woman is portrayed as a helpless innocent victim 
(Schwartz 2005: 140). 
 John Schwartz notes that the Australian media criticised 
Chamberlain for her lack of emotion thirty years earlier but congratulates her for her 
public support of Corby (2005: 140). Unlike Chamberlain, Corby presented a very 
public display of grief whilst on trial. Her overflowing emotion was perceived by many 
as a testament to her innocence:  
Corby is granted support because she stays within the parameters of what is considered 
appropriate behaviour for a woman, as opposed to Chamberlain, who was punished for 
her inability to perform to this standard and left within a “zone of uninhabitability” 
(1993: 3). Although the position and treatment of women has shifted significantly since 
Chamberlain’s trial, I do believe that Butler’s statement, that “we regularly punish those 
                                                           
27 It should be noted that since Lindy’s second marriage, her name is now Lindy Chamberlain-Creighton. However, for the purposes 
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who fail to do their gender right” (1988: 273) has resonance to the Corby case. During 
her trial, Corby was supported and congratulated by her audience for her docility 
because her emotional decorum was considered to be acceptable within the dominant 
discourse of appropriate behaviour for a woman.  
 
Self-discipline is a vital component of the regulation of the body and the surveillance of 
the panopticon. Kevin Haggerty and Richard Ericson refer to the subjectification 
process involved in the panopticon when they argue that the panopticon “involves a 
productive soul training which encourages inmates to reflect upon the minutia of their 
own behaviour in subtle and ongoing efforts to transform their selves” (2006: 63). 
Corby exemplifies a hegemonic gender discourse as a beautiful yet fragile woman, a 
representation that she self-regulates in accordance with this dominant discourse. Neil 
McMahon remarks: “Corby behind bars; Corby in handcuffs; Corby in tears. And 
always, always beautifully groomed” (2005). Even in the bleakest hours of her 
incarceration, Corby refuses to ‘let herself go’, a practice Ellis reads as a self-conscious 
performance: “It’s the ultimate reality TV show, Corby, who seems to be the only bule 
(foreigner) in Bali who doesn’t sweat, has adapted well to her starring role” (2005: 18 
emphasis added). Corby is subjugated by a projected ‘femininity’: a ‘sweaty’ woman 
would be evidence of her ‘failing’ her femininity. Yet Corby is also complicit in her 
own subjugation by enabling this “starring role” (Ellis 2005: 218). She writes a year 
after the verdict of her need to shape and preen her body: 
I still pluck my eyebrows, I put conditioning treatment in my hair and dye it as 
soon as the grey roots come through. Most mornings I apply Natural Glow 
bronzing powder and waterproof mascara – for all the tears – and am constantly 
applying Cherry lip gloss (Corby and Bonella 2006: 4). 91 
 
Corby expresses a pride in maintaining her appearance. However, by so doing she 
reinforces her docility. This is not to imply that a person should not find his or her own 
way to cope with such a traumatic situation, but I acknowledge the significance of a 
gender-based discourse in this context. This subjugation is not only reinforced via her 
representation as a ‘helpless’ white woman exiled in a foreign landscape but also via her 
own acceptance of this projected image. Hence, Corby’s awareness of the significance 
of the spectacle that surrounds her compounds the actual observation of her. 
 
I believe that, as long as Corby continues to perform her gender ‘correctly’, she will 
sustain her own objectification. If she does not, the risk is that her attentive and 
supportive audience might reject her. In an interesting development, recent media 
reports (principally magazine and Internet commentaries) have focused on Corby’s 
mental health. Concern for her well-being has taken on a paternalistic attitude. 
Headlines have included: “Corby not ‘in the real world’” (Cassrels 2009: 3), “Clemency 
pleas for ill Schapelle” (Wockner 2009: 4) and “Grave fears for Corby’s sanity” (Kellet 
2009: 3). Whether these reports are true or not, her mediatised representation situates 
Corby as volatile, fragile and in desperate need of assistance. In this sense, her 
commodification – Corby’s audience value and commercial marketability – centres on 
her emotional demeanour and mental health status. There seems to be a shift from the 
time of her trial to the time of the reports above published in 2009, where her emotional 
outpourings were interpreted by many as symbolic of her innocence and innate feminine 
truth to her current situation as vulnerable to ‘madness’.  
 
These reports seem to neither punish Corby for her inability to continue performing 
docility nor to declare her ‘erratic’ behaviour as projecting some kind of gendered 92 
 
hysteria. Rather, they suggest that her possible psychological breakdown is the result of 
her foreign environment. In an interwoven interplay between gender and racial 
discourses, the suffering white woman is positioned in opposition to Indonesia, which is 
seen as evil, criminal and unfair. I am not arguing that Corby herself is not suffering 
from mental health issues but rather that there is a market value attached to representing 
her in this way to appeal to a fascinated spectatorship, which, in turn, further 
compounds the spectacle surrounding her. This changing media representation of Corby 
reflects that, as Corby’s audience shifts, so, too, does the nature of the spectacle. 
 
If Corby is fantasised, fetishised and consumed as a heterosexual woman within the 
forums of such magazines as FHM, Ralph and Penthouse, then Renae Lawrence, from 
the Bali Nine, is the representation of social ‘unacceptability’ as a lesbian.
28
                                                           
28 The ‘Bali Nine’ are nine Australians convicted of smuggling 8.3 kg of heroin into Indonesia. They were arrested in Bali on 17 
April 2005. Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran were sentenced to death, while Si Yen Chen, Scott Rush, Tach Duc Thanh 
Nguyen and Mathew Norman had various sentences including twenty years and life. However, in 2006 the Indonesia Supreme Court 
imposed the death penalty for Si Yen Chen, Scott Rush, Tach Duc Thanh Nguyen and Mathew Norman. Michael Czugaj and Martin 
Stephens were sentenced to life in prison and Renae Lawrence received twenty years. Lawrence was the only woman in the group. 
Michelle Leslie, an Australian model, was arrested in Bali for possession of ecstasy on 21 August 2005 and was sentenced to three 
months jail. She was released on 19 November 2005. 
 In this case, 
linked to a gender and racial discourse, is a discourse of heterosexuality. When Corby, 
or the individuals associated with her, are unable to perform to a “heterosexual 
imperative” (Butler 1993: 2), they are symbolically punished. As Foucault argues, “The 
whole indefinite domain of the non-conforming is punishable” (1977: 178 - 179). 
Stephen Crofts contends that Corby, “expresses outraged innocence, anguish, muted 
anger, and sad resignation in the manner of a silent film star” (2006: 8). In opposition to 
this, Lawrence is the homosexual Other, who according to one blogger, “Looks like a 
thundering diesel dyke” (twodogshellbound 2008). I argue that Lawrence was never 
given the marketable status or the emotive spectacle granted to Corby because of 
presumptive heterosexual normalising strategies. 
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Crofts suggests that the media interest in Corby is inseparable from her representation 
as a heterosexual woman: “She is as beautiful and photogenic as someone in a celebrity 
news item; compare Renee Lawrence from the contemporaneous Bali Nine trial, who 
has attracted markedly less media interest” (2006: 8). Corby was reported to have given 
make-up and dress advice to Lawrence, although, when Corby first met Lawrence, she 
described her as a ‘psychopathic lesbian’: 
All the girls who’d shared a cell with her had been telling stories about this 
freak. She refused to let anyone else sleep if she was awake. She’d kick them in 
the head, sexually hit on them, punch them. So by the time she checked in at 
Kerobokan, I imagined Renae as a psychopathic lesbian. I was scared to death of 
her (Corby and Bonella 2006).  
Lawrence has little chance to resist being positioned as the Other when she is referred to 
as a freak or a psychopathic lesbian. The Australian model, Michelle Leslie, was often 
handcuffed to Lawrence as they attended their court appearances together.
29
 
 It was 
reported that Leslie’s defence team wanted to have them enter separately – believing 
that Lawrence’s obvious guilt of drug trafficking might in some way affect Leslie’s 
attempts to prove her innocence. However, perhaps this decision was also linked to 
Lawrence’s sexuality. This situation could be read as a negotiation around the “cultural 
intelligibility” of women in this context: if Leslie was to be associated, linked, to the 
body of the lesbian Other, her own intelligibility might be called into question or at least 
reinforce a projected difference. 
Hinch remarked on the difference between Lawrence and Corby: “I haven’t seen any 
TV network devoting prime time to some scrawny, male Vietnamese-Australian on 
death row in Singapore. ... Or for the Bali Nine girl and I’d say it’s because she’s 
                                                           
29 Michelle Leslie, as a result of spending three months in jail at the time of her sentencing, was released the following day from 
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unattractive and a lesbian” (Yeaman 2005: 4).
30
 
 Lawrence is a perceived threat to the 
“heterosexual imperative” promoted by the mainstream media, consumerist discourse 
and dominant moral boundaries concerning sexuality. Hence, she does not receive the 
same amount of media or popular attention as Corby. In a recent book about daily life in 
Kerobokan Prison, Kathryn Bonella (co-author of Schapelle Corby’s autobiography My 
Story), remarks that the “other lesbians called Renae Lawrence the playboy of the 
women’s block. She was large, muscular and masculine, had money and was Western” 
(2009: 105). Lawrence is not only unable to claim innocence in reference to her crime – 
the cakes of heroin were found strapped to her flesh – but she is also guilty of not 
conforming to the normative function of the ‘naturalized’ heterosexual woman. In 
opposition, as long as Corby is able to maintain her innocence (of drug trafficking) she 
will retain the mediated representation of an ‘innocent’ woman supported by her ability 
to ‘successfully’ perform this feminine and heterosexual discourse.  
Corby, Lawrence and Leslie are constituted and represented via the ‘intelligibility’ of 
their ‘sex’: “‘Sex’ is, thus, not simply what one has, or a static description of what one 
is: it will be one of the norms by which the ‘one’ becomes viable at all, that which 
qualifies a body for life within the domain of cultural intelligibility” (Butler 1993: 2). 
Sexuality, like gender, is a performative act constituted and enacted through 
socialisation and rendered legitimate or otherwise according to these normalising 
strategies. Barbara Creed argues that, “woman in whatever form – whether heterosexual 
or lesbian – has been variously depicted as narcissist, sex-fiend, creature, tomboy, 
vampire, maneater, child, nun, virgin” (2005: 109). Corby’s capacity to remain as 
‘intelligible’ can be seen, in reference to Creed’s assertion, as a negotiation between a 
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depiction of symbolic virginity and maternal femininity. However, all three women are 
unable to escape from the classification and examination techniques of the status quo 
determining whether they are the patriarchal pin-up, the villainous manipulative woman 
or the homosexual Other. 
 
The continual reiteration of a discourse of heterosexuality is maintained via the varied 
representations of Corby in the media, principally in the form of women’s magazines 
and her biography. Corby writes, in an ‘exclusive’ extract from her personal diary, that 
in Kerobokan jail “unsightly sexual activities occur”. She describes them as: “prisoners 
performing sexual acts on guards through the bars, or female prisoners kissing a female 
guard” (Corby 2007: 16). This extract illustrates not only a negative perception of 
homosexuality but of any sexual activity by the inmates. In this context, the 
representation of Lawrence in the media and in the public eye as different excludes her 
from social normativity, while desire for Corby ultimately derives from her helplessness 
and declarations of sexual abstinence. Corby writes of the dirt, smell and disease of 
other inmates (which implicates Lawrence even if only by association). In reference to 
prisoners with AIDS and hepatitis, she declares that, “I haven’t done anything to be 
exposed to those” (2006: 3). According to Lambert, “Schapelle remains above the 
others, but in a constant struggle with abjection, with territorial contamination” (2008: 
250). Corby’s sentiments not only link the sexuality of the other inmates to the prison’s 
‘unclean’ environment but also by doing so imply an unknowable foreign Otherness.  
 
After it was reported in the Indonesian media that Corby might be pregnant, she was 
subjected to a court-ordered pregnancy test. The inference, before the test’s negative 
results were revealed, was that she was strongly suspected of either engaging in 96 
 
consensual sexual activity or that some form of abuse had occurred. The implication of 
consensual sex is a threat to the perception of Corby’s innocence. How innocent could 
Corby be if she were guilty of ‘enjoying’ her incarceration? Lambert argues in relation 
to Corby’s pregnancy test: “Her body, then, became both a potential passport to 
freedom and a biological, ethnic and sexual prison” (2008: 249). Corby continued to 
dismiss similar allegations into 2007 and in reference to her rumoured romance with the 
Bali Nine’s Andrew Chan, she declared, “I don’t and have not had a boyfriend in here. I 
have never had sex in this filthy and disgusting place and won’t until I’m released – I’ll 
just keep eating a lot of chocolate” (2007: 17). If Corby was involved in a sexual 
relationship in prison, consensual sex might be considered morally ambiguous and thus, 
potentially damage her image as an ‘innocent’ woman. 
 
Corby also represents the normative gender discourse that equates womanhood with 
motherhood. Corby wrote in 2007 of her desire for children: “Right now I’m in the 
middle of my final appeal. It’s my last chance for a normal life, for a future where I can 
get married and have a baby, fulfil my potential as woman. If it fails I do not know what 
I will do” (2007: 17). This statement encapsulates the naturalised patriarchal discourse 
of gender and sexuality in relation to the frustrations of her situation. It assumes that her 
‘natural’ right as a woman to be a mother and a wife has been cruelly and unfairly 
disrupted.  
 
Occasionally, Corby is unable to perform to expectations of heterosexual femininity. 
New Idea magazine described one hair cut as a “brand-new butch look” (Editor 2006: 
22), suggesting that she had buried her shorn hair in the prison garden, “like some 
strange religious burial ceremony” (Editor 2006: 22). Lambert argues that implicit in the 97 
 
representation of her shorn hair is an insinuation of guilt: “Is, she, for instance, 
becoming ‘prisoner’ by becoming less ostensibly feminine and heterosexual, and 
thereby less the Australian figure of distress that requires defence?” (2008: 253). In 
adopting this ‘butch’ hairstyle, Corby is presumably failing to reinforce a discourse of 
‘femininity’. Not surprisingly, she is mocked by the media for not performing her 
sexuality and gender ‘correctly.’ Not only do these responses reflect a perceived failure 
to reinforce social normativity, they also show us that her audience is just as likely to 
reject as support her. These shifts in audience support could be seen as indicating an 
evolving, and perhaps superficial, spectatorship that then influences the nature of the 
spectacle. 
 
As previously discussed, societal rules classify and regulate individual behaviour within 
a “normalising judgment” (Foucault 1977: 177). Each blog entry, magazine or 
newspaper article that discusses the figure of Corby contributes to this sense of 
observation and objectification. Whenever she or the people surrounding her fail to 
reinforce this normative judgment, they are criticised and symbolically punished. This 
punishment leads to a change in the mediatised and popular representation of Corby – 
shifting from endorsement to a lessening of support and at times contemptuous 
vilification. Some examples of public response are merciless: “Look at the family that 
poor girl comes from, she never had a chance, a bushpig mother, drugged yobbo father, 
half islander half who knows what no no no they are all scum leave them in Bali” 
(Housos 2005). In the screening of the documentary, Schapelle Corby: The Hidden 
Truth, very few individuals represented (family, friends and legal associates) escaped 
unscathed. The screening elicited further comments from the public, many vilifying 
Corby and her family. One blogger named Presti declared that: “[The] Corby family are 98 
 
clearly manipulative trash” (2008). I find it fascinating that at the height of her 
popularity during the trial very little was reported against Corby’s family but that as the 
spectacle transformed – shaped and directed by her commercial marketability – her 
family was increasingly examined and critiqued. This shift suggests that Corby’s active 
and participating audience continually evolves with the spectacle surrounding her. Thus, 
Corby will continue to be “subjected, used, transformed” (Foucault 1977: 136) by these 
regulating discourses of normative society: a complex system that ‘qualifies’, 
‘classifies’ and at times ‘punishes’ Corby and those around her (Foucault 1977: 184).  
 
Conclusions 
The moral panic around the Corby case is linked to what she came to symbolise for her 
audiences. For some, it was an innocent helpless woman in a foreign landscape. For 
others, it was her status as a sexual object within a consumerist discourse, while other 
respondents reacted strongly to the media and popular attention given to the case. The 
responses, however varied, contributed to an anxiety surrounding Corby, revealing 
deeply entrenched social and political issues – influenced by discourses of race, gender 
and sexuality – rendering the subject objectified. The moral panic is fuelled by a sense 
that social normativity is threatened in some way by her situation. The performance 
surrounding Corby questions how a subject can be considered “socially acceptable” and 
what happens to the subject when they are able, or unable, to perform this intelligibility. 
Corby is regulated and disciplined, like Foucault’s docile body, in that she is subjected, 
shaped and framed according to what her audience considers appropriate. At times, she 
is able to return the gaze and manipulate her situation to her advantage. Ultimately, 
however, this agency is incomplete, as it cannot exist outside the regulating regime of 
the media and the dominant discourses of race, gender and sexuality. Agency, in this 99 
 
sense, is restricted to the same discursive paradigm that dictates social acceptability. For 
Corby, the spectacle is her greatest ally and her fiercest enemy and this surveillance of 
imposed intelligibility is potentially as inhibiting as the very walls of her literal 
incarceration. 
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...it was taking charge of life, more than the threat of death, 
that gave power its access even to the body (Foucault 1980: 143) 
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Chapter three: Biopower in the performance of the Terri Schiavo case 
 
 
Figure 2: Terri Schiavo with her mother, Mary Schindler, 
at the Woodside Hospice in Pinellas Park, Florida in 2001 (Reuters 2005) 
 
In 1990, American woman, Terri Schiavo suffered a cardio and respiratory attack and, 
until her death in 2005, was in a persistent vegetative state (PVS), kept alive by a 
surgically inserted feeding tube. Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett suggests that to 
“perform is to do” (2002: 33) and yet in the case of Schiavo, to do was to perform. The 
slightest bodily movement was perceived as a sign of some vestige of her former self. 
Because of the prevailing social and political landscape of the USA, the particularities 
of the Schiavo case became the canvas for a broader debate on the value of life. All 
three case studies explore the discourses involved in moral panic triggered by each 
event. The previous chapter examined the notion of the panopticon in relation to the 
Schapelle Corby case and discourse of race, gender and sex. In this chapter, I examine 
the particulars of the Schiavo case, while exploring the entire event as a performance of 102 
 
contested truth formations in the regulatory operations of biopower (Foucault 1980; 
Agamben 1998; Hardt and Negri 2000; Žižek 2005).  
 
Most of the opinion-as-evidence in this case came from old and new media, including 
newspaper articles, websites, television talk shows and blogs. The latter were generally 
attached to Internet sites of a critical liberal faction (constitutional/judicial analysts and 
the right-to-death campaign), in contrast to sites concerned with Schiavo’s parents 
Robert and Mary Schindler’s fight to save her (and to interest groups associated with the 
pro-life movement). As the spectacle accelerated, so did the performance of vitriolic 
judgments and divergent claims to truth. Scandalous opinions were validated as the 
prerogative of the individual, the family, of religion and of the State. Yet each 
intervention by the spectators in the spectacle further contributed to the building moral 
panic that occurred, predominantly in the USA. As a result, the objectification of 
Schiavo was compounded by the continual cycle of spectator, spectacle and moral 
panic. 
 
This chapter begins with a history of the Schiavo case. I then explore how the spectacle 
surrounding the Schiavo case became the site for the furious struggle among competing 
versions of truth. Although Schiavo herself was in a hospice, her body (and medical 
status) were exhibited in the media, in the courtroom, on the floor of United States 
Congress, and on the Internet. She had become the literal manifestation of the body of 
evidence. As this was essentially a battle between various truth formations, I am 
interested in how hearsay was used. This exploration examines the ideological and 
discursive interplay of the moral panic triggered by the case in relation to Foucault’s 
theory of biopower (1980; 2003) and Giorgio Agamben’s conceptualisation of “bare 103 
 
life” (1997; 1998). Biopower and biopolitics can be considered a critical discourse of 
modernity that enables the monitoring, classification and regulation of peoples and 
populations. Bare life refers to the perception that a subject is unworthy of participating 
within the status quo. In the contemporary landscape, particularly in relation to the 
ongoing ‘war on terror’, concepts such as these play a significant role in unpacking the 
nature of the moral panic surrounding the Schiavo case. The chapter concludes with 
questions about subjectification processes in relation to the case, in contrast with 
another American woman, Susan Torres.  
 
The case of Terri Schiavo  
Teresa Marie Schindler Schiavo (Terri Schiavo) was born in Philadelphia on 3 
December 1963. She was the eldest of three children born to Robert and Mary 
Schindler, who are devout Roman Catholics. Terri married Michael Schiavo in 1984 
and moved to St Petersburg, Florida, where Michael worked in the hospitality industry 
and Terri worked as a clerk for an insurance company. On February 25 1990, when she 
was 26 years old, Schiavo suffered a cardiac and respiratory attack. Michael found her 
unconscious in a hallway of their house in the early hours of the morning. She was 
resuscitated, defibrillated, and ventilated and remained in a coma for ten weeks 
(Wolfson 2003: 7-8). After numerous studies and tests, it was reported that, because of 
the lack of oxygen to the brain at the time of the cardiac arrest, Schiavo was in a 
continuous sleep-wake state. After three years in this condition without change, she was 
diagnosed as existing in a Persistent Vegetative State (PVS).
31
                                                           
31 Florida state law defines PVS as: “a permanent and irreversible condition of unconsciousness in which there is: (a) The absence of 
voluntary action or cognitive behaviour of any kind, and b) An inability to communicate or interact purposefully with the 
environment” (Florida Legislature 2002).  
 Her only mechanism of 
Florida law permits the removal of life support of a patient in PVS without an advance directive if they have a judicially appointed 
guardian, or a guardian acting on the specific advice of a physician. (Florida Legislature 2002). 104 
 
survival was a surgically inserted feeding tube and she remained in that state for fifteen 
years. 
 
From 1998, Michael Schiavo began what were to be seven years of legal proceedings to 
have her feeding tube removed. He argued that it was what Terri would have wanted. 
By the time of her death, after the removal of the feeding tube for the third time, the 
Florida court system had heard some fourteen appeals, motions, petitions and hearings, 
rulings by the Federal United States Supreme Court, and intervention by the United 
States Senate and House of Representatives. President George W Bush, in the early 
hours of March 21
 2005, signed a Congressional Bill later known as the Palm Sunday 
Compromise, allowing the federal courts to intervene (U.S. Senate and House of 
Representatives 2005). However, the Federal United States Supreme Court refused to 
hear the Schiavo case on the strength that no further evidence had been offered to refute 
earlier rulings, or that it was a constitutional matter. On 23
 March 2005, Judge Greer 
issued a restraining order against the Department of the Children and Families (DCF), 
declaring that Florida law enforcement would have to act if the DCF removed Schiavo 
from the hospice (Cerminara and Goodman 2006). On 31
 March 2005, at the age of 41, 
Schiavo died, thirteen days after the removal of the tube and fifteen years after her 
initial collapse. 
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The battle for truth  
In 1990, Michael Schiavo was appointed Terri’s legal guardian and in 1992, he sued Dr 
G. Stephen Igel, the obstetrician who had been assisting Terri’s attempts to become 
pregnant. Michael argued that the high levels of potassium found in Schiavo’s body 
after her initial collapse indicated an undiagnosed eating disorder that was related to 
weight fluctuations she had suffered persistently over many years (Wolfson 2003: 8-9). 
It was found that Igel had been negligent because he did not inform Schiavo of the 
danger of high levels of potassium and Michael Schiavo, as her guardian, was 
eventually awarded one million dollars. During this time, the Schindler family and 
Michael amicably shared various duties in caring for Schiavo. By May 1998, Michael 
was convinced – after numerous experimental treatments and attempts at rehabilitation 
– that his wife was indeed in a permanent and persistent vegetative state (PVS) and that 
she would not have wanted to continue living in such a condition. The Schindlers 
disagreed and so began the extraordinary legal battle. 
 
A trial was held to determine whether Schiavo would have wanted to continue living in 
such a condition. In December 1998, Richard Pearse was appointed as Terri Schiavo’s 
second legal guardian to assess properly Schiavo’s stance on euthanasia and Michael’s 
intentions. Pearse found no finite answers to either while the diagnosis of PVS was 
correct (Wolfson 2003: 11-13). In 2000, a trial was held to determine Schiavo’s wishes 
in the absence of an advance directive. This trial was a battle between the opposing 
forces of an alleged truth, with each side providing eyewitness accounts from eighteen 
witnesses. Michael argued that Schiavo had explicitly told him she would not want to be 
reliant on medical technology. He was supported by testimonies by his brother and 
sister-in-law, arguing they too had heard Schiavo make this statement (Lynne 2005: 3). 106 
 
The Schindlers argued that (as a devout Roman Catholic), Schiavo would never have 
disregarded the sanctity of life; a friend also testified that Schiavo had mentioned she 
would want to continue living in the event something like this happened to her (Lynne 
2005: 4). In February 2000, Florida District Court Judge George Greer ruled in 
Michael’s favour and, although the Schindlers appealed that decision, it was eventually 
upheld in 2001. 
 
The Schindlers attempted various legal manoeuvres to delay the removal of the tube, 
including a request for oral feeding (deemed impossible because she was not capable of 
swallowing) and a guardianship challenge.
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 The court ruled in Michael’s favour to 
uphold his right to guardianship and set the date for the tube’s removal to be April 24 
2001. What followed was a frantic attempt by the Schindlers to stay the removal of the 
tube, including a motion citing new evidence. This motion was denied and Schiavo’s 
feeding tube was removed. The Schindlers quickly filed a civil law suit for alleged 
perjury and Judge Frank Quesada ruled that the tube be reinserted until the allegation 
could be heard. It was reinserted two days later.  
At this time, it became apparent that the Schindlers needed a change in direction. They 
began a legal challenge to the diagnosis of PVS. They turned to the Court of Appeals, 
claiming that Schiavo might ‘wake’ if she received appropriate stimulation and on 17
 
October 2001 the Florida Second District Court of Appeals declared that an evidentiary 
hearing be held with five experts to provide an impartial and updated diagnosis 
                                                           
32 This challenge was on the grounds that Michael was intimately involved with other women and that he was not providing 
adequate care for Schiavo. Michael was involved with Jodi Centonze and at the time had one child with her. They later married after 
Schiavo’s death. Michael argued that he had always been open about the relationship and that earlier, in the first years of Schiavo’s 
incapacitation, the Schindlers had encouraged him to see other women. He argued in response to the guardianship challenge that 
divorcing Schiavo was not in his interest, as it would mean reneging on his duty to fulfil her wish to die (Wolfson 2003: 1-38). 107 
 
(Cerminara and Goodman 2006). The Schindlers and Michael Schiavo were allowed 
two experts each, with the final deciding expert to be appointed by the court. It was 
during this evidentiary hearing that the court saw six hours of video footage of Schiavo. 
The tape depicted Schiavo as moving slightly. Her parents argued that the movement 
was a response to the presence of her family and a floating balloon. Along with the 
video footage, updated computed axial tomography scans (CAT scan), and other 
medical procedures indicating limited brain activity, were presented to the court. Dr 
Cranford, Dr Greer and the court-appointed Dr Bambakidis determined that Schiavo 
was in PVS with no chance of recovery and Dr Maxfield and Dr Hammesfahr 
concluded she was in a minimally conscious state. Judge Greer, on reviewing the 
evidence and testimonies declared that Schiavo was in PVS without any hope of 
improvement and that Schiavo’s movements were inconsistent and incapable of 
reproduction (Wolfson 2003: 17). However, the Schindlers edited the six hours of video 
footage into various clips amounting to a total of six minutes and released them to the 
public via the Internet. The resulting images portrayed Schiavo as apparently responsive 
and aware. In my view, the unedited footage, conclusively indicating the extent of 
Schiavo’s PVS, was manipulated to encourage pity and released to the court of public 
opinion. The footage and how it was interpreted reflect how ‘truth’ is a contested and 
mediated construct. 
 
In 2003, the Schindlers introduced a petition with five separate affidavits attached. Four 
were from the Schindler family and one from a Dr Alexander T. Gimon. The aim was to 
delay the removal of the tube. One of these affidavits came from the nurse Carla Sauer 
Iyer. Iyer alleged that low levels of blood sugar could have been attributed to Michael 
intravenously injecting Schiavo with insulin. Iyer told the court that in response she had 108 
 
called the police and was fired the following day.  Judge Greer denied the petition and 
stated that the petition “is an attempt by Mr. and Mrs. Schindler to re-litigate the entire 
case. It is not even a veiled or disguised attempt. The exhibits relied upon by them 
clearly demonstrate this to be true” (2003: 3-4). It appears that the accelerating spectacle 
of truth formations were rapidly becoming desperate. By this stage, the case had 
captured the imaginations of an ideologically and politically divided public: 
 
By mid 2003, the landscape, time and texture of Theresa Schiavo’s case underwent 
profound changes. National media coverage, active involvement by groups advocating 
right to life, and the attention of the Governor’s office and the Florida Legislature 
catapulted Theresa’s case into a different dimension (Wolfson 2003: 18). The nature of 
testimony also transformed – evolving from judicial evidence from the expert witness in 
the early courtroom appearances to what I refer to as the survivor’s testimony given by 
the differing perspectives of the Schindlers and Michael Schiavo. According to John 
Durham Peters, the testimony of the survivor “lies in mortal engagement with the story 
told” (2001: 716). The Schindler family and Michael Schiavo were intensely invested in 
their understanding of truth: death or life was the outcome of each individual’s version 
of history involving what must have seemed like a mortal engagement with variations of 
the truth. Each party enunciated a survivor’s testimonial crucial to the continuation and 
direction of the spectacle, thus ensuring that it would meet their particular needs. Both 
Michael and the Schindlers relied on a sustained spectacle for the vindication of their 
particular version of the truth – to kill or not to kill.  
 
The most acrimonious argument that unfolded within old and new media was the 
relationship among Schiavo, Michael and her family. Writing about the case, Joan 109 
 
Didion declared that, “In the bright light shed by family disaster, few marriages look 
good” (2005). Michael Schiavo was questioned about “control issues” because he 
apparently kept a record of the travel mileage of Schiavo’s car. Didion notes that Bobby 
Schindler, Schiavo’s brother, had declared that before her collapse, she had tearfully 
admitted that her marriage was “falling apart” (2005). Speculation mounted surrounding 
whether Michael’s motivations were honest and whether there was a case for abuse. 
This speculation directly led to the Florida Department of Children and Families 
receiving and investigating 89 complaints regarding the abuse and exploitation of 
Schiavo. It was determined that there was no reason or evidence to believe that this had 
occurred at any stage by either the Schindlers or Michael (2005). On the Larry King 
Show, Michael declared that the Schindlers’ motivations to fight the removal of 
Schiavo’s feeding tube were purely financial (King 2003). The Schindlers claimed that 
Michael hadn’t pursued rehabilitation and he claimed in response that he had repeatedly 
sought medical options, all of which all resulted in the same prognosis: Schiavo’s 
medical condition would not change (King 2003). As Didion suggests, “Accusation was 
nonetheless the air all parties were by then breathing” (2005). 
 
On 15 October 2003, Schiavo’s tube was removed for the second time. In an 
extraordinary move by the Florida legislature, a bill titled “Terri’s Law” was passed, 
enabling Florida Governor Jeb Bush to intervene in the case. Schiavo, six days without 
hydration or nutrition, was removed from the hospice by the Florida Department of Law 
Enforcement and placed in hospital where her tube was surgically reinserted. Dr 
Wolfson was appointed as a guardian ad litem – an impartial witness – reporting to 
Governor Bush. Eventually, the Florida Supreme Court found that the legislation and 
intervention were unconstitutional. Apparently, the government had gone too far. The 110 
 
actions of the government, politicians and the courts were critical in sustaining the 
growing moral panic surrounding Schiavo and her feuding family. 
 
My objective is not to determine who was considered to be speaking the truth but 
instead (using this case as an example) to explore how truth is constituted and for what 
purpose it is legitimated. Further, my intent is to examine the prevailing dominant 
discourses and normalisation strategies that legitimise these truth formations. Dr Jay 
Wolfson alludes to the spectacle surrounding Schiavo and how it potentially affected the 
Schindlers and Michael Schiavo thus: “extensive urban mythology has created toxic 
clouds, causing the parties and others to behave in ways that may not, in the order of 
things, serve the best interests of the ward” (2003: 34). From this perspective, Schiavo 
became a symbol of a larger ideological struggle. She was the literal object exhibited for 
the purposes of sustaining a spectacle for the media and her opposing family, the 
vindication of opposing truths for the right-to-life/death movements and the battle for 
the preservation and/or disruption of normative discourse. 
 
The series of events that occurred at the junction of government intervention represent 
both the symbolic and the literal applications of legal and political discourse on the 
human body. Therefore, when Governor Jeb Bush removed Schiavo from her hospice to 
have her feeding tube reinserted, he was symbolically inscribing legal discourse onto 
her objectified body. It could be argued that this move went beyond the pursuit of 
personal or political beliefs and entered the realm of national symbolism. This struggle 
was principally concerned with the contestations surrounding a particular discourse of 
liberty. The American tradition of liberty for all – personal, political, professional – 
associated with neo-liberalism as an economic and political strategy of the conservative 111 
 
Bush administration (with its origins much earlier) and the ongoing wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq seemed to position liberty as the prevailing discourse at the time. However, 
liberty is a problematic concept: for whom and how is ‘liberty’ pursued and/or obtained 
and at what cost? How can liberty ever be literally experienced by the subject who is 
physically and mentally incapacitated? Further, who is this liberty really for if it can’t 
be experienced by that subject? The  fraught performance of enforced liberty can be 
only for the mass-mediated audience (and interest groups) that are galvanised in 
response to the six-minute clips, endless court appearances, speeches, prayers, 
speculation and gossip. The ensuing spectacle means that not only are the immediate 
players – such as Governor Bush, the Schindlers, Michael, etc. – implicated in the 
objectification of the incapacitated subject but also the spectators who became actively 
involved in the case. Schiavo becomes the actual battleground on which the fight for 
liberty occurs. The meanings produced by the audience become a concoction of hearsay, 
‘expert’ opinion, and specific ideological interests. These contributions both in the 
formal courtroom and in the court of popular opinion (principally in the form of blogs) 
become a type of evidence that is primarily concerned with particular notions of liberty. 
 
Hearsay as spectatorial intervention 
John Durham Peters suggests that hearsay is “quotation, testimony at second-hand” 
(2001: 716). In this situation, hearsay occurs in the public sphere and is considered less 
‘truthful’ than that which is discussed within the courtroom. However, the notion of 
hearsay is critical to unpacking the significance of the Schiavo case. As the spectacle 
accelerated, gossip and rumour began to be interpreted as evidence. Examining hearsay 
is valuable not only to understanding the cultural and political issues inherent in this 112 
 
moral panic but also to understanding the nature of moral absolutism in the wake of 
polarised truth formations. 
 
Didion reported that groups such as the National Right to Life, the Traditional Values 
Coalition, the Family Research Council, Focus on the Family, and Operation Rescue, 
were involved in supporting the Schindler’s case (2005). The National Right to Life was 
founded in 1973 as a response to Roe v. Wade and is the largest pro-life organisation 
(political action group) in the USA, with representatives in all fifty states. The 
organisation was instrumental in rallying both public and political support for the 
passing of the Florida State legislation, ‘Terri’s Law’, which allowed Governor Jeb 
Bush to intervene in the case. In 2010, there were still over two hundred articles in 
reference to Terri Schiavo on their website. Overall, public commentaries supporting 
the Schindler family and the pro-life campaign tended to be emotional and 
sensationalist. As discussed in chapter one, the very nature of blogs means that 
objective reporting is not necessarily important. Brian McNair argues that, at “times of 
global crisis the blogosphere comes into its own as a uniquely diverse and rich 
information pool, for which the occasional error or malicious rumour may be judged a 
small price to pay” (2006: 129). The evidence presented in court was examined and 
debated on blogs and this discussion was often imbued with the ideological position of 
the blogs’ creators and contributors. The impartial judiciary system was placed in a 
contested parallel with the court of popular opinion and thus the distinction between 
hearsay and evidence outside of the courtroom became blurred. The ideological 113 
 
interplay among various interests groups influenced particular institutional bodies to 
respond, thus extending the spectacle and what Schiavo came to represent.
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Patrick Kelley wrote in his blog: “Michael Schiavo is a hero in my opinion, one of the 
few true American heroes (a term which oft used and abused) ... What Michael Schiavo 
has been going through over the last twelve years amounts to libel and slander of the 
most obscene variety” (2005). Throughout his blog, Kelley makes some extraordinary 
speculations, some of which could be considered slanderous. However, the vast 
majority of vitriolic judgment was predominantly anti-Michael Schiavo.  
 
One particular blog, A Family’s Torment- Terri Schiavo, contained a dialogue between 
pro-life campaigners and, in my opinion, represents the magnitude of the spectacle 
surrounding the case. What is intriguing about this blog is how speculation was 
presented as truth and not the unsubstantiated hearsay that it was. This particular blog 
provided what seemed to be a blow-by-blow account of the various court proceedings, 
yet the ‘evidence’ was grossly manipulated because of the particular intentions of its 
creators. On 12 February 2005, a detailed explanation of the case was posted by a 
blogger named only as ‘amdgmary’: “The following items are among many very 
frustrating circumstances that Terri Schiavo’s parents, brother, and sister consider to be 
abuses of Terri on the part of Michael Schiavo. … All of these have been condoned by 
Judge Greer and the Pinellas County officials” (2005). The abuse written about was 
based on allegations made by the Schindlers (and continually denied by Michael) were 
found to be unsubstantiated by Judge Greer (Cerminara and Goodman 2006). The same 
                                                           
33 In both the 2000 and 2004 US elections, both the pro-life and pro-choice movements in association with political action groups 
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blogger continues with accusations of neglect and the “Denial of Therapy, 
Rehabilitation and Necessary Services” (2005) and suggests that, as the inheritor of 
Schiavo’s medical trust fund, Michael may have had dishonest intentions. The blog 
contains an outline of the various times when Michael restricted visitors, predominantly 
Schindler family members, and refused to replace an old wheelchair – as evidence of his 
character failings and malicious intentions. The blog entry argues that Michael did not 
allow swallow therapy and reports that: “Terri’s parents, Bob and Mary Schindler, have 
the testimony of several physicians and have submitted additional affidavits to the court 
since the original January 2000 trial stating that, with proper therapy, Terri could be 
taught to not only eat food again, but also speak” (amdgmary 2005).  
 
The 2003 report by the third court-appointed guardian ad litem, Dr Wolfson, found that 
there was no hope for rehabilitation (Wolfson 2003: 33). This information was absent 
from the blog and instead replaced with this statement: “Judge Greer has denied any 
swallowing therapy believing that a potential death by aspiration and choking is more 
agonizing than his order to have Terri die by starvation and dehydration” (amdgmary 
2005). This allegation is followed by accusations of “Denial of Personal Items, Gifts” 
and “Denial of Stimulation” and the “Denial of Interaction with Parent” (amdgmary 
2005). The list of accusations as evidence of negligence and abuse by Michael Schiavo 
is concluded with a statement: “Michael Schiavo refuses to Dissolve Marriage” and is 
“Living in Open Adultery” (amdgmary 2005). This particular blog is significant because 
its subjective judgments claiming to be factual and objective information directly 
manipulate an audience’s desire for guidance in making sense of complex issues. In 
response to these accusations, commentators deliberate and discuss the material in a 
manner that resembles a jury responding to evidence. ‘amdgmary’ is positioned as an 115 
 
expert while other contributors become the juror weighing up the information. 
‘Theodore’ posted on the same blog on 12
 February 2005: “We need to remove that line 
‘land of the free, home of the brave’ in reference to poor Terri” and later commented 
that the Schindlers were “understanding first-hand the definition of ‘American tyranny’” 
(2005). This post was followed by a comment by ‘cyn’: “As has been often noted, we 
are not allowed to treat prisoners or animals the way Ms. Schiavo is treated. Apparently 
the only rights that are important to Michael Schiavo are those that will lead to her 
death” (2005). As this quotation suggests, the accusations regarding the guardianship of 
Schiavo as negligent were reinforced, along with the suggestion that Schiavo’s universal 
human rights were under threat. Blogger ‘tutstar’ declared Michael Schiavo guilty of 
“false imprisonment” (2005) and “floriduh voter” proclaimed: “THIS IS NOT A CIVIL 
MATTER. IT IS A CRIME, THE CRIME OF THE CENTURY” (2005 original 
emphasis). “AnimalLover” declared, “we are our brother’s keepers and are responsible 
to defend the most vulnerable. I’m all for hiring mercenaries to take directly to Walter 
Reed for impartial evaluation. I’d be happy to donate” (2005). Negligence and physical 
abuse, considered tyrannical and synonymous with a perceived assault on liberty, 
amounted to a sense that a crime against humanity had been committed. 
 
There is an advertisement towards the end of A Family’s Torment- Terri Schiavo for a 
computer desktop logo supporting the Schindlers’ campaign. It reads: “Terri Schindler 
Schiavo Life Ribbon Campaign”, but the name Schiavo is crossed out. The campaign 
not only provides unequivocal support for the Schindlers, but also symbolically 
extinguishes her relationship with Michael and undermines the legitimacy of his truth 
claims. An interesting tangent is Michael’s choice of epitaph for Schiavo that read: 
“Schiavo Teresa Marie Beloved Wife Born December 3, 1963 Departed this Earth 116 
 
February 25, 1990. At Peace March 31, 2005 I kept my promise” (Goddard 2005).
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Michael Schiavo provocatively renders present his beliefs in the enunciation of the 
epitaph. Schiavo is identified without her maiden name and depicted as not truly living 
beyond the day she collapsed. Michael declares that it his ‘truth’ that prevails, with his 
final words, “I kept my promise”, positioning her family’s judgment in clear contrast. In 
this context, truth is reiteratively constructed and performed according to the 
motivations and circumstances of its production. Whether it is the Schindler ribbon 
campaign or, in contrast, Schiavo’s epitaph, truth is performatively enacted: what is 
stated is also in its utterance enacted. The supporters of the ribbon campaign render 
Michael Schiavo absent and in retaliation Michael silences the Schindlers and their 
supporters with a final statement of his certainty. The next section examines the 
underlying discursive issues at play within this challenge. 
Biopower: religion, politics and ethics 
Central to the truth claims embedded in this event are enduring questions about who 
speaks and who listens. I find the concept of ‘biopower’ useful in deconstructing these 
processes. Foucault outlines a shift from the sovereign authority of the management of 
death to the administrative regulation of life as “marking the beginning of an era of 
‘bio-power’” (1980: 139-140). For Foucault, this does not only oppress but is inherent 
within any technique of regulation, productivity and influence. In fact, power “is 
everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from 
everywhere” (Foucault 1980: 93). The manifestation of biopower as a tool to manage 
populations is based on a foundation of capital production. As people have learnt to live 
longer with an improved quality of life, populations have been manoeuvred into 
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processes and institutions for the production, and the reproduction, of capital. Therefore, 
according to Foucault, “bio-power was without question an indispensable element in the 
development of capitalism” (1980:140-141). In a compelling dilemma, Schiavo both 
dislodges the capitalist endeavour as the incapacitated disabled object, whilst also being 
a symbol for the ideological pursuit and discursive imperative of biopower: the 
regulation of life.  
 
John Marks suggests that, rather than “exercising its sovereign right to curtail life in 
periodic, spectacular manner, politics focuses increasingly on the fostering and direction 
– the government – of life” (2006: 333). This quotation is particularly relevant in 
relation to the extraordinary reaction of the Florida State government, the United States 
Congress and even the Executive Office of the President with regard to the Schiavo 
case. What was seen by some politicians as a deprivation of liberty was seen by many 
others as a gross intervention of the state. The conservatism exercised in response to the 
case was channelled by ideologically constituted interest groups, including politically 
motivated parties, religious groups and a range of media organisations.  
 
The case was embraced by religious right factions as representative of the continuing 
struggle for the sanctity of life. Particularly leading up to Schiavo’s death, the 
passionate and vitriolic sentiments linking support for the Schindlers and the Christian 
right became more and more frequent and emotive. The final entry in the blog, A 
Family’s Torment- Terri Schiavo by an individual named only as ‘GeekDejure’ was: 
“Hail Terri… Child of God… We Pray those judicial sinners… Do not cause the hour 
of thy death… Amen” (2005 original emphasis). In brackets after the name 
‘GeekDejure’ were the words “LOL = Liberals Obey Lucifer”. At another point in the 118 
 
blog, Mittens writes: “Michael is one of the most Wicked and Heartless men Walking 
the earth, if you can even Call him a man. O Lord, Continue to Protect Your daughter 
from the sons of Darkness!” (2005 original emphasis). On 7 March 2005, the leader of 
the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace Cardinal Renato Martino, on behalf of the 
Vatican, issued this statement regarding Schiavo: 
She will die a horrible and cruel death. She will not simply die; she will have 
death inflicted upon her over a number of terrible days even weeks … how is it 
that this woman, who has done nothing wrong, will suffer a fate which society 
would never tolerate in the case of a convicted murderer or anyone else 
convicted of the most horrendous crime? (2005). 
For the millions of Catholics worldwide and the supporters of the Schindlers and pro-
life advocates, the case must have seemed quite simple: it was morally reprehensible to 
‘kill’ Schiavo. Didion referred to the Christian symbology of the case when she wrote of 
the final removal of the feeding tube in March 2005: “It was the convergence of that 
countdown with the holiest week in the Christian calendar that exacerbated the ‘circus’, 
the displays of theatrical martyrdom outside the hospice” (2005). In an online article in 
The New York Times on 25 March 2005, six days before Schiavo’s death, Abby 
Goodnough wrote: “Many of those supporters are making parallels between Ms Schiavo 
and Jesus, describing ‘the passion of [Terri Schiavo]’ as Easter approaches” (2005).  
 
After the first anniversary of Schiavo’s death, Father Frank Pavone, the National 
Director of Priests of Life and an avid supporter of the Schindlers, released a letter to 
Michael Schiavo in which he declared: 
Some have demanded that I apologize for calling you a murderer. Not only will I 
not apologize, I will repeat it again. Your decision to have Terri dehydrated to 
death was a decision to kill her… it was murder in the eyes of god and of 
millions of your fellow Americans and countless more around the world. You 
are the ones who owe all of us an apology (2006).  
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In contrast, John J. Paris in an online article in the Southern Medical Journal, argued 
that the Vatican’s statement was a misleading interpretation of Catholicism: “In fact, the 
tradition makes it clear that if there is no further physical or spiritual benefit, to be 
gained in sustaining life, then there is no moral obligation to do so” (2005). Following 
this argument, Schiavo quite obviously did not enjoy “physical or spiritual benefit”, and 
therefore, it was not immoral to assist death. The autopsy report revealed that not only 
was Schiavo irreversibly in PVS but also that the pyramidal neurons essential to the 
cerebral cortex had been destroyed. Further, her brain weighed half of what is expected 
of a woman her height, weight and age. Dr Jon Thogmartin reported that “no amount of 
therapy or treatment would have regenerated the massive loss of neurons” (Cerminara 
and Goodman 2006). Why did Father Pavone feel it necessary to allege the case was 
murder a year after Schiavo’s death, particularly in the revelation of the extent of her 
condition? I suggest that his allegations were entirely ideological.  
 
Within this event, biopower can be seen as one of the key institutionally enforced 
discourses within the operation of government, politics, ideology, religion and science. 
According to John Marks, the Second World War established two outcomes of 
biopower: mass war between multiple countries and populations and the study and 
practice of eugenics (2006: 333). As a result, debate followed on the dangers and limits 
of science and the role of bio-ethics. Thus, the science surrounding stem cell research, 
genetic cloning and the human genome project continues to stimulate debates, which, 
according to Marks, “all raise significant biopolitical issues” (2006: 333). The evidence 
of such a “biopolitical anxiety” (Marks 2006: 334) inherent in the Schiavo case is clear 
as both a cause and effect of the social and political landscape of the United States at the 
time. 120 
 
The Christian Right did not only influence the mobilisation of interested spectators but 
also participated in a larger project of national symbolism being enacted through the 
political machinations of the United States legislature and government. President Bush 
made the following statement on 17 March, 2005: 
The case of Schiavo raises complex issues. Yet in instances like this one, where 
there are serious questions and substantial doubts, our society, our laws, and our 
courts should have presumption in favour of life. Those who live at the mercy of 
others deserve our special care and concern. It should be our goal as a nation to 
build a culture of life, where all Americans are valued, welcomed, and protected 
– and that culture of life must extend to individuals with disabilities (2005). 
The political pursuit of a “culture of life” reveals that this issue of biopower is a 
fundamental endeavour of the industrialized modern world. Bush reinforced the notion 
that all of levels of public life – “our society, our laws, and our courts” – must regulate, 
control and maintain populations. Not only does the statement reflect an allegiance with 
the pro-life campaign and the religious right, it also equates this stance with a 
disabilities rights advocacy. What for many was considered a ‘private’ case, or at least 
an issue solely for the State of Florida, was made a Federal issue when a cultural 
conservatism was endorsed directly by the Executive Office.
35
 
  
The timing of the statement is crucial to understanding its significance. The day the 
statement was made, on 17 March 2005, the Supreme Court refused to review the case 
and the US Senate passed a private bill concerning the case. This was also the day 
before Schiavo’s feeding tube was ordered to be removed for the third and final time 
(Cerminara and Goodman 2006). The President’s statement not only cemented his 
personal views on the Schiavo case but also his views on the subjects of euthanasia and 
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abortion. The statement operates as a channelling of support by signalling to his 
conservative and Christian right supporters that he shares a similar ideology and a 
course for future action. Further, he indicates to fellow Republicans that they should 
follow his lead. The statement ensures the continuation of the spectacle and anxiety 
surrounding Schiavo. 
 
Four days after the statement on 21 March 2005, President Bush signed the Palm 
Sunday compromise. The Bush Administration had been re-elected four months earlier 
and the government intervention in the case was largely attributed to ‘paying back’ the 
conservative right factions for returning a Republican majority and President Bush to 
office (Stolberg 2005). Around the time of the congressional intervention, the CBS 
network found that 82 percent of Americans thought that Congress and President Bush 
should not have become involved in the case (Stolberg 2005). Speculation about the 
political appeal for such support was rife. The Palm Sunday Compromise Bill was 
passed in the Senate with only three senators present and passed in the House of 
Representatives on 21 March 2005 at 12.41 am. According to Sheryl Gay Stolberg, 
Republican Senator Susan Collins declared that it “went through like a tsunami” (2005). 
In all, 74 percent of people interviewed in the same CBS poll believed that the 
government intervention was enacted only for political mileage (Stolberg 2005). 
Stolberg suggests that, “when the case of Terri Schiavo came along – a brain-damaged 
woman, grieving parents, a husband painted as a villain and a Greek chorus of 
protestors – many in Congress leaped into the stage light” (2005). Furthermore, in 2005 
it was revealed that an unsigned memo had been distributed to several Republican 
senators, revealing the potential political merits in supporting the Schindlers (Allen 122 
 
2005). It seems that Schiavo case was a political opportunity the conservative 
Republican right could not pass up. 
 
The domestic socio-political landscape was complicated further by global political 
machinations. Members of Coalition forces had been fighting, and dying, in Iraq and 
Afghanistan since 2001. Further, the American military was steeped in controversy over 
the Abu Ghraib prisoner-abuse scandal. In 2005, at the height of the Schiavo spectacle, 
the legitimacy of the incarceration of foreign prisoners at Guantánamo Bay was being 
challenged. Meanwhile, the Bush administration was questioned over US military 
involvement in Iraq after admitting a lack of evidence concerning supposed weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD). This time also saw the emergence of information regarding 
torture and clandestine CIA interrogation centres. The entire premise of the war on 
terror was being challenged. I argue that the political support for the Schindlers was not 
merely a crisis of conscience or an alliance between Governor Jeb Bush and his brother 
President George Bush. Rather, it was a timely intervention for distracting a dissenting 
public.  
 
When war is conceptually based, the boundaries for such a battle become limitless and 
indefinable. Hardt and Negri write of the characteristics of past warfare as having 
definite spatial and temporal parameters: war was declared, it was fought, it moved 
countries and it ended (2004: 13). Contemporary warfare, however, is largely supported 
by concepts without spatial limitations or time frames. Hardt and Negri argue that war 
“has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling 
the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life” (2004: 13). Not 
only does the Schiavo case represent a conflict of ideological symbolism, but the case is 123 
 
also set against the backdrop of contemporary warfare that both conceptually and 
literally has no end. 
 
In an article published online the day after the 2004 US Presidential elections, Bill 
Bennett argues that the election was won with a return to a moral debate: “Ethics and 
moral values were ascendant last night – on voters’ minds, in American’s hearts” 
(2004). Bennett goes on to argue that the rejection of the proposed “redefinition of 
marriage” legislation concerning the civil rights of same sex unions as a vote for Bush. 
He even quotes the Los Angeles Times as saying that more than half of Bush’s voters 
cited “moral issues as a principal reason for their support – more than any other issue, 
including even terrorism” (Bennett 2004). Bennett concludes his short analysis with the 
statement that, having “restored decency to the White House, President Bush now has a 
mandate to affect policy that will promote a more decent society, through both politics 
and law” (2004). This statement suggests that the perceived threat to the moral 
boundaries of the nation was an ongoing concern for the contemporary American 
public. The homily of a “culture of life” functions as a regulative tool for the subject at 
home and at war, as well as a nostalgic reflection on a conservative morality.  
 
Hardt and Negri point to further consequences of biopower amidst contemporary 
warfare. Where international and domestic politics merge, the definition of the ‘enemy’ 
becomes diluted and the notion of the ‘outside’ is brought to the forefront: “To the 
extent that the enemy is abstract and unlimited, the alliance of friends too is expansive 
and potentially universal. All of humanity can in principle be united against an abstract 
concept or practice such as terrorism” (2004: 15). One of the more explicit 
manifestations of this concept of the outside is the parallel between Schiavo and the 124 
 
events at Abu Ghraib and the detainees in Guantánamo Bay. The ethics of these cases is 
concerned with the nature of punishment, torture and the corporeal embodiment of 
subjectivity. When is torture acceptable? Does the nature of contemporary warfare 
suspend previous notions of torture, death and the subject? Why is the prolonging of 
life, where there is no volition, not also considered a form of torture? Why is one 
subject’s life considered valuable and worthy of care and another obsolete and 
unnecessary, even invisible? These are biopolitical questions.  
 
Foucault understood sovereign power as initially pertaining to the granting of life and 
the taking of life in a visible and definitive way that later developed into the 
institutionalised state-operated biopower of regulating populations and making death 
less visible. Elizabeth Dauphinee and Cristina Masters locate the transition to biopower 
as the “transformation of modern sovereign power from the right to ‘let live and make 
die’ to the right to make live and let die’” (2007: xiii). Intrinsic to the “make live” is the 
invisibility of death, or what they refer to as the “desubjectification process” 
(Dauphinee and Masters 2007: xiii). Biopower in this context, means that in order to 
regulate populations of bodies, or as Agamben argues to: “transform the care of life and 
the biological as such into the concern of State power” (1999: 155), death and killing 
needed to be removed from the concept of liveliness itself. Thus, on the one hand, the 
killing of civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan is deemed a casualty of war (perhaps even a 
quasi-retribution for the killings of September 11), whilst, on the other hand, to “make 
live” (through the pursuit of liberty and democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan) was 
ultimately the argument for invasion. As Dauphinee and Masters suggest, biopower is a 
“set of regulatory practices that produce spaces of exception in which human beings are 
stripped of their political subjectivities such that any violence can be committed against 125 
 
them with impunity” (2007: xii). This impunity is granted when the subject is 
considered unworthy of being a subject and thus subjectification and desubjectification 
processes continue. For Schiavo, on the one side, she became a symbol of a life that 
should be allowed to “let die”. However, on the other, she was representative of the life 
still living, the subject not quite desubjectified enough to warrant a visible killing. The 
notion of visibility is critical to how moral panic surrounding the case was created and 
sustained. 
 
The philosopher and social commentator, Slavoj Žižek, draws a parallel between the 
prisoner abuse scandal of Abu Ghraib, the Guantánamo Bay detainees and the case of 
Schiavo by suggesting that each involve a rationalisation of torture. The torture of the 
Iraqi prisoner is legitimised – albeit the practice is kept largely invisible and the victims 
are considered ‘subject-less’ – because there is a perceived threat of the invisible force 
of terror. Similarly, the fight for Schiavo is representative of a desire for the 
preservation of the notion of liberty. Yet the continuation of her life at any cost is 
somehow not considered a form of institutional torture: “The legitimization of torture 
and the excessive care for a human life reduced to vegetative state are thus two 
manifestations of the same grotesque logic” (Žižek 2005: 3). Žižek describes the 
Guantánamo Bay detainees as persons who were “missed by the bombs”: a definition he 
suggests is a declaration of them as the “living dead” (2005: 2). This notion is linked to 
the invisibility of death in the regime of biopower that Dauphinee and Masters describe 
and the impunity of the State in allowing torture and killing because the victim’s 
subjectivity is reduced to the living dead. Žižek suggests that the attention focusing on 
the battle for Schiavo’s life resulted in an objectification of the subject to the point of 
absolute exclusion and absence from her own spectacle. Schiavo had no cognitive 126 
 
perception of an enforced liberty whereas the ‘detainees’ have their status forcibly 
removed: 
What these two opposites share is a reduction to bare life … Terri Schiavo not 
only deserved to enjoy every human right but must have them forced on her, 
though she was unable in any event to make use of them as a person; the tortured 
prisoners are able to use –and presumably desperate to be granted – any human 
right but must be deprived of all (Žižek 2005: 5).  
The notion of the “bare life” is undoubtedly a reference to Agamben’s suggestion that a 
subject positioned outside of the political system is reduced to a bare life. The homo 
sacer – the Roman understanding of a subject stripped of the rights of the citizen exists 
neither inside nor outside the law – is reduced to bare life (Agamben 1998: 71). Because 
of this dichotomy the bare life is rendered invisible: a subject stripped of political 
subjectivity thus allowing the state to kill with impunity because the subject is no longer 
considered worthy of the law. Thus, the bare life is a “state of exception” from the 
workings of ‘citizens’ of power in the sovereign state (Agamben 1998: 159). Therefore 
what is considered unlawful is now not even considered anything at all: action without 
impunity. Jenny Edkins argues:  
[The] life excluded from politics is a life in some senses unworthy of 
consideration – a life that can be killed without that killing constituting murder – 
though it was necessary for politics, in that something had to be excluded for the 
political community to be constituted as bounded and sovereign (2007: 37).  
Edkins applies the notion of bare life to the thousands of posters of missing persons 
displayed in New York City in the aftermath of September 11 by arguing these posters 
were emblematic of the depoliticisation of the bare life that paradoxically becomes 
inherently valuable (and arguably political) to a grieving city. The posters were 
reminders of the attacks on ordinary life everywhere. Agamben suggests that at one 
stage, the bare life existed on the fringe of the political world, but in the modern 
biopolitical sphere, the bare life is capable of being about anyone and living anywhere. 
In this sense, as biopower increases in potency and legitimacy as a modernised tool for 127 
 
the regulation of populations and life: any subject has the potential to be considered 
unworthy of the normative discourses of law and basic human rights. This 
desubjectification was most evident in the scientific experiments and mass 
exterminations carried out by the National Socialist Party of the Third Reich in the 
nineteen thirties and forties. Agamben argues:  
Insofar as its inhabitants were stripped of every political status and wholly 
reduced to bare life, the camp is also the most absolute biopolitical space ever to 
have been realised, in which power confronts nothing but pure life, without 
mediation. This is why the camp is the very paradigm of political space at the 
point at which politics becomes biopolitics and homo sacer is virtually confused 
with the citizen (1997: 110).  
Most recently, the policies of rendition through covert CIA operations, unlimited 
detention of terror suspects and legitimised torture techniques practiced in Guantánamo 
Bay are examples of the impunity granted to the political state and the perceived 
unworthy status of the bare life subject. According to Miguel de Larrinaga and Marc G. 
Doucet, “Guantánamo Bay has become the prime example through which the question 
of exceptionalism and its bounded relationship to sovereignty has come to the fore” 
(2008: 530). The Schiavo case became a conflict over who was or was not granted the 
rights of subjecthood. Aside from being played out at the same time, the invisibility 
(and perceived illegitimacy) of the detainees of Guantánamo Bay is in direct contrast to 
the visible spectacle of the Schiavo case. However, both situations are fraught with the 
struggles associated with ideology, morality and human rights. As Kelly Oliver argues, 
“It is easier to justify domination, oppression, and torture if one’s victims are imagined 
as inferior, less human, or merely objects who exist to serve subjects” (2001: 3). In this 
instance, torture and the granting of subject status are given equal footing by the 
regulatory powers of biopower.  
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The manifestation of biopower is apparent throughout the Schiavo case. On one side is 
the traumatised family and the morally, ideologically and politically motivated factions 
that support the sustenance of life and the removal of judicial power in deciding such 
cases. On the other side, the decisions made by the courts were considered a victory for 
the pro-choice, pro-euthanasia cause. For the pro-choice (and liberal) movements, the 
case reflected a sense of gross intervention of political and governmental forces. I argue 
that underlying these arguments is a fundamental fear of death. George Felos, Michael 
Schiavo’s lawyer, speaks of this fear in an interview with Larry King: “This is a death 
adverse society. Death is one of the last taboo subjects. We don’t like to talk about it. 
We don’t like to contemplate our own death. And watching somebody else die, like 
Terri Schiavo, makes people very uncomfortable” (King 2003). In this sense, a 
spectacle that focuses on death is so taboo that it can operate only in terms that focus on 
the value of life. Bauman contends that: “Fighting death is meaningless. But fighting the 
causes of dying turns into the meaning of life” (2005: 317). As a spectacle of biopower, 
this taboo surrounding death is linked to the notion of “make life and let die” and that 
death is either rendered invisible or sanctioned through the killing of an already 
perceived invisible subject. Foucault argues that in the biopolitical regime the main 
concern is to ‘make live’; hence, death has no authorised or enunciated place: “Power 
no longer recognises death. Power literally ignores death” (2003: 248). Biopower (or 
biopolitics) finds ways to legitimise killing by arguing that it will support the more 
crucial agenda to ‘make live’: “Biopolitics hides its death-producing activities under the 
rhetoric of making live” (Dauphinee and Masters 2007: xiii).  
 
The moral panic surrounding the Schiavo case was sustained because she was never 
entirely able to represent either side: she was neither the case to ‘make live’ nor the case 129 
 
to ‘let die’. Her death was not or could not possibly be considered invisible and her 
subject status was not unworthy enough to be considered ‘bare life’. Thus, allowing her 
to die could not be justified by the right-to-life movement. The religious right and the 
conservative political landscape of the time determined her life to be worth living and 
thus the discursive practices of biopower – the ultimate institutionalised regulation of 
living bodies – were reinforced.  
 
At the beginning of this chapter, I wrote about how spectatorial hearsay was embraced 
as testimonial and evidence of certain aspects of the case. I also wrote of the two rival 
parties – the Schindler family and Michael Schiavo – as engendering a kind of ‘survivor 
testimony’. Agamben discusses the Latin definition of the witness as being either of the 
‘testis’ – the person who stands as the independent third party reporting on a situation 
regarding two rival groups – and the ‘superstite’ – the person who bears witness to a 
situation from beginning to end (1999: 17). In this context, Schiavo existed in an 
ambiguous terrain. She was never able to be the testis, as she was incapable of reporting 
on two rival parties. However, the recordings of her spasmodic movement were used by 
both parties as a form of testimonial to pursue their individual arguments. In a similar 
sense, she was also unable to bear witness to the spectacle that centred on her. Again, 
the rival parties had to bear witness for her, as well as for themselves. This ambiguous 
landscape – a witnessing without a witness – most definitely contributed to the intensity 
of the spectacle and the moral absolutism portrayed by both sides of the argument.  
 
Contributing to sustaining the spectacle and prolonging the moral panic was the 
personal and emotional involvement of particular spectators. This intervention 
ultimately led to the objectification of Schiavo. She was essentially an object via her 130 
 
incapacitation. However, she was also objectified symbolically via the spectacle: she 
was exhibited to further the ideological and discursive interplay deemed necessary at the 
time. Because of the fraught ‘social anxiety’ and the extraordinary role of the 
intervening spectatorship surrounding this spectacle, the nature of the subject as a 
concept must be unpacked. It is the notion of the construction and condition of the 
subject which is the focus of the final section of this chapter. 
 
Re-imagining the subject-object divide 
This section is concerned with whether there would have been such a fierce moral 
panic, or such a notorious spectacle, if Schiavo were not ‘seen’ to be alive. Did the fact 
that her audience observed a person who appeared to be active contribute to the 
intensity of the debate? Even though a diagnosis of PVS is a declaration of severely 
limited brain activity, would there have been such intervention by spectators if Schiavo 
were in a coma? To examine these questions, I explore the performance surrounding 
Schiavo in comparison to the case of American woman Susan Torres. 
 
Susan Torres, from Arlington, Virginia, was declared brain dead on 7 May 2005 after 
collapsing from secondary cancer in the brain, at the age of twenty-six. She was fifteen 
weeks pregnant and her husband Jason made the decision to keep his wife attached to 
life support until the baby had developed enough to be born. Apart from the bioethical 
questions and the fascinating metaphors that this spectacle conjures, what is interesting 
about this case is what it suggests about what might be perceived as the constitution of 
the subject. Schiavo and Torres both occupy the space of the observed object, yet the 131 
 
socio-historical context of each case grants each woman subject status, depending on 
what they came to symbolise. 
 
Schiavo and Torres existed in a temporal power play: bodies in disenfranchised space 
and disorganised time. As Elisabeth Grosz would have it: “Bodies, living and nonliving, 
are spatial and temporal bodies” (2004: 4). Schiavo’s ‘live-ness’ was contingent on a 
temporal suspension imposed by years of legal battles. Torres’ body was contained 
within a temporal acceleration: a battle between the propellant forces of cancer and the 
slower development of her child. However, the role of visuality was the most significant 
factor in how these women were perceived and their subsequent subject/object status.  
 
In the edited footage, Schiavo appeared to have not only sight but also the capacity to 
interpret what she saw. For some, the edited footage of her eyes apparently responding 
to movement came to represent volition, agency and thus, subjectivity. Because her eyes 
were open, those who viewed her could not perceive her as an incapacitated, unthinking 
object. In this sense, the spectacle surrounding Schiavo was not only characterised by a 
popular and mediatised visibility but also by the embodiment of visuality. It became the 
truth that this particular audience needed to be given: her open eyes were a sign of life. 
Thus, it could be argued that the eyes were instrumental in the perception of Schiavo as 
an embodied, lived subject.
36
                                                           
36See the following for in depth analysis of the historical, philosophical and linguistic significance of visuality (Houlgate 1993). and, 
(Jay 1993) and (Jay 1993) 
 In this sense, the entire Schiavo spectacle complicates the 
distinction between the subject and object.  
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Susan Torres was kept alive entirely by a respirator and never awoke from her original 
collapse. Thus, the issue of visuality – she no longer looked alive but one could see the 
ultrasound imagery of the growing baby – played a major role in the decision to 
continue her life support. The family and medical team were able directly to observe the 
baby’s development, which arguably influenced their decision to continue the 
pregnancy. Justin Torres, Susan’s brother-in-law and the family spokesperson, was 
quoted as saying that the whole family was encouraged when his brother Jason felt his 
unborn daughter kick: “It was a very, very nice reminder of what this is all about” 
(Daily News Central 2005). Therefore, the debate lies in the preservation of the sense 
(particularly the sense of sight) as Vangie Bergum and Mary Ann Bendfed argue: 
“visual perception is symbolic rather than immediate” (2002: 76). I would argue that if 
the ultrasound had not been available, the continuation of Torres’ life for the incubation 
of the baby would not have been considered a ‘moral’ obligation.  
 
Torres’s family unanimity in its decision to extend her life for the development of the 
baby undoubtedly influenced public support. The inevitability of Torres’ death 
determined whom she came to symbolise as a woman and mother. Although Susan 
Torres did not receive as much media attention or public outcry, she became a symbol 
of success for the pro-life movement. Torres herself was considered beyond hope of 
recovery and therefore it was acceptable to ‘let die’. However, there was still hope for 
the child. The pro-life movement claimed this outcome as a celebration of life. 
According to Martha Brant of Newsweek: “Torres’s plight has garnered worldwide 
attention, but mercifully it is not a replay of the Terry Schiavo case. Instead, it may be a 
quiet antidote. ... For some prominent members of the pro-life movement, bruised by the 
Schiavo battle, Torres presents a simpler case” (2005: 34).  133 
 
Torres’ was a “simpler case” because she was, and could only ever be, an object. Once 
the baby had developed to an acceptable weight and the advancing cancer was 
considered too grave a danger to continue with the pregnancy, the baby, Susan Anne 
Catherine Torres, was born via caesarean section. Her birth was twelve weeks after her 
mother was declared brain dead. The following day, the respirator keeping Susan Torres 
alive was removed and she died soon after. Sadly the baby also died five weeks later, on 
11
 September, from complications experienced during surgery for a perforated intestine.  
 
The photographs of Torres circulated in the media were of her before her illness: images 
of a healthy and happy young woman. I suggest that these images assisted in curbing 
criticism surrounding the extension of her life for the sole purpose of gestation. It is 
interesting to note that while the images of Schiavo released to the public tended to be 
of her in PVS, Torres was portrayed mainly as a young healthy woman before her 
medicalisation. These images memorialise her as perpetually healthy and young, while 
in reality her comatose body was ravaged by cancer. I would argue the representation of 
Torres pre-medicalisation captured her ‘liveliness’. That representation assisted in 
limiting the ethical ambiguities of her situation. It was understood that the woman 
depicted would never be the same again. However, her unborn child might live and 
hence the discursive function of biopower was seemingly clear and without issue: 
Torres was the case to “make life and let die” (Dauphinee and Masters 2007: xiii). In 
comparison, the mediatised representation of Schiavo situated her as divisive. The pro-
life movement was convinced that her bodily movement, along with her open eyes, 
equated to a moral right to life. The court ruled that these moments were involuntary, 
evidence of the extent of her PVS, and that she would not have wanted to continue 
living in such a state. The pro-choice factions took this as evidence of the impartial and 134 
 
secular role of the judicial, government and executive functions. While both cases were 
significant representations of biopower as a discursive function, Torres became an 
example of a quiet “letting die”, while the Schiavo case was a furious battle for moral 
absolutism in the fight to “make live” (Dauphinee and Masters 2007: xiii).  
 
So why is it considered morally reprehensible to remove Schiavo’s feeding tube and yet 
not so in terms of the removal of Susan Torres’ respirator? On one level, it may be 
because death via starvation takes longer and is therefore perceived as a form of torture. 
Perhaps a different view is that Schiavo was represented with her eyes open, while 
Torres was only ever seen frozen in her pre-medicalised youthful state. In another 
respect, keeping Torres alive as an incubator for the development of her unborn child 
influences the opinion that her assisted death was more morally ‘correct’ than that of 
Schiavo. She helped life continue, and once this was achieved, was allowed to die. 
Therefore, the constitution of the subject relies upon his/her capacity to contribute to 
society. Schiavo became a subject because she was a useful symbol for the ideologically 
conservative factions of religious and political life in America. In comparison, Torres 
symbolised the inevitability of death and the forces of nature and, as a woman, was seen 
to have supported the sanctity of life by fulfilling her role as a mother. In both instances, 
the women were objectified by society’s gaze, yet were gifted a subject status by what 
they came to represent. However, this subjectivity was indivisible from their partially 
functioning bodies. In this context, the subject does not exist outside of an 
objectification by the media and public. 
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Conclusions  
Terri Schiavo became an object of intense public scrutiny invoked by an ideological, 
political and religious conservatism, the regulative forces of biopower, intermingled 
with a new world order of conceptually elusive boundaries. The spectacle surrounding 
her, where her open eyes came to symbolise subjectivity, inspired a conflict that 
spanned fifteen years, numerous government interventions, and the breakdown of a 
family. The video footage and courtroom testimony became synonymous with gossip 
and speculation, ultimately leading to the symbolic trial of all parties, including Michael 
Schiavo, the Schindlers, the government, and the United States judiciary system. The 
significance of the case was not so much about the debate surrounding the removal of a 
feeding tube, as it was about the questioning of the rights and responsibilities of who 
participated in the spectacle. In this sense, the fight for life at any cost becomes greater 
than the object or the subject. The battle for life is ultimately the struggle for power: “it 
was the taking charge of life, more than the threat of death, that gave power its access 
even to the body” (Foucault 1980: 143). To examine this struggle is to understand how 
modern power operates. The Schiavo case, like all three social events discussed in this 
dissertation, is an opportunity to tease out the ambiguities inherent in understanding the 
nature of the subject, spectatorship, mediatised spectacle and moral panic.  
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Graffiti. Tags, throw-ups and pieces. Names, statements, logos. Written illegally or 
sprayed to order. Messages in the city and to the city. Omnipresent  
(Mai 2005: 15). 
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Chapter four: Resistance and transgression in the Redfern riots 
In the late hours of 15
 February 2004, some residents of Redfern, an inner city suburb of 
Sydney, took to the streets to stage an act of resistance against a “thin blue line” – the 
New South Wales (NSW) Police force – that lasted approximately nine hours (Gargett 
2005: 10). By the early hours of the following morning, some forty police were injured, 
many ‘insurgents’ arrested, but the streets of ‘The Block’ were once again silent. The 
unrest was subsequently referred to by some as “the Redfern riots” and led to three 
independent inquiries: the internal NSW police inquiry, the NSW parliamentary inquiry 
and the coronial inquest into the death of Thomas ‘TJ’ Hickey, which was the initial 
catalyst for the protests. Hickey, a seventeen year old Aboriginal boy, lived with his 
family in both Redfern and country New South Wales. He was riding home on the night 
of 14 February 2004 and after a short police pursuit, he was propelled from his bicycle 
and impaled on a fence near Phillip Street and Waterloo Green.
37
 
 Hickey died in 
hospital from extensive injuries to his neck in the early hours of Sunday, 15 February. 
Later that day, the so-called ‘riots’ erupted. This chapter examines the representations of 
the Redfern ‘riots’ as a performance of a moral panic by exploring notions of agency, 
representation and space.  
First, I outline the history of the suburb of Redfern, provide some background to the 
riots and briefly explore the concept of space in relation to urban resistance as a way in 
which to try an understand why the riots occurred. I examine the ways in which the riots 
were portrayed in the media and the public and the socio-historical conditions of the 
short but fierce ‘social anxiety’ that resulted from the riots. I reviewed copies of front-
                                                           
37 Senior Constable Michael Hollingsworth and his partner, Constable Maree Reynolds, denied pursuing Hickey, yet at different 
times held contradictory evidence as to what happened that night. Initial statements were made by the officers (they shared notes) in 
the hours after his death. Yet, after it was revealed that there were several witnesses, a week later these statements were amended 
with the admission that they had, in fact, mounted the curb to follow Hickey. Ultimately, Abernathy found that the police were not 
responsible for his death (Australian Broadcasting Corporation 2004). 138 
 
page newspaper stories, as well as online reports. During an Internet (Google) search for 
images of the riots, I discovered a photograph. I argue that this image, and the ease with 
which I located it, is representative of how the riots were generally portrayed pictorially 
in both old and new media. While it could be argued that this was an impressionistic 
approach, rather than a methodical analysis of the media coverage, it is precisely the 
pictorial impression of the ‘riots’ that I am interested in examining. I choose to analyse 
this image, not in relation to how often it was used or how it was reproduced, but rather 
by exploring how, as products of the media, an image of the riots can frame a particular 
take (or perspective) on the riots and thus, reflect underlying discourses of race and 
criminality. It is imperative to define the parameters of this research. My interest in this 
case study is the mediatised representation of the riots, and the rioters, and not in the 
different stories relating to the police, parliamentary or coronial enquiries or the tragic 
details of T.J. Hickey’s death. I argue that to investigate in detail every incident, story 
and detail of the riots, Hickey’s life and the issues associated with Redfern and the 
Block is well beyond the scope of this case study. Instead, this chapter is principally 
concerned with how the riots were represented in the media in the first few days after 
the riots and how some members of the public responded to this initial representation. I 
suggest that the images and statements made by the media and the public did not lead 
directly to a moral panic. However, the socio-historical context of the riots and the ways 
in which they were framed in the media, in the days immediately after the riots, meant 
that an anxiety was inevitable. I contend that in some of the responses to the riots, a 
discourse of colonialism influences a confluence of representations of race, identity and 
criminality. Thus, the popular representation of the protestors, particularly in the riots’ 
immediate aftermath, reflected deeper issues about race relations in Australia.  
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The chapter moves on to an investigation of another important text in this story: an 
urban graffiti response to the riots. I explore the politics of space in the memorialisation 
of the site of Hickey’s death with graffiti. The case studies presented in chapters two 
and three employed the concepts of the panopticon and biopower to examine the moral 
panic in each instance. This chapter examines the space of transgression to both such 
forces. I propose that a reading of the riots and the memorial is heterotopic because they 
mark an ambivalent space between subjugation and empowerment for those involved.  
 
The history of Redfern and the riots 
‘The Block’ consists of a block of land that lies at the intersection of Louis, Vine, 
Eveleigh and Caroline Streets in the inner Sydney suburb of Redfern, across the street 
from a busy train station and adjacent to Sydney University. The Gadigal people are the 
traditional owners of the land, and according to Elizabeth Rice in the Indigenous Law 
Bulletin, throughout the twentieth century, Redfern and ‘the Block’ were a meeting 
point for Aboriginal people as well as a place for employment opportunities (Rice 2005: 
19). At the time of Federation in 1901, the six states were bound by a constitution that 
made two references to Aboriginal persons. Firstly, Section 127 stated that all 
Aboriginal persons were excluded from the census and, secondly, part 26 of Section 51 
gave the power of ‘protection’ of Aboriginal persons to each state. As a result, 
Aboriginal people were disallowed the rights of citizenship until the legislated policies 
were amended in the 1967 referendum. The policy of assimilation, principally 
orchestrated by the state and federal governments from the 1930s, directly led to the 
forcible removal of Aboriginal children of mixed descent from their families, and 140 
 
people affected by these policies are now known as ‘the stolen generation’ (NISATSICF 
1997).
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Throughout these oppressive periods of Australian history, Redfern has emerged as a 
suburb with intense symbolic and literal meaning for Aboriginal people. There is a long 
history of Aboriginal activism throughout Australia, predominantly in the twentieth 
century, including the establishment of the Australian Aboriginal Progressive 
Association (AAPA) in 1924, the Australian Aborigines League in 1936 and the 
Aborigines Progressive Association (APA) founded in 1937 (Foley 2009: 13). During 
the turbulent times of the nineteen sixties and seventies, the ‘Black Power Movement’ 
gained momentum, influenced by the civil rights movement in the USA, while in 1965, 
Charles Perkins conducted his famous ‘Freedom Ride’ (Foley 2009: 14).
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One of the most profound and sustained activist projects is the Aboriginal Embassy, 
erected on the lawns of Parliament House in Canberra in 1972 as a permanent site of 
protest (Foley 2009: 18). The embassy continues to be both politically and visually 
symbolic: an unequivocal demand for recognition and sovereignty. Partly in response to 
this wave of activism, the Labor Government of Gough Whitlam (1972-1975) was 
committed to a policy of ‘self determination’ for Indigenous Australians, and thus, in 
1973 gave the land titles of the area now known as ‘the Block’ to the Aboriginal 
Housing Company (AHC). The transfer of land ownership represented a distinct policy 
                                                           
38 This term was coined as a result of the 1997 Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission report, Bringing Them Home: 
Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from their Families. This 
report explores the impact of the Australian Federal, State and Territory Governments policies of assimilation, which saw the 
removal of thousands of Aboriginal children from their biological families. The report found that: “The Australian practice of 
Indigenous child removal involved both systematic racial discrimination and genocide as defined by international law. Yet it 
continued to be practised as official policy long after being clearly prohibited by treaties to which Australia had voluntarily 
subscribed” (NISATSICF 1997: 266).  
39 Charles Perkins conducted a tour of regional New South Wales, with thirty white students from Sydney University, exposing 
segregation and other instances of racial discrimination in Australian communities (Foley 2009: 14). 141 
 
shift for the Australian government away from the colonial operations of protection and 
assimilation towards self-governance. According to Angela Pitts this “secured the first 
Aboriginal urban land rights in Australia and marked a period of genuine support and 
self-determination” (2009: 117). The Block had become a literal reflection, and a spatial 
metaphor, for the struggle towards sovereignty and agency for Aboriginal people.  
 
By the late twentieth century, the Block, and Redfern, had become key sites for the 
social movement toward reconciliation. Andy Gargett in the Indigenous Law Bulletin 
writes: “Redfern is arguably the ‘black heart’ of Australia with a strong political, 
spiritual and cultural significance to Indigenous peoples from all over NSW and across 
Australia” (2005: 8). On 10 December 1992, Labor Prime Minister Paul Keating, 
marking International Human Rights Day as the official launch of the United Nations 
International Year of Indigenous People, gave an historic speech in the Block on the 
nature of reconciliation:  
It is a test of our self-knowledge. Of how well we know the land we live in. How 
well we know our history. How well we recognise the fact that, complex as our 
contemporary identity is, it cannot be separated from Aboriginal Australia. How 
well we know what Aboriginal Australians know about Australia. Redfern is a 
good place to contemplate these things (2001: 9).  
Keating’s statement was a conscious acknowledgement of both the endurance of 
Aboriginal culture and the significance of Redfern to Aboriginal activism and 
empowerment.
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40 By no means am I suggesting that ‘Aboriginal culture’ as a unified or homogeneous entity but rather that Keating’s statement 
alludes to the need to acknowledge the significance of Aboriginal ‘culture’ for both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Australians. 
 Over last three decades, however, the Block has deteriorated into an 
area with a reputation for poverty, crime, social dysfunction and drug abuse. In the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first century, an era of political conservatism and heightened 
private and public interest in real estate in the inner city has led to repeated calls for the 142 
 
demolition of the derelict housing on the Block.
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 Because of its location close to public 
transport and the CBD, Redfern is a prized residential and commercial property area in 
the inner city. The Redfern Waterloo Partnership Program, established in 2002 and the 
Redfern Waterloo Authority 2004 were government programs established to confront 
issues to do with Redfern and the Block, although with varied success and some 
controversy (Aboriginal Housing Company 2007). According to the AHC, recent 
initiatives to develop their own plans for the site (beginning in 2004) have met with 
strong resistance from the NSW State Government (Aboriginal Housing Company 
2007). It should be noted that in September 2010, demolition of the Block began and the 
AHC’s Pemulwuy Project (named after Pemulwuy the Gadigal warrior) plans to 
construct over sixty houses to be managed by the AHC. According to Angela Pitts and 
Peter Valilis of the AHC, the Pemulwuy Project “represents the most significant urban 
renewal opportunities on Aboriginal land in Australia and the Social Plan is now 
recognised as one of the most important social planning strategies in Aboriginal 
community urban renewal projects” (2007: 8). What remains to be seen is what happens 
to an Aboriginal presence in Redfern after these processes have been completed. 
In discussing the socio-historical origins of disenfranchisement for Aboriginal people, it 
is both useful, and necessary, to raise the influence of colonial (and postcolonial) 
discourses. Both the symbolism and practical reality of Redfern for Aboriginal people 
are intertwined within complex socio-historical forces stemming from a colonial 
history. The widely disparate experiences of postcolonial contexts throughout the world 
mean that there can never be a unified or homogeneous postcolonial context. The theory 
                                                           
41 The social conservatism was largely supported by the Howard Liberal Government and in particular, their refusal to ‘apologise’ 
for the crimes committed against Aboriginal Australia and the stringent and complex machinations of claims for Native Title. In 
2008, the Labor Government led by Prime Minister Kevin Rudd issued an apology, as the first act of the new parliament, on behalf 
of the government, which the opposition party ratified. This apology was not only an election promise but also an enormously 
significant moment for Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Australia because it was a legal and symbolic acknowledgement that the 
policies of past governments had, and continue to have, horrific impacts on the lives of Aboriginal Australians. 143 
 
and study of postcolonialism can afford neither to be prescriptive nor reductive in its 
delineation of what is (or is not) or who is (or is not) postcolonial. Instead, it must relate 
to the specific socio-historical and political context of the nation.
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42 Postcolonialism is as wide and varied a discipline as it is contested and messy in its definition. A wide spectrum of theorists  
contribute to the field: Homi Bhaba, Terry Eagleton, James Clifford, Stuart Hall, Albert Memmi, Edward Said, Frantz Fanon, 
Guyatri Chakravorty Spivak, Bob Hodge and Vijay Mishra  
 Ania Loomba 
suggests that postcolonialism, “far from being a term that can be indiscriminately 
applied, appears to be riddled with contradiction and qualifications” (1998: 12). 
Loomba goes on to argue that what might be more useful is to think of the “contestation 
of colonial domination and the legacies of colonialism” (1998: 12). I find this comment 
helpful when engaging with the representation of, and the varied responses to, the riots. 
I argue that Australian race relations are influenced by oppression and dispossession 
brought on through colonialism. Albert Memmi declared: “Who can completely rid 
himself of bigotry in a country where everyone is tainted by it, including its victims?” 
(2003: 67). In this sense, who is capable of being entirely free from this colonial legacy? 
Australia is both the colonised (in relation to its Indigenous citizens) and the coloniser 
(in relation to its settler history). More recently, Australia has become a multicultural 
nation participating in shifting partnerships with many countries, whilst retaining strong 
ties with Britain. Stephen Muecke notes that Australia exists in a “complex process of 
self-definition” but that “postcolonialism is something that can only be properly 
achieved in relation to the original inhabitant” (1992: 10-11). He also argues that the 
non-Aboriginal population are to “be held responsible to assist in the decolonisation of 
the Aborigines” and yet are themselves “scarcely emerging from their own colonial 
status” (1992: 11). Perhaps the Australian context can be best described as having a 
multicultural make-up within the dominant white paradigm of a former colonial 
stronghold. The legacy of such racialised (and class-based) dominance cannot be 144 
 
underestimated, particularly when these discourses contribute in producing such 
instances as the riots.  
 
How criminality is produced and represented in the media is determined by the media 
organisations and their readership. The ‘news’ – and what is considered ‘newsworthy’ – 
are an interplay between discourse and discursive institutions. As discussed in chapter 
one, the notion of a mediatised truth is both contentious and dependent on a range of 
factors including marketability, profitability, sensationalism, and audience 
demographic. The mainstream representations of Aboriginal people often play against 
sovereignty through an episteme of disruption and non-conformity and this perception 
directly influences what is considered newsworthy. Stephen Mickler argues that: 
“Deviance, its control and its opposite, normality, are in fact the primary discursive 
objects of news making” (1998: 27). Moral panic is constituted through this discursive 
interplay of normativity and non-conformity. Mickler suggests:  
[The] institutional spheres of police and news media intersect in the shared 
purpose of visualising and controlling deviance. The news media and police 
have an institutional affinity in reproducing order and an ideological affinity in 
acknowledging order (1998: 29-30). 
In this sense, the Block may have degenerated through abject poverty, poor 
management and criminal activities.
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43 It is important to note that I do not suggest that the selling or using of drugs is exclusive to the Aboriginal population of Redfern. 
There have also been countless community development projects in that community and neighbouring communities helping to 
combat drug addiction and supporting other community health initiatives. 
 However, the symbolic spatial status of the Block 
also means that any disruption to normative order within the larger non-Aboriginal 
community raises significant issues. What the riots exposed was a history of tension 
between the discourses of the media, governance, individual sovereignty and the 
representation of Aboriginality. Hickey’s family and community commonly believed 
that the police were implicated in his death because of a history of hostility between the 145 
 
residents and the police. “Mr Lawrence”, a community outreach worker associated with 
the Catholic Church, made the following statement reflecting this conflict: “People are 
suspicious about what happened. The police want it to blow over, but everyone is 
suspicious. Because we are black, we are guilty” (Penberthy and Kamper 2004: 4). The 
circumstances from which the Redfern riots emerged cannot be removed from this sense 
of injustice and the inequitable hierarchy dividing race relations in Australia at the time. 
 
The notion of space continually emerges as a fundamental concept in examining the 
riots. Space is not only of concern because the performance occurred on the urban 
streetscape but also because the riots were themselves a struggle for empowerment. 
Geographically, the riots were contained within the demarcated location of the Block, 
particularly through the presence of the riot squad, who represented governmental and 
policing institutions of social control. The weapons used by the rioters were drawn from 
the immediate area and included bricks from the footpath and shopping trolleys used to 
house Molotov cocktails. However, the riots also represented a space of political 
resistance and the pursuit of cultural citizenship. Michel Keith and Stephen Pile write 
that: “Distinct, irreconcilable understandings of space underscore the cultural mappings 
of the contemporary” (1993: 5). Other politically motivated riots include Paris (1968, 
2005), Tiananmen Square (1989), Los Angeles (1992), Palm Island (2004), Macquarie 
Fields (Sydney) (2005) and Cronulla (Sydney) (2005), and with the exception of the 
1968 riots in Paris and the Tiananmen Square uprising, these riots involved a racial 
conflict.
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44 Cronulla and Macquarie Fields are low-income outer suburbs of Sydney with a long history of ethnic and racial tension. Although 
the Tiananmen Square riots (and subsequent massacre) and the riots in Paris in 1968 were not racially motivated, they nevertheless 
remain useful examples of political resistance in public space. 
 In addition, the riots in Los Angeles, Paris (2005) and Macquarie Fields 
(outer suburban Sydney) were initiated by a tragic death interpreted as some form of 
gross injustice and oppression by those involved. I would argue that on each occasion 146 
 
these riots were a symbolic and literal attempt at reclaiming space involving a kind of 
ascension of agency and a radical transformation of normativity. 
 
These insurgencies, regardless of the duration of the violence, are a deliberate shock to 
the status quo. They initiate transgression where the dispossessed temporarily gain 
power. Stuart Hall argues that: “The use of violence marks the distinction between those 
who are fundamentally of society and those who are outside it. It is coterminous with 
the boundary of ‘society’ itself” (1978: 68 original emphasis). The Redfern riots 
featured similar dynamics. An initial tragedy reinforced a deeply entrenched sense of 
injustice and the response to Hickey’s death was a determined attempt at utilising 
symbolic space. In this sense, Redfern comes to represent more than just a suburb. 
Under these socio-historical circumstances, some residents and supporters of the 
Redfern community in and around the Block seemed motivated to take up arms in order 
to seek retribution for what was perceived as an example of the discrimination 
experienced by Aboriginal people. In this way, Hickey’s death represented far more 
than the loss of one boy’s life. In many ways the mediatised response to the riots took 
on the form of a visual and linguistic expression which in turn helped to constitute and 
maintain the moral panic surrounding the situation. 
 
Visual and linguistic representations of the Other in old and new media 
In various ways (partly determined by the medium and its audience), the riots were 
represented, judged and enacted into a performative constitution. Butler argues: “The 
power attributed to hate speech is a power of absolute and efficacious agency, 
performativity and transitivity at once (it does what it says and it does what it says it 147 
 
will do to the one addressed by the speech)” (1997:77). In Redfern in 2004, hate speech, 
issued by some mainstream media and members of the public, helped to produce and 
sustain a notion of criminality. I argue that both visual and linguistic representations can 
be read as revealing and extending certain ideological positions and racialist discourses. 
As Goode and Ben-Yehuda argue: “We must never lose sight of the fact that fear and 
concern are expressed in specific actions taken, beliefs held, or sentiments felt by 
specific individuals in a society or community” (1994: 41 original emphasis). In this 
context, both visual and linguistic statements by the some members of the media and the 
public concerning the riots helped sustain an ‘anxiety’ regarding Aboriginal people in 
general. 
 
The media influence public perceptions of criminality and help to disperse ‘truth’ 
formations that are produced through discourse. The truth, according to Foucault: “is 
linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to 
effects of power which it induces and which extend it. A ‘régime’ of truth” (1980: 133). 
I argue that the following photographic and linguistic texts, the first appearing the day 
of the riots and the rest circulated in the days after, enact this manifestation of 
problematic truths influenced by the media, interest groups and the public.  
 
Early on 15 February, Police Inspector Robert Emery held a press conference and stated 
that while the police were near Hickey at the time of his accident, they were not 
responsible for his death. He contended that: “Police were in the vicinity but they 
certainly weren’t chasing him” (Australian Associated Press 2004). The police denial 
was issued before an official investigation of the case could occur, even though the 
actions of police that night, police procedure and several eyewitness accounts were yet 148 
 
to be properly examined.
 It is possible that the statement was made because of the 
acrimonious relationship between the police and some of the Aboriginal residents of 
Redfern and their supporters and neighbours. However this provocative and speedy 
denial appeared only to increase a sense of injustice for Hickey’s community. A street 
poster accusing the NSW Police Commissioner and other police officers of being “child 
murderers” and implicating them in Hickey’s death, surfaced in Redfern on 15 
February, several hours after his death. This poster/flyer contributed to the mobilisation 
of community members angered by alleged police involvement.
45
 
  
Charles Miranda of The Daily Telegraph wrote: “The flyers – which proclaim police 
were chasing the youth when he crashed his bicycle – were distributed widely, raising 
tensions” (2004: 2). The poster/flyer is a key example of Foucault’s explanation of how 
knowledge is discursive (1980: 69). In this instance, the discourses constituting the 
poster/flyer – race, policing and criminality – helped to activate the community already 
exposed to a much larger matrix of discourses: race, the media, poverty, dispossession, 
homelessness, governance, gentrification, the police, criminality, and individual 
sovereignty in a mutually reinforcing cycle. The poster/flyer can be read as a symbolic 
battle cry drawing upon a long and fraught history of race relations in Redfern; the 
poster not only triggered tension but also reflected a community already in crisis.  
 
In reference to the video footage of the horrific beating in 1991 of American Rodney 
King, Butler argues that ‘visuality’ is an issue within any racial struggle. She contends 
that the legal team defending the police were able to distort the video in such a way as 
to appeal to a racist perception that the black male body is a continual threat to white 
male hegemony. By slowing down the video images, the jury witnessed what looked 
                                                           
45 See the following Internet address for the image of the poster/flyer: http://www.australian-news.com.au/Redfern_riots.htm 
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like a menacing animalistic black male readying for attack. Butler argues: “According 
to this racist episteme, he is hit in exchange for the blows he never delivered, but which 
he is, by virtue of this blackness, always about to deliver” (1993: 19). Butler suggests 
that (the victim) King is ultimately perceived by the jury as the aggressor. The defence 
team relied on a perception of an inherent racial hierarchy within the white hegemonic 
subconscious. Butler concludes that: “The visual field is not neutral to the question of 
race; it is itself a racial formation, an episteme, hegemonic and forceful” (1993: 17). I 
suggest that images of the riots distributed in the mainstream media in the days 
immediately after the Redfern riots were produced through a similar racial episteme.  
 
 
Figure 3: The riots were sparked by the death of a local teenager 
(Australian Broadcasting Corporation 2004) 
The pictorial example above is, in fact, only one of many that I found in an Internet 
search for images of the riots. This image, plus others, was found through Google Image 
and although not necessarily belonging to any particular print newspaper, typify the 150 
 
kinds of images used in the mainstream media to depict the riots generating the pictorial 
symbolism that potentially influenced audience judgement.
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Figure 3 depicts a band of police with a burning car providing a prototypical ‘riot’ 
reference in the background. The police are configured as the central subjects in the 
image. They are, in fact, the only subjects clearly represented within the frame. Whilst 
the nature of the portrayal would be dependent on the characteristics of the newspaper’s 
readership to some extent, I suggest that the authoritative readiness assumed by the 
police is supported by their relatively relaxed stance. The rioters are almost completely 
absent from this image; the rioters are so far in the distance that the image of the fire is 
more prominent. This spatial negotiation implies that the people the reader can see 
clearly are both literally and symbolically associated with authority. This image reflects 
a hierarchy of power relations within the representation of the riots. The band of police 
is the focus of the image which, I argue, positions the reader on the “same side” as the 
police, whilst the rioters in their blurry absence become ‘deficient’ or ‘shady’ characters 
representative of chaos and the unknown.  
 
I choose to read this image as contributing to an overall representation of the Aboriginal 
rioter as inherently Other: unknowable and abstracted from the audiences’ field of view. 
Gargett argues in reference to the Redfern riots that: “The media produce the 
Indigenous body as criminal. Indigeneity itself becomes crime” (2005: 9). With these 
easily accessible images, the mainstream media position the rioters and the police in an 
                                                           
46 Similar images were printed in: The Australian on February 17, pages 1 and 6; The Daily Telegraph on February 16,
 page 1; 
Sydney Morning Herald 16
 February, page 1 and 17
 February, page 1; The Courier-Mail 17 February, pages 1 and 4. The following 
Internet address depicts an image of an injured policeman and can be read in a similar way to the image depicted here: 
http://www.australian-news.com.au/Redfern_riots.htm 
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immovable dichotomy. Certain racial stereotypes are reinforced in response to the riots 
in a way that position Aboriginality as synonymous with criminal behaviour. I argue 
that these images contribute to the overall sense of the Aboriginal rioters as unknowably 
Other. Simone Drichel argues: 
If colonialism’s way of dealing with cultural otherness was to contain it within 
the boundaries of preconceived stereotypes, what strategies can postcolonialism 
offer for dealing with an otherness it is so loath to relinquish? How can 
postcolonialism continue to embrace ‘the other’ without simultaneously 
recycling stereotypes? (2008: 588) 
What is equally important to recognise is that the Self is created through a similar 
process. Understanding this dual constitutive and reiterative process of the Self and 
Other helps to avoid the dilemma referred to by Drichel. Just as images and perceptions 
of Aboriginal people can be constructed through varying degrees of colonial and 
racialist discourses, so, too, are the perceptions of non-Aboriginal people constructed. 
This complex interplay of discourse and power produces truth formations. The 
objectification/subjectification processes lay the foundations for particular responses 
from the media and the public in the aftermath of the riots, thus further compounding 
the simmering moral panic.  
 
Several responses from the public contextualised the origins of the riots and attempted 
to counter the surrounding moral panic. Jane Flynnes-Clinton wrote in The Courier 
Mail: “This racism and our seeming inability to admit it or deal with it drills a hole in 
the soul of Australia” (2004: 15). In response to the riots, prominent Aboriginal leader 
and former politician, Aden Ridgeway argued that:  
I do not excuse the events of that night but they comes as no surprise to me or 
any person who is familiar with the volatile dynamics of Redfern, and the wider 
issues in Indigenous politics in this country. …What happened on Sunday night 
in Lawson Street was an extreme expression of the mistrust between aboriginal 152 
 
youth and the police service set against a backdrop of poverty, a lack of jobs and 
limited education (2004). 
Lee Rhiannon MLC went so far as to declare in reference to the death of Hickey that: 
“The handling of this incident by the NSW govt authorities is another shameful act in a 
shared history that continues to be dominated by harassment and exploitation of the 
indigenous people of this country” (2004). However important these voices were to the 
ensuing debate, I am interested here in how the media are able to facilitate a particular 
tension regarding Aboriginality and criminality. In the days immediately after the riots, 
there were some extreme responses from some members of the public that further 
objectified the rioters within a racialist discourse, producing what could be called a 
‘naturalisation’ of racial difference. I suggest that these responses were directly 
influenced by the portrayal of the riots in the mainstream media. Joanna Atherfold 
argues that: “Rather than foster understanding or concern for Redfern’s Indigenous 
community and its complex history, images may simply reiterate the view that 
Indigenous people deserve their plight” (2006: 46). Although Atherfold is specifically 
referring to the negative depiction of the Aboriginal rioters in the linguistic ‘imagery’ 
used in the media, this quotation is also applicable to the meanings associated with a 
visual representation of the riots. Whether in a visual or linguistic form media articles in 
the immediate aftermath of the riots “were framed largely in terms of chaos and the re-
establishment of order” (Atherfold 2006: 43).
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 I argue it is critical that this 
representation is explored in reference to how the riots may have come to be understood 
in relation to larger issues concerning perceptions of Aboriginality.  
                                                           
47 Although the notion of linguistic form is in reference to print and cyber media there is another kind of linguistic representation 
that should be noted. In terms of the language employed in the representations of the riots the automatic labelling of the unrest as a 
riot suggests an underlying discursive imperative situated within the linguistic choice. In the construction of this binary distinction, 
the many reasons for Aboriginal discontent are not acknowledged and instead replaced with a simplistic summation that renders the 
unrest as illegitimate and irrational. Thus, even in the choice of the word riot a performative statement demarcates a space in which 
a discourse of criminality is performed.  153 
 
In their media analysis of the Redfern riots, John Budarick and Debra King argue that 
the riots were represented very differently across media outlets. In relation to the 
Indigenous newspaper, the Koori Mail, they argue that it: 
Framed powerful ideological positions regarding racial identity and imagined 
racial communities in order to construct a different, more problematic version of 
the riots. In so doing, they discursively challenged mainstream constructions of 
the riots by providing alternative symbolic resources with which readers could 
understand the riots (Budarick and King 2008: 356). 
The Koori Mail included a “greater number of Indigenous voices” than other 
mainstream newspapers and their language was less emotive or harsh in relation to the 
violence than that of the Sydney Morning Herald or the Daily Telegraph. As Budarick 
and King explain, “more neutral language was used in which less emphasis was placed 
on individual actors” (2008: 362). Budarick and King argue further that, overall, the 
Koori Mail (as opposed to the Sydney Morning Herald and the Daily Telegraph) 
represented the socio-political and historical origins of the riots: “The riots were situated 
within a context of social injustice and poor policy. … This was followed by a 
prognosis that focused on the history of unsuccessful government policy towards 
Indigenous communities in Australia” (2008: 362). However, the Daily Telegraph 
framed the riots “as an inexcusable violation of the law” and argued that, “Violence was 
emphasized, and the police were positioned as a thin blue line under siege from an 
unruly criminal mob” (Budarick and King 2008: 362). In addition, the coverage by that 
newspaper tended to be about drug use and trafficking on the Block “to strengthen the 
law and order diagnosis and that comments from the police were the dominant witness 
to the events that took place” (Budarick and King 2008: 362). Budarick and King argue 
that: “The law was seen as sacrosanct, with the status quo having to be upheld through 
these laws as a matter of urgency. There was little room left for any deeper social 
context of the riots” (2008: 362). The Sydney Morning Herald tended to “frame the riots 
as an issue of race relations in Australia” and that “the key questions revolved around 154 
 
Aboriginality and an essentialized Indigenous nature” (Budarick and King 2008: 363). 
With all three newspapers, they contend, “to a greater or lesser degree, there was a 
commonality in creating two distinct groups, an ‘us’ and a ‘them’, with one of these 
groups constructed as an Aboriginal community” (Budarick and King 2008: 363). It is 
interesting to see, in these few examples, how Australian print media used language 
differently to respond to the riots and how language might have influenced the 
perceptions of the public. In the following section I use both print and talk-back radio 
comments to better understand how the spectator in this event (both media and public) 
contributes to a moral panic concerning Aboriginality in general. 
 
Atherfold notes that between 15 February and 11 March, seventy percent of quotations 
reported in the Daily Telegraph were from members of law enforcement agencies or 
politicians, while in the Sydney Morning Herald quotations of a similar origin were 
approximately fifty percent (2006: 44). Although she suggests that the latter newspaper 
had a greater cross-section of sources, the riots were predominantly represented from 
the perspective of “authoritative sources” (Atherfold 2006: 44). An editorial of The 
Australian, entitled “No excuses can exonerate Redfern riot”, contended that the riots 
were “not the Australian way to surrender the streets to mob rule” (2004: 12). Not only 
is the participant in the riots rendered illegitimate by their collective status as a ‘mob’, 
but also the word ‘excuse’ insinuates a history of criminal activity that has been 
previously ignored. In response to the positioning of Aboriginal people as criminal and 
violent, the non-Aboriginal participants (police, government etc.) are reinforced as 
dominant and stable. It is not surprising, then, that a moral panic is propagated through 
the exchange between the media and their readership regarding the riots specifically and 
of Aboriginality at large. The following anonymous quotation from the Herald Sun 155 
 
exemplifies this perception: “The riots in Sydney’s Redfern are absolutely disgraceful. 
Unfortunately, Aboriginal people have a huge chip on their shoulder” (Various 2004: 
16). According to Budarick and King:  
When the media cover social issues and events – particularly ones that 
encompass populist concerns such as law and order, crime and multiculturalism 
– they also engage with ideological norms and constructions. These ideological 
norms come in the form of deeply entrenched and naturalized views and beliefs 
about society and the world at large (2008: 356). 
The normative discourse concerning race informs the mediatised and public responses 
that position the rioters as objects in opposition to law-abiding subjects, thus 
perpetuating a moral panic surrounding an already existing prejudice regarding 
Aboriginality and Aboriginal issues. Drichel contends: “How can we conceptualize an 
indigenous identity without trading on the same old stereotypes we have become so 
used to in discussions surrounding (formerly) othered peoples?” (2008: 591). It becomes 
extremely important to resist repeating and hence, reinforcing the Otherness associated 
with stereotypes. Although this Otherness might be contextual, the creation of such 
stereotypes is essentially a discursive process. Discourse pertains to be knowledge and 
this knowledge is historically driven. Hence, the Other is constructed through a history 
of competing discourses designed to objectify, naturalise and disempower.  
 
A discursive interplay in the riots  
The media representations of legality, criminality and civic responsibility are enforced 
and acted upon in the very negotiations and references to the space and spectacle of the 
riots. Gargett argues that: “The police are constructed as neutral characters in the lead 
up to the riot: simply doing their job. During the riots this neutrality is replaced with 
victimisation – police sacrifice their well-being to return order to the streets” (2005: 10). 156 
 
The ‘uninhabitable’ space of the abject Other (Butler 1993: 3) is employed to delineate 
the space of normative order. The creation of this space is particularly notable in the 
polarisation of the ‘criminal’ rioters with respect to the ‘innocence’ of the police. The 
NSW Police Commissioner, Ken Moroney suggested that bravery medals be awarded to 
all police involved, describing their conduct as “absolute heroism” (Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation 2004). The NSW Opposition Leader at the time, John 
Brogden, declared the Block should be bulldozed, whilst the then Federal Opposition 
Leader, Mark Latham queried where the parents of rioting children were during the 
riots. The then Prime Minister, John Howard, declared the riots the result of the “total 
breakdown of family authority” and openly formed an alliance with the police when he 
said: “I defend very much the police in a situation like that” (Shaw 2004: 3). The NSW 
Premier, Bob Carr stated: “I’ve always said about Redfern that the riot we saw was 
criminality, plain and simple” (Australian Associated Press 2004). Thus, we can see that 
the relationship between lawful and unlawful behaviour is used to position the rioters as 
a homogeneous racialised entity. Although it was written in the 1950s, Albert Memmi’s 
statement resonates in this context: “The colonized is never characterized in an 
individual manner; he is entitled only to drown in an anonymous collectivity” (2003: 
129). The politicians’ statements illustrate how an ideological positioning is rendered as 
‘truth’: an entire group of people is reduced to a stereotype implicating criminality and 
an inherent Otherness articulated from the highest levels of government to individual 
spectators. 
 
Piers Akerman, a respected conservative columnist with the Daily Telegraph, referred 
to Redfern as “a petri dish for rafts of self-indulgent social engineers wishing to 
experiment with the lives of a chronically dysfunctional group of people” (2004: 18). 157 
 
By suggesting that the riots were both the result of dysfunction and also the ‘pandering’ 
of liberalist policy, Akerman places the Self and the Other in diametrically opposed 
positions that are considered normative. He later declares that there was nothing to 
suggest that Hickey “was a victim of anything more than his own tragic stupidity and a 
cycling mishap” (Akerman 2004: 18). By laying the blame entirely on the victim, he 
renders the arguments of the community illegitimate and ignores the circumstances of 
Hickey’s life. Regardless of whether Hickey was or was not pursued by the police, 
Akerman systematically denies the acrimonious history between Aboriginal people and 
the police. In reference to the possible involvement of police in her son’s death, Gail 
Hickey was quoted as saying: “It’s got to stop, the way they treat our kids. They treat 
our kids like dogs ... they manhandle them” (Miranda 2004: 19). This history of 
mistreatment may have contributed to Hickey’s sense of fear, and thus, inadvertently led 
to his accident. For Akerman, the sight of an Aboriginal youth fleeing the police is an 
event unworthy of investigation. A fear of the police might, in fact, be the reason why a 
youth might flee and is certainly a substantial circumstance necessary of inquiry. At the 
very least, it is reason to open up debate rather than shut it down – which it seems to 
have been the intention of Akerman’s comments. 
 
There were some instances of questionable behaviour by the media in relation to the 
riots. Bob Francis, in response to the riots, on his Adelaide radio show, Radio 5AA, 
declared: “How dare you call it a display of grief? You dirty, rotten bastards” (Friends 
of the ABC 2004). This comment provoked a response from ‘Gary’, a member of the 
public, saying that if he had been a policeman present at the riots, he would have 
“emptied his gun into the crowd and would have made sure he did not miss” (Friends of 
the ABC 2004). The Australian Broadcasting Authority (ABA) declared the Bob 
Francis show guilty of inciting racial hatred. However, the Authority has yet to pursue 158 
 
any formal punishment (Friends of the ABC 2004). The Honourable Ian Gilfillan 
reported on these findings and asked the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and 
Reconciliation, the Honourable T.G. Roberts, if he believed the ABA had responded 
adequately. The Minister responded with various comments, including: “I think the 
ABA is somewhat of a toothless tiger in what it metes out when dealing with these 
issues” (South Australian Democrats 2005). For me, the radio commentary exhibits 
explicit racial discrimination which is compounded by the inactivity of the governing 
bodies that are meant to judge such behaviour. In the absence of such an action, those 
governing bodies (such as the ABA) are implicated in enunciating an implicit racial 
discrimination. Butler argues that: 
What the law says, it does, but so, too, the speaker of hate. The performative 
power of hate speech is figured as the performative power of state-sanctioned 
legal language, and the context between hate speech and the law becomes 
staged, paradoxically, as a battle between two sovereign powers (1997: 81). 
In abstaining from properly punishing the radio station, the ABA is hence sanctioning 
the use of hate speech and is effectively complicit in condoning such behaviour. Thus, 
the law, the governing institutions and the conductors of media communication are 
implicated in the production, performance and reiteration of hate speech, as much as 
‘Gary’ and his bullets. 
 
Another conservative Australian columnist Andrew Bolt wrote in his opinion essay in 
The Herald Sun on 18 February 2004 
Who’s to blame for the Redfern riots? Drunken thugs and guilt ridden whites 
who have poured money into the hands of Aboriginal agitators. We all paid to 
stage this Redfern race riot – that’s how suicidal we now are. ... The hate-
spewing Aboriginal ‘leaders’ who cheered and praised the rioters? We paid 
them. ... The Aboriginal ‘leaders’ – and their guilt-chocked white accomplices – 
who excuse the most depraved behaviour of a black by blaming it on a white? 
We paid them. ... We paid them as we pay such ‘leaders’ of other ethnic and 159 
 
religious groups out of this same racist conception of multicultural Australia. 
Stupid. Stupid (2004: 19). 
It is necessary to include the entire quotation to illustrate clearly the extreme nature of 
this statement. Bolt reinforced the constitution of the Other by framing Aboriginal 
activism as unnecessary and illegitimate. He implied that it was nothing more than a 
stubborn inability of Aboriginal people to assimilate into ‘mainstream’ Australia. In this 
instance, such a statement (made only three days after the riots) punishes activists such 
as Lyall Munro, who argued that the riots were essentially a demand for 
acknowledgement: “A stand was taken by our young people last night. It’s completely 
freaked the country out. As for the question of condoning violence – violence begets 
violence, and if that’s the only way to save our kids, so be it” (Penberthy and Kamper 
2004: 4). Although potentially creating a greater divide by refusing to condemn 
violence, Munro makes an important point by positioning the riots as a proclamation of 
dispossession and grief. In opposition, Bolt’s opinion reflects normative social practice 
and the reiteration of an underlying racist discourse – producing what Butler refers to as 
a “structural subordination” (1997: 76). Bolt denies the protestor a voice by 
systematically ridiculing the social circumstances of the riots and reiterating racial 
stereotypes. Butler argues: “As a performative, hate speech also deprives the one 
addressed of precisely this performative power, a performative power that some see as a 
linguistic condition of citizenship” (1997: 81). Bolt subordinates as he writes and thus, 
in his articulation of his ‘stupid stupid’ reading of the Redfern riots, he objectifies the 
rioters and removes their right to subject status. 
 
Bolt was not alone in this argument. In relation to the riots, certain responses of the 
public and the mainstream media helped to facilitate this reading of the rioter as 
‘criminal’ and ‘illegitimate’. In reader feedback to Bolt, Keith Hooper states in 160 
 
agreement, that Andrew Bolt “… is right to declare (Feb 22) that taxpayers paid for the 
Redfern riot, because those who live in the past rob the future” (2004: 89). This 
response implies that the disadvantages of Aboriginal Australians were either trivial 
indulgences or ‘payment’ for failing to assimilate to the dominant white culture and that 
non-Aboriginal people were victims of political policy. Similarly, J.D. Bindon argues: 
“Good on Andrew Bolt for having the courage to write what a significant proportion of 
the population feels” (2004: 89). Bolt, and others, attempt to close down debate by 
reproducing colonial and racialist attitudes toward Aboriginal people, thus positioning 
the rioters as inherently inferior, and in doing so, reinforcing normative social order. 
 
A particularly interesting Internet forum appeared on 29 March 2004 in response to a 
Four Corners television report on the riots broadcast on the ABC earlier that night. One 
blogger referred to as ‘Tulips’ suggested: “It appears to me that there is one law for the 
rich one for the poor one for the white and one for the black” (2004). Another named 
‘realist’ stated: “The 4 corners program tonight stunk with the same bleeding heart 
blame-game that we Australians are getting used to – but still makes us sick” (2004). 
Another blogger wrote: “Drugs, riots and all that aside a boy lost his life. If he had been 
white and appeared to be from a wealthy family do you think this would have 
happened” (Ginny 2004). This last response reflects the inequality between Aboriginal 
and non-Aboriginal Australians. What these texts reveal are the discursive operations at 
the heart of the riots. What Butler calls the “linguistic condition of citizenship” (that I 
argue should be a universal human right, the right to self-representation) is denied in 
most of the responses that assume a generic criminality (1997: 81). Thus, the lived 
experiences of the rioters are circumscribed by the normative practices that construct 
Aboriginal people as the Other. These responses also indicate the way in which 161 
 
communities operate when they believe that social normativity is under threat. The 
moral panic that emerged reflected a fear of those who deviate from social order and an 
ongoing divide in race relations in Australia. 
 
Not long after the riots, the Redfern Police Station was relocated from a small street-
level office into two adjacent six-storey office buildings (the former TNT towers), 
looking down over Redfern Station and towards the Block. Although the timing of this 
move may be coincidental, Police Minister John Watkins did announce that the new 
police station would be “right where the police want it, with a bird’s eye view over the 
Block” (Jackson 2004). Foucault might have argued that the emergence of this 
‘panopticon’ was associated with the regulation of people in an attempt to control 
disorderly behaviour. According to John Pløger, the “Panopticon is an architectural 
design or équipement that shapes control and domination independent of human force, 
dependent on the possibility of uncontrollable visibility” (2008: 64). My interest here is 
not in the successes or failure of governing bodies or the individual perspectives of 
residents, but rather the way in which complex issues (such as the situation of the Block 
at the time of the riots) are represented discursively. The statements of Bolt and 
Akermann suggested a colonial discourse in their statements of blanket criminality: an 
inherent racial difference and concerns of radical deviation. The declaration by Watkins 
reinforces the notion that a state-sanctioned police presence in Redfern, whether from 
towers or on the street, might discipline the ‘criminal’ mass through perpetual 
observation. At the very least, such a declaration can only serve to inflame an already 
complex and fraught relationship between Aboriginal residents of the Block and the 
police. 
 162 
 
A fundamental principle of the disciplinary regime, according to Foucault, is the 
compliance and docility of the object: “He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and 
who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power” (1977: 202). The 
acrimonious history between police and Aboriginal people – particularly in Redfern – 
suggests a quasi-panoptic system. Yet the riots prevented the panopticon from actually 
succeeding, primarily because the riots reflected a lack of compliance with the law. 
Although the police station moved into the TNT towers after the riots, the very fact that 
there were riots indicates the failure of any disciplinary regime associated with a 
sustained observation. By deliberately disobeying social order, the rioters refused to 
become ‘docile’.  
 
Belonging in liminality 
According to the anthropological/performance research of Victor Turner and Richard 
Schechner, there are four phases in a “social drama”: the breach of a social code, the 
crisis, the redressive action, and the resolution (Schechner 1985: 14; Turner 1987: 34). 
In this context, the application of Turner and Schechner’s theory of the social drama 
provides two alternative readings of the notion of the ‘resolution’ stage and hence, an 
interesting theoretical paradigm concerning instances of social crisis. 
 
On one level, the breach of a “social code” in reference to the Redfern riots is not 
necessarily an isolated event but is the culmination of generations of oppression 
experienced by Indigenous Australians, which led to the belief that the death of Hickey 
was the result of police victimisation. The ‘crisis’ can be read as the actual riots and the 
“redressive action” as the retaliative action of the police and riot squad. Finally, the 163 
 
resolution’ was the restoration of social order with the cessation of the uprising and the 
subsequent inquiries, and arrests. 
 
Another reading could be that the initial breach resulted from the action of the riots and 
that the crisis was the face-to-face encounter with the rioters as Other. The “redressive 
action” might then be understood as the aftermath to the riots. These responses could 
include the media, the inquiries (coronial, police and parliamentary), community 
development initiatives such as the formation of the Redfern Waterloo Authority and 
the recently approved redevelopment initiative, the Pemulwuy Project, initiated by the 
AHC. Thus, in effect the “redressive action” is the reinforcement of the status quo. 
However, in this reading, the final stage of the social drama is incomplete: there is no 
resolution or return to social normativity. In some respects because of the initially high 
level of what I refer to as this ‘social anxiety’, the full extent of the inequity, grief and 
dispossession felt by the rioters was silenced and although the status quo is returned, the 
transgressions of the riot continued to be ‘felt’ by the participants and Hickey’s 
community. Schechner argues: “Liminal rituals permanently change who people are. 
These are transformations” (2002: 63). The significance of this particular reading is that 
there are important aspects that continued to linger after the riots official closure. The 
riots have elements of both a social drama and a moral panic and that the notion of an 
unreconciled and incomplete resolution to deeply imbedded race issues warrants critical 
examination.  
 
There is a complex negotiation in the midst of this transformation. Firstly, the riots 
caused a primarily negative backlash from the mainstream media and sections of the 
public, thus triggering a moral panic. Secondly, whilst the riots were short-lived, they 164 
 
did have an impact beyond their conclusion.
48
Space, knowledge and power will always create relations and forms of 
institutionalized forces. Institutions are not only governmental institutions or 
knowledge apparatus, but also the installation of discourses in public and onto 
publics (2008: 66). 
 One of the rioters declared in the Four 
Corners television report, Riot in Redfern, broadcast on 29 March 2004, that: “[Like], 
we gotta show what Redfern can do, you know. ... Like, if we can beat the coppers, we 
can beat anyone....” (Jackson 2004). This young (anonymous) girl is acknowledging a 
sense of power and agency gained in challenging the status quo. Another example 
occurred on the first anniversary of Hickey’s death, when his community presented the 
Redfern police station with a list of seventeen demands (one for each year of his life) 
regarding the investigation into his death. These demands were not acted on. However, 
the peaceful protest recognised the ongoing need to rectify the gross inequity 
experienced by Aboriginal Australians. According to Pløger:  
I extend this statement by suggesting that discourse and power are also inscribed on the 
streets of a city, most notably in the enactment of an urban social crisis. I argue that the 
memorialisation of Hickey’s death in the form of graffiti street art is a particularly 
significant response to the riots: a literal inscription on the city pavement of the grief 
felt by his community. 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
48 It should be noted that as time went on many members of the media, government and public called for open and critical debate 
surrounding the issues of the riots. This included comments made by Aboriginal politician, Aden Ridgeway, Ian Gilfillan and T.G. 
Roberts, among others. Mainstream media reporting also began to include a range of perspectives in the weeks after the riots, 
including the weekend edition of the Sydney Morning Herald on 22 and 23 February 2004, entitled “It takes a riot to care about 
these kids” and other reports specifically about Hickey’s life and tragic death. However, this chapter is primarily concerned with the 
framing of the riots in the mainstream media immediately after the riots as a way in which to look at how a short, explosive moral 
panic can be triggered through racial discourse. For the above article see Jopson 2004: 25. 165 
 
The memorial of graffiti 
One year after Hickey’s death and the riots, the NSW Department of Housing and the 
Sydney City Council refused to display a commemorative plaque because they argued 
that it implicated the police in his death. The proposed plaque, made by students from 
the University of Technology Sydney, described the death of Hickey: “On the 14th 
February, 2004, TJ Hickey, aged 17, was impaled upon the metal fence above, arising 
from a police pursuit. The young man died as a result of his wounds the next day. In our 
hearts you will stay TJ” (Pearson and Brewer 2005). The plaque would only be accepted 
if the wording of “police pursuit” was changed to “tragic accident”, to which his 
mother, Gail Hickey, replied: “I ain’t going to change no words for no-one” (Pearson 
and Brewer 2005). The refusal of the original plaque is a performative gesture, which 
censors a community’s desire to inscribe their symbolic citizenship and demand for 
recognition. It could be argued that the refusal to accept the original plaque is a 
performative gesture, which censors a community’s desire to inscribe their symbolic 
citizenship and demand for recognition. Butler contends that: 
[the] mechanism of censorship is not only actively engaged in the production of 
subjects, but also in circumscribing the social parameters of speakable discourse, 
of what will and will not be admissible in public discourse (1997: 131-132).  
Therefore, in the absence of the plaque, the silencing of individual and collective grief 
reinforces normative practice of what is considered “speakable discourse” and what 
(according to Butler) “will not be admissible in public discourse” (Butler 1997: 131-
132). By the authorities’ rejecting the plaque, its absence takes on a new significance. In 
its place, another kind of memorial emerged: a wall of graffiti.  
 
There is a wall near Phillip St and Waterloo Green with a surrounding fence where 
Hickey fell from his bicycle and died. This wall was subsequently covered in signatures, 166 
 
messages to Hickey and the term ‘RIP’. I suggest that any form of graffiti acts as a 
conduit for some form of knowledge. It is a message sent from an artist to a broad 
audience, yet will often, particularly in the instances of ‘tagging’, be understood only by 
a very small section of that audience (Keith 2005: 152). The knowledge transmitted is 
the performance of belonging because of the spatial and performative inscription of the 
artist’s sense of identity within their location. As Keith explains, graffiti is an ancient 
practice (2005: 137). The first rock paintings and the messages on the walls of Pompeii, 
testify to graffiti as a practice and a mode of communication. It also has a long history 
as a tool of political activism: messages of protest on the Berlin Wall, of countless anti-
war sentiments across the ages and political markings from Tehran to Stockholm. 
Graffiti is often associated with the memorialisation of spaces by marking the territory 
of the dead. Large ‘pieces’ were made in memory of music artists (Tupac, Jam Master 
Jay) and religious and popular icons, such as Mother Teresa and Princess Diana.
49
 
 In the 
instance of marking death, a piece creates a sense of presence in absence. A piece may 
be the graffiti artists’ attempt at memorializing that which is gone and marking out a 
space for an emergence of what may be yet to come. 
Tagging is the signature of the graffiti artist. It delineates space and enables the writer to 
be present: to have a significant place in a world that elsewhere and at other times may 
exclude them. According to James T Murray and Karla L Murray: “A tag is a writer’s 
name or signature mainly used to indicate a writers presence, not for artistic purposes” 
(2002: 39). It is interesting that there are so many literary references to an image-based 
form. Graffiti artists are called Writers, their work referred to as Writing, with an entire 
language system to describe the work (Cooper and Chalfant 1984: 27). Examining the 
                                                           
49 For an interesting examination of graffiti responses to the death of Princess Diana (and others) see Taylor, D. (2003). 167 
 
sub-cultural movement of tagging and graffiti as legitimate cultural practices challenges 
and extends the parameters of what can be considered art, language and text.
 50
     
 Graffiti 
can be read as an artistic and communicative practice encoded with specific and unique 
cultural signifiers. For the purposes of this examination, the cultural signifier is 
principally a person’s sense of belonging and desire for recognition in relation to space 
and identity: “Almost every tag contains an element that seeks to take possession of a 
space” (Mai 2005: 17). 
 
Figure 4: The site of Thomas ‘TJ’ Hickey’s death 
(Newman 2006) 
                                                           
50 According to Michael Keith to ‘write’, to ‘tag’ and graffiti as communication, text and literature are all phrases that are commonly 
used, by both the artists and analysts of graffiti (Keith, 2005: 136-152).  168 
 
Figure 4 is a photograph of the site where Hickey was fatally impaled. The messages of 
‘RIP’ and the special notes of memory delineate and perform the space of a memorial 
site and the tags, the names of the urban radical, inscribe the space with the identity of 
its authors. Berlin graffiti artist ‘Amok’ is quoted as arguing that regardless of the 
“politics that control our cities, tags will always mark their streets. Writing is an 
essential urban phenomenon” (Mai 2005: 2). Graffiti, whether considered as art, 
language or vandalism, is nevertheless the marking of identity in time and place. Michel 
Keith suggests that “understanding urban writing is ultimately about appreciating the 
symbolism of the surface on which it is inscribed as much as the ostensible message of 
the tag or the script” (2005: 137). The site pictured above, in this sense, is made present 
through the combined symbolism of surface and inscription making an otherwise 
‘meaningless’ urban streetscape into a place of great significance. 
 
The memorial of graffiti is fervently rendered present by the ownership of Hickey’s 
community. Keith argues that: “graffiti is not merely the sign or the effect of an 
underlying ethological community; rather it is the embodied social landscape” (2005: 
150-151). The very presence of graffiti implicates a radical re-writing, a transgression of 
social order and the language and practices of cultural normativity. As Keith suggests: 
“Graffiti is perhaps the exemplary mode of outlaw communication. By definition it is 
intrusive, emblematic and opportunistic” (2005: 136). This search for agency is a 
liminal transgression that continues beyond the closure of the riots, as Markus Mai 
explains: “Whether they’re sending a signal, being different, being provocative, 
spreading their fame, creating, thrilling in illegality or finding and expressing their 
identity, Writers are leaving their mark” (2005: 15). In this context, the mark is the tag 
and the tag embodies the presence of a radical memorial in the absence of official 169 
 
commemoration. The memorial of graffiti continues to be a significant site with the art 
collective Squatspace, conducting a ‘Tour of Beauty’ through Redfern, with invited 
speakers providing commentary that draws attention to their particular lived experience. 
Lucas Ihlein suggests that speakers on the tour “represent themselves: they are free to be 
as inflammatory, seductive or rhetorical as they like” (2009: 47). One such speaker (as 
recently as May 2009) was Ray Jackson, a Redfern community leader, who traces 
Hickey’s final route, while calling for a reopening of the coronial inquest. This sort of 
activity, according to Ihlein forces us into “the uneasy role of impromptu mourners and 
amateur crime-scene investigators” (2009: 47). In April 2009, there were reports of 
plans for a redevelopment of the memorial site, removal of the fence and stripping the 
‘unattractive’ graffiti, although Sydney City Council denied these reports at the time 
(Thompson 2009).
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 It appears that, for Hickey’s community, this site continues to 
function as a memorial marking his death. If graffiti involves a search for empowerment 
through deliberate transgression, the performers of graffiti as memorialisation enact the 
very thing that they are seeking: agency. Keith suggests: “what is at stake in these forms 
of urban graphology is an emergent struggle over inclusion, citizenship, entitlement and 
belonging” (2005: 137). The memorial of tags houses multiple authors and meanings, 
which trace a liminal, heterotopic space of grief. Although it is a memorial to Hickey, 
his death is indelibly linked to the riots, and thus, the graffiti acts as a legacy of both the 
impact of his death and the riots. 
 
 
                                                           
51 According to Angus Thompson, reporting on the ‘proposed’ redevelopment of Waterloo Green, and the site where Hickey died, 
Gail Hickey remarks that the council was considering displaying the banned plaque and that twice a year Gail, and TJ’s community, 
meet in memory of his birthday and death (Thompson 2009). 170 
 
Heterotopia  
Many theorists have embraced the concept of ‘heterotopia’ to encapsulate ambiguous 
space.
52
Utopias are sites with no real place. ...They present society itself in a perfected 
form, or else society turned upside down, but in any case these utopias are 
fundamentally unreal spaces. ... There are also, probably in every culture, in 
every civilization, real places – places that do exist and that are formed in the 
very founding of society – which are something like counter-sites, a kind of 
effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites, all the other real sites that can 
be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and 
inverted...I shall call them, by way of contrast to utopias, heterotopia (1986: 24). 
 Originally, it referred to anatomical anomalies such as tumours, cysts and extra 
appendages or absent limbs: where a physiological displacement had occurred and the 
body enabled the growth of something unusual. Essentially, Foucault theorised that 
understandings of spatial and temporal configurations could be related to ordered 
reality, utopia and heterotopia: 
Kevin Hetherington argues that, for Foucault, “places of Otherness are spaces, whose 
existence sets up unsettling juxtapositions of incommensurate ‘objects’ which challenge 
the way we think, especially the way our thinking is ordered” (1997: 42). They are sites 
or enactments of disruption and dislocation yet still identifiable against that which it is 
in opposition to or in reflection of. Johnson suggests that heterotopic spaces: “mirror, 
reflect, represent, designate, speak about all other sites but at the same time suspend, 
neutralize, invert, contest and contradict those sites” (2006: 78). The notion of a 
transgressive liminality is indicative of both heterotopia in general and the Redfern riots 
specifically. 
 
                                                           
52 Some theoretical uses of heterotopia have included postmodern geography, architecture and cyberspace. See: (Hetherington 
1997), (Chaplin 2003: 340-356), (Downes 2005) and Johnson 2006: 75-90). 171 
 
In her analysis of “contamination plays”, Joanne Tompkins associates the dystopian 
abandoned nuclear testing site of Maralinga in South Australia and certain performances 
that deliberately destabilise this abandoned space as a form of heterotopic presence 
(2006: 94): “Contamination renders Maralinga more dystopic than utopic, but in the 
chasm between the non-place and utopia, the plays explore heterotopic possibility” 
(2006: 94).
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 In another reference to “theatrical interventions”, Tompkins suggests that 
heterotopia as a device is “a ‘place’ that has agency, meaning, and relevance to the real 
world, even if it is ‘unreal’” (2006: 95). In this sense, performance theory, like that of 
performance itself, can utilise the concept of heterotopia to examine instances of social 
enactment where disturbance is foregrounded: where an absence can be made present. I 
find this notion of utopia as absence and heterotopia as presence particularly relevant in 
relation to reading the memorial of graffiti as rendering present a community who was 
not only denied a plaque, but also denied its grief. 
Hetherington makes a crucial point of not romanticising the notion of heterotopia but 
rather suggests that it is a useful concept to identify fluid and transgressive spaces:  
In general, the term has been used to try and capture something of the 
significance of sites of marginality that act as postmodern spaces for resistance 
and transgression – treating them in many ways as liminal spaces. ... The 
paradox is that heterotopia can be either or indeed both. Spaces of total freedom 
and spaces of total control are both spaces of social ordering (1997: 42). 
Foucault does not necessarily define heterotopia exclusively as sites of resistance, 
although I find it useful in this context because the Redfern riots and the memorial were 
an ambivalent negotiation between order and disorder: “heterotopia are sites of all 
things displaced, marginal, novel or rejected, or ambivalent” (Hetherington 1997: 46). It 
                                                           
53 The plays Tompkins analyses are Sunrise by Louis Nowra, Heart of the Future by Janis Balodis, Tiger Country by Andrea Lemon 
and Sarah Cathcart and The Career Highlights of the Mamu by Scott Rankin and Trevor Jamieson. 172 
 
is not that heterotopia by nature involve resistance, but that any form of civil unrest and 
rioting could be argued as heterotopic. It is the notion of marginality, displacement and 
ambivalence, which is perhaps the most crucial component on reading the riots and the 
memorial of tags as heterotopic space.  
 
Heterotopias are about deviation: “those in which individuals whose behaviour is 
deviant in relation to the required mean or norm are placed” (Foucault 1986: 25). Which 
leads into another principle that: “a society, as its history unfolds, can make an existing 
heterotopia function in a very different fashion” (1986: 25). In one sense, the riots were 
heterotopic because of the deviation of normative order whilst in another sense the 
memorial of graffiti is an extension of this transgression but is different still because of 
its function and context. 
  
Heterotopia can house several alternate and potentially conflicting spaces within one 
place (Foucault 1986: 25). In other words, the riots may have occurred on the night of 
15
 February 2004 of the Block, but there were multiples spaces of meaning within the 
riots, such as dissent, mourning, retaliation and the reinforcement of social normativity. 
They also involved a temporal displacement. For Foucault, heterotopia are most often 
linked to “slices in time” and can either represent an “accumulation of time” or “to time 
in its most fleeting, transitory, precarious aspect” (1986: 26). In this sense, the riots 
enabled a temporary suspension of order while the memorial represented a more 
permanent deferral in the inscription of a lingering non-conformity. Heterotopia is 
particularly relevant in relation to the riots as spatial and temporal deviation. Teresa 
Davis argues in relation to Foucault’s understanding of heterotopia that, “heterotopia are 
‘like utopias’; these sites relate to other sites, they both represent and invert them but 173 
 
unlike utopias they have to be ‘enacted’ or practiced” (2010: 663). The Redfern riots 
and the memorial of tags were the lived practices of a transgression of hegemonic order. 
 
There are specific rules to the entry of a participant in the heterotopia: “the heterotopic 
site is not freely accessible like a public place...To get in one must have a certain 
permission and make certain gestures” (Foucault 1986: 26). The memorial site requires 
a shared language for the meaning of the site to be interpreted and for the participants to 
be granted entry into the shared meaning making process; it can only be truly entered 
and owned by its artists. For Mai, a tag “defines a site, an area or a viewpoint and 
claims it as it own” (2005: 17). A tag might define a space but it can never be entirely 
owned by anyone other than the community from which it was born. This is the 
haunting trace of the writer who transforms an otherwise inanimate landscape into 
embodied space. 
 
Foucault’s final identifying principle is perhaps the most representative of the riots: the 
relation of the heterotopic space to the ordered space of ‘reality’. Heterotopia tend to 
reveal something significant about the ‘real’ space, from which the heterotopia have 
deviated. According to Foucault, the role of this type of heterotopia is to “create a space 
of illusion that exposes every real space, all the sites inside of which human life is 
partitioned, as still more illusory” (1986: 27). In the disruptive space of the riots, of the 
unreal space, the nature of reality (of social normativity) is revealed as social 
construction. When grief and dispossession lead to temporary chaos, the cause and 
nature of this displacement is foregrounded. The representation of the rioters as Other, 
both through explicit racism and an implicit insidious objectification on the grounds of 
cultural and racial difference, necessitates a critical reflection as to how and why this 174 
 
objectification exists. The riots and the memorial of graffiti can be read as landscapes of 
dissent and as a result, the social and political issues regarding race that exist in the 
‘real’ space of everyday life are exposed. 
 
In the context of the Redfern riots, the deviation drew unequivocal attention to the 
make-up of order. It is ambivalence which is the ultimate transgressive quality of the 
riots and the memorial of tags: heterotopia are “a major source of ambivalence and 
uncertainty, thresholds that symbolically mark not only boundaries of a society but its 
values and beliefs as well” (Hetherington 1997: 49). Whilst heterotopic spaces might 
share certain qualities and reflect common principles, the truly transformative capacity 
of the concept exists in its irreducibility and incapacity to be defined properly. Sarah 
Chaplin, relating heterotopia to urban geography (in particular, Los Vegas), suggests: 
“the positioning of heterotopia both semantically and physically cannot be stable and 
fixed, since its very purpose is to effect contingency and disrupt continuity” (2003: 
342). Whilst the writers of the memorial of graffiti enact grief, their status and identity 
is equally ‘unknowable’ and therein a level of transgressive agency exists. While 
utopias have “no real locality”, “afford consolation” and “permit fables and discourse”, 
heterotopia are “disturbing” and “make it impossible to name this and that” (Foucault 
1970: xviii) by existing in disseminated and dislocated space; quite like the liminal 
space of the “betwixt and between” (Turner 1969: 95). According to Chaplin, “Foucault 
regards the ability to resist naming as a fundamental characteristic of the heterotopia: its 
evasiveness provides a powerful sense of agency with which to challenge the easy 
complacency of utopia” (2003: 346). Thus, while moral absolutes and vitriolic 
statements proclaimed during the heights of moral panic exposed deeply imbedded 175 
 
ideological and discursive issues the riots and the memorial of grief remain inherently 
unstable. 
 
Conclusions 
When we examine the Redfern riots as performance, as the flow between the social 
event, the spectators’ responses and the resulting moral panic, we must confront the 
socio-historical circumstances of the riots. I argue that the riots were an embodied lived 
enactment of the resistance to oppression and the enunciation of underlying discursive 
formations. In other words, the riots were motivated by and reflected the experiences of 
real people caught alongside the forces of history. The mediatised responses tended to 
objectify the rioters by representing them as criminal and illegitimate. In the aftermath 
of the riots, the ‘criminal’ body is fashioned by interested media bodies and the public 
and moral panic erupts. This anxiety produces the perception of Aboriginality as the 
unknowable Other.  
 
The riots were catalysts for a particular kind of ‘social anxiety’ that exposed ingrained 
social and political issues surrounding race relations in Australian society, however they 
also provoked a different space of belonging for the people directly objectified by these 
race issues. The memorial of graffiti is one such site of belonging, where the space 
indicates marginality and dislocation but also transgression and agency. We can learn 
about the conditions of ‘real’ space by contrasting it to the chaos of displaced time and 
place in the riots. To explore the protests as the performance of liminality and 
heterotopia is to question the limits of ‘different’ space.  
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Although the Redfern riots may have reinforced the power formations that maintain 
inequity for Aboriginal people by stimulating racialist responses from many spectators, 
the memorial site, on the other hand, is a space of discontinuity and disruption. It is, as 
Hetherington explains: “an almost magical, uncertain space, monstrous combinations 
that unsettle the flow of discourse” (1997: 43). Not only does the memorial disrupt a 
traditional connotation of a memorial, it also locates the significance of the death of 
Hickey for his community. This space of dislocation is deliberately separate from the 
space of the status quo. For Hetherington, the important point to remember when 
considering heterotopia is “not the spaces themselves but what they perform in relation 
to other sites” (1997: 49). The riots, the aftermath and the memorial are all ambiguous 
‘sites’ of dislocation that are significant precisely because of what they are not. They do 
not prescribe to a discourse of social normativity or legal obedience. They are zones of 
disorder, transgression and belonging in difference. The 2004 riots were a fight for the 
streets, a literal and symbolic space of sovereignty and agency in an uncomfortable 
dance with dislocation and abject poverty. The riots revealed a performance between 
specific bodies of discursive conflict colliding with grief and dispossession in an acute 
attempt to be heard. 
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Acts become sedimented precisely through the orbit of their historical repetition and 
desedimented through, shall we say, “exorbitant” variations on such repetition, 
citation, rehearsal, and parody 
(McKenzie 1998: 223). 
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Chapter five: Three Interrupted Lives: An original creative performance work 
The following is a performance text inspired by the events surrounding the Schapelle 
Corby trial, the Redfern riots and the Terri Schiavo case. Before the performance, the 
audience will be given a programme briefly describing the events surrounding the case 
studies, which inspired the performance and the research process. They will also be told 
that there is a small level of audience interaction. In reference to the following 
performance text, stage directions are indicated by italics. Quotations from literature or 
media material are indicated with quotation marks and references. The language is often 
deliberately clipped to encourage a particular acting style. 
 
Character/Persona breakdown 
Narrator 
Fan 
Victoria (1894) 
Colonial 
Dispossession 
Hope 
Host 
Guest 
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Three Interrupted Lives 
The audience enters the space and is immediately greeted by the Performer. The 
audience members are given a yellow ribbon at random. Other members are given a 
slip of paper with instructions. These include: “When I say stand up and look left stand 
up and look left” and “When I say stand up and look right stand up and look right”. 
The space is set up in such a way that there is a thrust stage with audience on three 
sides. A scrim far upstage is used throughout the performance as a projection screen 
and for particular lighting effects. There is a large sofa draped in a white sheet stage 
left, a series of crates upstage centre and a small digital/video camera. There is a ramp 
continuing from upstage right to downstage centre. There is a long piece of string that 
is suspended like a clothesline around the perimeter of the stage. A scratchy song can 
be heard playing. A soft orange light from the top of the ramp emerges revealing a 
small music box. The Performer gestures to the audience to be seated and speaks 
 
NARRATOR: I think we are ready. I believe we are. The beginning. 
 
The Performer exits and reappears at the top of the ramp. She winds the music box and 
as she does this, she tumbles down the ramp with the music box in her arms. She sits, 
appears shocked and then cleans herself off. She winds the box up and places it 
downstage. The Performer moves in a disjointed manner mimicking the dance of the 
figurine of the music box. Her silhouette flickers on the scrim in the deep orange glow. 
The music box stops playing but she continues to dance in the disjointed movement. The 
song is replaced with the building cacophony of technological sounds (text messages, 
phone calls, etc) which plays underneath the following speech. Projected on the ramp 180 
 
are shards of red and orange lights producing fiery shadows on the backdrop. The 
Performer directs the following speech to the audience. 
 
NARRATOR: Do you sense the charm? I say. Be ready. For the moment. Do you feel 
the heat? You might not know it when it. But it’s here. This is a time eclipsed by alarm 
bells. Do what we want. Hear what we say. Some of what I speak is real. It’s been 
spoken before by others other than me. Some of what you speak (pointing at audience) 
what he speaks and what she speaks is real. It’s truth. We’ll see. You and me. Let me set 
the scene. 
 
A jailbird with her blue eyes and a faint angelic glow. Battle cries of a blown out pub 
bomb. Brown skin and difference. Unsettling the cheap sunnies and braided hair. Too 
foreign. Distant. Exiled. Not us (gestures to the audience). Not us. That would be 
wrong. Can you hear the crackle? The smell? Fear. 
 
A riot. Cocktails and bricks. A boy. Dead. Trauma overshadowed. Made absent with 
concrete and bricks mortared over. Politicians argue as police build a tower but don’t. 
Whatever you do. Don’t mention that blasted generation (loudly gesturing at the 
audience) Don’t mention the kids. Keep it to a whisper.  
 
The NARRATOR moves over to the ramp and lies across the sofa. 
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A tube from her stomach her only salvation. A husband. A family. A court. A nation. 
Wasted flesh and bones. Priest and politician mating for someone’s, anyone’s, right to 
liberate. A war over there. Far away. Bodies brought home to tidy towns. Sickly silence 
as a screen projects far too young faces. Joy. Condemnation. Terror. Women in black 
scarves holding children not smiling amidst a war of withered anxiety. Never know. 
Who will ever know? 
 
She jumps to the sofa balancing as though on a tightrope. The sounds of technology 
continue building in volume and intensity. 
 
How many epochs have had such a stinking smell and a crackling of fear? Sink or swim 
but burnt either way. Mothers, daughters, sisters and lovers denied page time. Crusades 
pursued. Natives wiped out, a generation removed. The six million or so killed, starved, 
raped. What is this, an invasion of a perversion? Consumption, consumption, 
consumption? Is this an age of injurious spectacle? A time eclipsed by alarm. Bells. I 
can hear it. I can.  
 
She jumps from the couch with the sheet and leaps to the ramp. She wraps herself in the 
white sheet and the sounds of technology ends. There is silence as the red and orange 
lights are replaced by a white spotlight as she turns to the audience. 
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What say we, you and me, start with a girl. Strange and golden. A fan. Captive in a 
prison with innumerable walls. So high you can’t climb. So fragile the walls just might 
shatter. 
 
The Performer hides underneath the white sheet. 
 
Episode one: Has anybody seen my gal? 
 
Projected on to the white sheet which covers the Performer is the title Episode one: Has 
anybody seen my gal? The song “Five Foot Two, Eyes of Blue (has anybody seen my 
gal?)” plays: 
 
“Five foot two, eyes of blue 
But oh! what those five foot could do 
Has anybody seen my girl? 
Turned up nose, turned down hose 
Never had another beaus 
Has anybody seen my girl?” 
 
http://lyrics-a-plenty.com/f/five_foot_two_eyes_of_blue.lyrics.php 
 
The Performer emerges from beneath the sheet with a yellow ribbon around her neck 
and a handful of newspaper clippings. She plays with the ribbon throughout the 
following. This persona is called the FAN. She is emotionally volatile; at times 
vulnerable, reminiscent, cheeky or desperate. 
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FAN: I love her. I really think I do. Its silly isn’t it – the way we worry about who we 
say it to and why when really there’s no time to waste. Anything could happen and then 
it’s all over. Cancer, accident, jail. I was one of the first. Yeah, I was an original. I was 
one of the only ones who recognised her pain and the injustice. At the beginning. 
Sometimes it bothers me. Yes. It bothers me that everyone has jumped on the 
bandwagon claiming support when they weren’t there from the beginning.  
 
She starts to hang the newspaper clippings on a long piece of string as though they 
were clothes on a washing line. 
 
Most people took notice after the television interview. But I was there at the start. From 
the very first day, 8 October. Well, actually, that is a bit of a lie (it sits heavy) it was 
more like a couple of days later. I mean, it was reported in the paper and I was, you 
know, a little delayed in reading it and I was in the shops waiting for mum to come out 
of the hairdressers and BANG there was this article on this (pause) girl and I was 
(pause), you know, mesmerised. Her poise. Her silky thick hair. Her manicured hands 
and sculptured face. Those eyes. Blue eyes with a sparkle. With terror and strength. 
What a woman. What a glorious example. And now she’s trapped. This butterfly, like 
the enormous blue ones from the top of Queensland, is trapped. She’s like a collection. 
Like a trapped, captured exhibit. Stuck in that cell interrogated for hours. Moved to 
prison. So dirty, and rotten. With rats and dirt and sweat. No privacy. I think she even 
has to squat to go to the toilet. So filthy. How is such a beautiful thing expected to 
survive such an ordeal, such waste? 
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The FAN is stunned and outraged. A single light globe slowly appears from the ceiling 
above the Performer. It is suspended on a long lead and slowly swings casting a 
shadow as it sways. The movement reveals the different newspaper images and articles 
about Schapelle Corby. 
 
They don’t know what they’ve done. They’ve caged the wrong bird. Her only crime is 
being an angel. A beautiful shining angel in a dirty foreign exile. They’ve locked her in 
with murderers. That smiling man. They’ve locked her in with Muslims.  
 
There is a marked shift to happy reminiscence 
 
I moved to the Gold Coast. I felt I would be of most use in Queensland. You see it was 
my idea to start a campaign, to lobby. I thought we had it sealed when Russell stepped 
in and then Lindy said she ‘understood’. There isn’t any stronger proof of innocence 
than Lindy?  
 
With some help from a growing base of supporters, we created Internet sites, rallies, and 
a letter campaign. I suppose you could call me a fan. I am a fan, of hers. But I’m more 
than that, so much more than that. They described how difficult the situation was that it 
was important to keep diplomacy open, or something? I don’t think ‘they’ understood 
our position though … the importance of saving her from the dirt and the muck. (builds 
in anger) It was our job to save her. If we didn’t, everything about her, what she stood 
for and what we stood for would be lost. Innocence lost. Beauty lost. Honesty and 185 
 
integrity lost. I will not tolerate her being stolen by little, smelly sweaty brown men who 
don’t realise what an extraordinary beautiful butterfly she is. She never lied about 
anything. She has only ever spoken the truth. They can’t be trusted (angry) They are the 
fanatics. They can’t be trusted.  
 
The light globe extinguishes. Floor lights shine upward casting an imposing light upon 
the head and torso of the Performer. The Performer approaches the audience and takes 
several yellow ribbons from members of the audience. As she speaks the following, she 
ties the ribbons around different parts of her body while she adopts the physicality of a 
woman in a tight corset. She is Victoria, an Aristocratic woman from 1894. Chopin 
plays in the background 
 
VICTORIA: “Yours is very beautiful, fine hair, but perhaps you are a little anaemic. It 
is almost certain you are too thin, and of a very nervous disposition. We are going to 
give you a very desperate remedy for your hair, namely, twice a week rub paraffin oil 
(the very purest) on your head with a sponge at night. It will not be so unpleasant as it 
sounds:, the smell will have quite gone off by the morning; if not brush your hair by an 
open window; the result will be worth a little discomfort” (Irmingard 1894: 470). 
 
There is the sound effect of planes and busy city noises. The single light globe brightens 
and the Performer is the Fan once again. The Chopin music stops playing. The 
Performer directly asks the audience for the yellow ribbons. This will require 
improvised lines encouraging the audience to give her the ribbons. 
 186 
 
FAN: I moved there a month before the verdict. The campaign had stalled. It was no 
longer enough to lobby the politicians or the celebrities. We had to take action … real 
action. You could see she was suffering. I remember the first time I met her in person. I 
paid the guards the money and met her at the gate behind the bars. She was pale and 
pasty. She said she wasn’t eating much and I gave her some goodies, chocolate, chips, 
Vegemite. She looked a little confused. I gave her tampons, and toilet paper. Told her to 
keep her chin up and not to let the bastards get her down. I asked her if she’d been 
raped. (She is surprised, frustrated and uses the next line as a justification) Those 
bastards will do anything to rip apart a woman’s innocence, her pride. She said she had 
to go. I asked her if she had a message for the Australian public. She didn’t. I nearly 
forgot to give her the make-up. It was important that she keep her beauty regime going. 
She had to look her best as often as possible. I told her I would always protect her.  
I knew I had the support of Australia I received messages from thousands of people. I 
knew I had to take it a step further than the clothes and tea towels and stuff. The yellow 
ribbons were a national symbol of support … you know, tie the ribbon around your 
letterbox if you support her. We called it ‘official merchandise’ and we had everything 
from g-strings, to coffee mugs, T-shirts, and computer mouse pads. I saved a couple of 
the g-strings for her … and for me, you know, something special. A guy from 
Queensland was applying for the use of her name for paints, varnishes, clocks and fruit 
and vegetables.  
 
The light globe starts to fade during the following 
 
Some people have criticised us for going too far, for sort of ‘profiting’ off her pain. But 
that hurts me because every day people contact me to keep going with the cause. Well 187 
 
they don’t contact me directly but you know people contact the website, and her family. 
And people post messages on blogs and stuff and I always keep up to date with what 
people in the magazines are saying and stuff. I feel encouraged to go further, to push for 
her innocence to be you know glorified. Everyone’s pretty passionate. A lot of people 
have said that they won’t go back to Bali and neither would I if I didn’t have to support 
her. We’ve given enough money to help them now they should be able to help 
themselves. There are messages from Norway, California, Canada, England and New 
Zealand. Even Malaysia. (genuine) Which surprised me. I suppose there are good 
people everywhere. The whole world seems to want to get involved. Which is great! 
You know in the name of justice and fairness we can all come together and fight evil 
and get her home. Home where we can protect her. You know protect her from 
everyone else. 
 
Sometimes I worry that it will take a miracle. Or violence. Maybe war? I’m not sure. 
But someone will be pushed to the limit. Especially after the bombings. (in a naively 
menacing manner) She is an Aussie and a Christian and she is innocent. They need to 
understand this.  
 
The following is said while tying more ribbons around the Performer’s body. She 
gestures to the audience to help tie them and there is a distinct shift her performance. 
Victoria is upright and contained. Chopin begins again 
 
VICTORIA: “The way to get pale, of course, is to get ill. The unnatural flushing when 
you walk is quite another matter. Are you sure that your stays are not too tight, and that 188 
 
you do not stoop? Either of these things would flush your face unhealthily. So would 
tight boots. When you walk, walk in perfect comfort – your shoulders well back and 
your chin well up. You will find you cannot do this unless your feet are perfectly 
comfortable. Your stays ought never to be so tight as to prevent you, while walking, 
from giving a deep full breath without stopping in your walk. It you are already wise in 
these respects, and your face still flushes, the cause is probably indigestion, and you 
must be careful not to walk too soon after meals. If it is a hot dry flush, soften your skin 
by rubbing on a little cocoa oil at nights. If it is damp and sticky, keep a piece of clean 
washleather to wipe your face with occasionally, and use a little good powder” (Queenie 
1894: 470). 
 
The Performer is now the FAN 
 
FAN: I reckon when she’s out she might have a bit of career as a model or an actress. 
They want to make her a star. It is like she is on parade, or like a circus show, always on 
display. Like a woman with snakes or the bearded women and stuff, except she’s 
beautiful. She’s trying, always trying, to look her best. She never lets herself go. Not 
like the other woman. Well she didn’t let herself go she was never there in the first 
place. I thought she was a man. . It says here (pointing to a crumpled piece of paper she 
has hidden in her clothes) that at the beginning, my baby was scared of her. She thought 
she was a psychopathic lesbian. A psychopathic lesbian! I don’t like that woman. I don’t 
trust her. Besides, I’m her friend. I think I can be the woman that she can admire, to see 
how devoted I am, how passionate. How committed.  
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She wraps the remaining ribbons around her body and the light globe swings again this 
time the light lead is lower still. This time the soundscape of Chopin is disjointed and 
scratchy. 
 
NARRATOR: “Lady Dorothy Nevil in ‘A page of confessions’ when asked, “the 
quality you most admire in Man” wrote “intellect”. When asked what she thought was 
“the quality you most admire in Woman” she wrote that “she wants to find a quality she 
can admire” (Queenie 1894: 383). 
 
There is silence as she reaches for the music box and assumes the persona of the 
NARRATOR. She speaks directly to the audience. 
 
She can’t find a single admirable quality. Not a single one. How truly sad. 
 
The Performer unscrews the bottom of the music box and scoops a handful of sand from 
its base. She slowly lets the sand seep through her fingers falling to the floor. She finds 
the digital/video begins filming herself during this next section, which is simultaneously 
projected through the live feed onto the scrim. Occasionally the audiences will be 
included in the projection of the live feed. The lighting change makes the yellow ribbons 
tied around her body look like she is wearing an orange jumpsuit. She is bound like a 
Guantánamo Bay prisoner. The Performer struggles to take the yellow ribbons off. The 
movement is disjointed and jarring. PUT THE BLAME ON MAME, the song made 190 
 
famous by Rita Hayworth from the film "Gilda" (1946) (Allan Roberts / Doris Fisher) 
Anita Ellis (Film Soundtrack) plays under this dance: 
 
“When they had the earthquake 
in San Francisco 
Back in nineteen-six 
They said that ol' Mother Nature 
Was up to her old tricks 
That's the story that went around 
But here's the real low-down 
Put the blame on Mame, boys 
Put the blame on Mame 
 
One night she started to shim and-shake 
That brought on the Frisco quakes 
So you can put the blame on Mame, boys 
Put the blame on Mame.” 
 
http://lyricsplayground.com/alpha/songs/p/puttheblameonmame.shtml 
 
By the end of the song, the Performer is free of the yellow ribbons and walks upstage. 
She puts the camera on the ground on a skewed angle. The feed is still actively filming. 
She winds the music box and places it downstage casting a large silhouette of the 
figurine on the scrim. 
 
Episode two: May the streets rest in peace 
As the Performer arranges five crates around the room, there is a soundscape of police 
sirens, running, bottles smashing and news readings, including the following text as a 
voiceover. There is an image projected on the scrim of the title “Episode Two: May the 
Streets Rest in Peace” with the live feed projecting over the title. The live feed is of the 
Performer setting up the crates. The following text is a voiceover in the style of a BBC 
WWII newsreel. The quotes are deliberately repeated over each other in a loop: 191 
 
VOICEOVER: “A petri dish for rafts of self-indulgent social engineers wishing to 
experiment with the lives of a chronically dysfunctional group of people” (Akerman 
2004: 18). “This is the moment one of Sydney’s worst riots reached a crescendo 
yesterday as police confronted a barrage of fireworks, bricks, and bottles hurled by an 
uncontrollable mob. A 48-hour chain of events ignited by the death of a teenager 
unleashed nine hours of terror in Redfern” (Penberthy and Kamper 2004: 1). “Was a 
victim of anything more than his own tragic stupidity and a cycling mishap” (Akerman 
2004: 18). “A petri dish for rafts of self-indulgent social engineers” (Akerman 2004: 
18). “I defend very much the police in a situation like that” (Shaw 2004: 3). “I’ve 
always said about Redfern that the riot we saw was criminality, plain and simple” 
(Australian Associated Press 2004). “Absolute heroism” (Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation 2004). “Not the Australian way to surrender the streets to mob rule” 
(Editorial 2004: 12). “This is the moment one of Sydney’s worst riots reached a 
crescendo yesterday as police confronted a barrage of fireworks, bricks, and bottles 
hurled by an uncontrollable mob. A 48-hour chain of events ignited by the death of a 
teenager unleashed nine hours of terror in Redfern” (Penberthy and Kamper 2004: 1). 
 
The Performer stands on one of the crates. She moves easily between persona/character 
in this episode signified by changes in voice and physicality. The live feed ends and 
replaced with a projection of a PT Barnum poster advertising a ‘circus’ show of 
Aborigines with the writing “Dime Museum, commencing Monday, December 3
rd, P.T 
Barnum’s Last Sensation, Australian Bushmen, cannibals, blacktrackers and 
boomerang throwers.” The Performer throughout this episode finds moments to paint 
her body and costume. She speaks the following dialogue painting her exposed skin with 
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COLONIAL: J. W. Bleakley from the book, “The Aborigines of Australia”, 1961: “Far 
from being shut off from the outside world, the inmates are encouraged to take part in 
local activities in sport and social life. The attitude of the public generally is 
sympathetic and helpful and all girls available for domestic service are readily 
employed. The main reserve is a La Peruse, which has become a popular visiting spot 
for tourists. The inhabitants of the native village have become highly civilised, living in 
neatly kept homes with many modern amenities, and have shown themselves will able 
to manage their own affairs”. (Bleakley 1961: 220-222). 
 
The Performer continues to paint her body and addresses the audience. 
 
NARRATOR: The inmates of reserves and government run institutions, Aboriginal 
children and adults. Thrilling sideshow alley exhibits, natives to be pinched and poked. 
Domestic servants and helpers. Perhaps you can become white and be ... better? 
Spectacle. A giggle. A pointed finger. You’re different. A man swings gently from a 
noose in a damp distant cell. How different do you have to be? A boy falls from a bike. 
Bricks and Molotov explode. It made the news in Paris. Another spectacle to watch and 
do nothing about. Tourists to our own implosion. Come on down. Come on Down. 
Down Under. Come and watch barricading police. And an eternity of grief (growing 
emotional and angry) “How dare you call it a display of grief?” (Friends of the ABC 
2004). At least that’s what Bob reckons. “You dirty, rotten bastards” (Friends of the 
ABC 2004).  
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The Performer moves the crates around until she is satisfied. The Performer adopts the 
persona of DISPOSSESSION. This persona is nervous and fidgets. She is distrustful of 
the audience. She straddles one of the crates and at other times paces or walks 
impatiently. The following speech is conversational. 
 
DISPOSSESSION: My name is anger. Or regret. I’ve also been known as exile. I live 
on the outskirts. On the fringe. But in the centre of most cities. I live in the decrepit 
space and the fancy. I am created by ... I’m not sure. You can smell it, can’t you? Hear 
the crackle. Sense it? I am created by an authority that knows no better and when 
knowing better does nothing. I am the freak show owner of Baltimore 1883… 
 
The Performer takes on the voice of the colonial persona as before. As she says the 
following text, she tears down the newspaper images suspended from the string from the 
earlier section. She screws up the paper and hands it one by one to the audience. On 
one side there are articles about Schapelle Corby and on the other side refer to the 
Redfern riots. 
 
COLONIAL: “With deep scars and seams in the tortured flesh, and bones, sticks and 
large things, thrust through the nose and ears for ornaments, veritable bloodthirsty 
beasts in distorted human form, with but a glimmering of reason and gift of speech”. I 
am the literature that knew no better by making poetry out of man as animal … making 
man a beast “as free as Nature first made man, Ere the base laws of servitude began, 
When wild in woods the noble savage ran.” John Dryden, The Conquest of Granada, or 
Almanzor and Almahide. 194 
 
She screws up the final piece of paper and places it in her mouth. She chews the paper 
then spits on to the ground. The image of the poster disappears as the soundscape of 
running feet and sirens begins again. The Performer continues to paint herself 
restlessly. While she does this, there is a black and white super eight film projection of 
the filmmaker’s feet walking at various speeds. At times, the film is disrupted by sharp 
edits and blurred photography. The film pans up from the feet to the memorial of tags in 
honour of ‘TJ’ Hickey. The film ends. At the end of the sequence, the Performer is once 
more Dispossession. The soundscape of sirens and footsteps is replaced with a solitary 
violin making sounds like a bird underplaying the following text.  
 
DISPOSSESSION: I am stolen children and broken promises, sugar addictions and 
strychnine waters. I am prison cells and life sentences. I am disease and forgotten 
moments. I am a land in which sporting heroes and travel shows are golden but make 
sure you cross the street. My name is Dispossession. I am the bitumen of your street. I 
am the tower that became the police station “with a bird’s eye view over the Block” 
(Jackson 2004). I am the man who wanted to empty “his gun into the crowd and would 
have made sure he did not miss” (Friends of the ABC 2004). 
 
The Performer is covered in red paint and she turns to the pile of sand on the floor and 
writes ‘RIP’ in the sand. The hymn, ‘All things Bright and Beautiful’, is sung by a 
children’s choir the whole time that this action is occurring. Once she writes the ‘RIP’, 
she enacts a young child and plays with the crates. She eventually forms a pyramid with 
the crates. The Performer goes to the top of the pyramid and steps inside the crate and 
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HOPE: Hi. (giggling) Hi. I bet you didn’t think I would be here. I come here often. I do! 
I’m here all the time. I like to live in the shadows and take you by surprise. Boo! You 
can’t see me, well not really. Sometimes I make myself known. I mainly come out when 
there has been a bit of trouble. I know I’m naughty. You should look out for me. No…. 
I mean you should look after me. (she laughs) My name is Hope.  
 
A soundscape of police sirens, news readings and footsteps plays again building into a 
crescendo of urban chaos. A large piece of white material falls from the ceiling and 
spills over the crates. Hope is giggling underneath. She finally frees herself and an 
image on the white material appears. It is a photograph of a pyramid of crates in a 
Redfern park. There is silence except for the sound of the music box playing and the 
silhouette of the dancing figurine looming large over the projected image. 
 
Episode three: Nobody talks about death 
The sound fades to the sound of a heartbeat. The Performer moves to the couch. She 
drapes the white material from the previous scene over the couch. The title of the 
episode is projected on to the white material “Episode three: Nobody talks about 
death”. She lies down on the couch and the title disappears. The Performer speaks the 
following text as the NARRATOR. 
 
NARRATOR: Teresa Marie Schindler Schiavo was born on December 3rd, 1963 and 
died March 3
rd 2005. She suffered cardiac arrest in 1990 and was in a coma for ten 
weeks. She was in a persistent vegetative state for 15 years. Her life support was a tube 
inserted into her stomach. Her husband and family by her side fought each other to the 196 
 
end. A question of liberty. A question of morality. Who are we if we cannot talk, smile, 
touch? She took thirteen days to die.  
 
She simulates a cardiac arrest violently plunging forward and falling to the ground. We 
notice the stain left from the paint of the previous episode, an outline of the Performer’s 
body on the couch. She slowly gets up from the ground. There is a loud soundscape of 
applause and television show music. The Performer fluctuates between a guest and the 
host of a talk show. It is deliberately difficult to tell the guest and host apart. Both are 
spoken with an American accent to place this section within the context of Terri 
Schiavo. She walks into the audience and says the following from amid the crowd. 
 
HOST: Welcome to what I imagine will be an invigorating debate over the value of 
human life. Who gets to live? How long can we suspend life? How do we value life? Do 
we duplicate, replicate, generate, or, dare I say, validate life or death? All are welcome 
to participate. All of you watching. I assume. Are alive. All of us are going to die. 
That’s for sure. Some will die a long, slow painful death. Cancer. Stroke. Paralysis. 
Starvation. Persistent vegetative state. Takes a long time to go. Some will die quickly 
with a wack of a police baton. The ‘thwack’ of a bus. Or a bullet to the heart. It’s all 
death and it’s all on show tonight. Because remember. “Nobody talks about death” 
(King 2003). A message from the President. 
 
The President is played as a petulant teenager swinging from the couch to juxtapose the 
complexity of the language. 
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PRESIDENT: “The case of Terri Schiavo raises complex issues. Yet in instances like 
this one, where there are serious questions and substantial doubts, our society, our laws, 
and our courts should have presumption in favour of life. Those who live at the mercy 
of others deserve our special care and concern. It should be our goal as a nation to build 
a culture of life, where all Americans are valued, welcomed, and protected – and that 
culture of life must extend to individuals with disabilities” (Bush 2005). 
 
It is important to note that the wording of text below is at odds with the content. The 
choice of wording and performance style is deliberately naïve and child like. 
 
PRESIDENT: Terri was fighting for her life. Well, the doctors, the ‘experts’, say that 
she had no understanding of what her life meant but while there is one life to save this is 
a life I will save. My brother was fighting for her in Florida and I came home from 
Texas late one night to sign a law saying that the highest court in America, the most 
important court in the whole world, the whole wide world, would decide if her parents 
were right. And they were right because while there is one life to save that is a life I will 
save. (Anxious) I was losing popularity and the lifers voted me back in and we kept 
having boys blown up and fooling around with guns. We had the photos of men being 
tortured and some questions were raised about our boys taking the ‘other’ boys to 
‘other’ countries to fiddle with their bits and ‘do things’ with their holy books. And 
those boys in Cuba dressed in their orange jumpsuits. You know what their problem is? 
They were fighting for the wrong man. I don’t see them. I can’t see them. I had to jump 
in to save her. I had to. Because while there is only one life to save this is a life I will 
save. (Pause) If I can’t save one at home what’s the point of killing them over there? 198 
 
Performer switches between several points of view in the following section. Each point 
of view whether it is the Christian right, or the Euthanasia lobby will be represented by 
the HOST and GUEST and each persona morphs into the other. 
 
HOST: “I say let it end, all the hatred, death for a Christian is a wonderful thing. I 
applaud Michael in all his efforts is letting Terri rest in peace and becoming whole 
again and being about to walk in golden fields (Anonymous 2005). “Nobody talks about 
death” (King 2003). Stand up and look left.  
 
Four audience members stand up and look left. 
 
GUEST: The courts they prey on the disabled. They test and prod and exhibit. What is 
the point if you can’t save one life at home? What is the point? “We need to remove that 
line “land of the free, home of the brave” in reference to poor Terri. Hitler must be 
guffawing from the pots of hell” (amdgmary 2005: 6).  
 
At certain intervals, the dialogue will be projected onto the scrim as though it was 
simultaneously being written on the Internet.  
 
HOST: “I think her family has been selfish and have used her for their own causes and I 
find that pathetic” (Roswell 2005). “Terri is not an inanimate object where we’re going 
to pass her back and forth (King 2003)”. “Nobody talks about death” (King 2003). 
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Four audience members stand up from their chairs and look. right 
 
GUEST: Kevin Fobbs from blogsforterri.com. (Angrily) “God – not man – decides what 
“quality of life” means because he – not man – created life and he – not man – decides 
when life begins and ends” (Fobbs 2005). God not man. God not man. (Calmly) R. 
Theodore, 2005. “However it came to me just the other day that it is WE, God’s people, 
who are HIS hand and feet and mouthpieces on this earth and God makes sure we are 
supported and surrounded by a host of angels to assist and protect us. It is therefore 
God’s people that must take the physical action to rescue this girl from certain murder” 
(Theodore 2005). (there is a sense of fatigue) Please sit. (The eight audience members 
sit down) AnimalLover, A Family’s Torment, 2005. “We are all our brother’s keepers 
and are responsible to defend the most vulnerable. I’m all for hiring mercenaries to take 
to Walter Reed for impartial evaluation. I’d be happy to donate” (AnimalLover 2005: 9) 
(softly spoken) GeekDejure 2005. “Hail Terri … Child of God … We Pray those 
judicial sinners ... Do not cause the hour of thy death ... Amen!!!” (GeekDejure 2005: 
15).  
 
Dean Martin’s song “I don’t see me in your eyes anymore” plays. The Performer sits 
quietly on the sofa. She quietly mimes staring at an imaginary balloon floating in the air 
above her and at the end of the song softly says, as the NARRATOR, the following 
directly addressing the audience. 
 
NARRATOR: “Terri is not an inanimate object where we’re going to pass her back and 
forth” (King 2003) .(Exacerbated) “Nobody talks about death” (King 2003). 200 
 
The Performer drapes herself in the white material and stands with the red paint 
markings obvious to the audience. Mozart’s ‘A Verum Corpus’ plays throughout the 
following monologue interspersed with intervals of a loop of recorded laughter. There 
is a projection of human cells developing and rapidly multiplying and reproducing. The 
projection should cover the entire performance space particularly visible over the white 
material with the painted outline of the Performer’s body. The Performer is the 
NARRATOR. 
 
NARRATOR: There is extensive damage the nervous system with atrophied brain 
weighing 615 grams, half the weight of a healthy female of the patient’s weight, height 
and age. Extensive damage to cerebral cortex, basal ganglia, cerebellum, midbrain, 
thalami and hippocampus regions of the brain. All pyramidal neurons necessary for 
cortex function were damaged. Curiously the coronary vessels and heart are healthy 
suggesting initial collapse was not due to cardiac arrest. There appears to be no sign of 
trauma to the neck or throat region. Severe dehydration noted. 
 
The Performer destroys the RIP message made from sand on the ground with her feet. 
The soundscape of the looped laughter is replaced with loud applause. The projection 
has stopped and there is a single spotlight on the Performer. She is the host/guest once 
more and adopts the American accent for the following. She repeats the first gesture of 
running the sand through her fingers until the sand is a mound on the floor. 
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HOST: What is the point if you can’t save one life at home? “Terri is not an inanimate 
object where we’re going to pass her back and forth. Nobody talks about death” (King 
2003). 
 
The Performer takes off the white drape and is the neutral persona of the beginning. 
With her back to the audience she dances very slowly and mimes the lyrics to the Nina 
Simone song ‘I’ve got life’. 
“I got my arms, I got my hands 
I got my fingers, Got my legs 
I got my feet, I got my toes 
I got my liver, Got my blood 
 
I've got life, I've got my freedom 
I've got life, I'm gonna keep it 
I've got life, I'm gonna keep it” 
 
The Performer speaks the following to the audience. In the background we can see the 
pile of yellow ribbons, the sofa couch, the mound of sand, pyramid of crates, and the 
white material with the painted outline of the Performer’s body. She holds the music 
box in her hand. 
 
NARRATOR: Now you see. The one. Two. Three. I wonder at how you take them. If 
you laugh, scoff, rebuke or nod off. Timing is golden when such panic ensues and 
history interplays with the lot. Are we at an intersection where life, death, exile and 
hope all fight for the spotlight? We project. Pod cast. Tweet. Wik. Write. Blog off. 
Neither deaf nor blind to the cries in the night. We gather notes. Ideas. Speculation. 
Notate the rotation and observe without hesitation. Alarm. Bells.  202 
 
The Performer takes the music box and places it in the centre. The Performer exits and 
the lights fade. The music box can be heard playing as the shadow of the figurine grows 
larger. The cacophony of technological sounds from the beginning sequence 
progressively gets louder.  
The End 
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Performative thinking must be seen as a means of cultural analysis 
(Schechner 2004: 8). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 204 
 
Chapter six: Three Interrupted Lives and the social event in performance 
The rise of globalisation, the impact of new media and the nature of spectacle in the 
twenty-first century have contributed to a situation summarised by Baz Kershaw as one 
in which “human exchange and experience is suffused by performance” (2007: 12). The 
argument at the beginning of this dissertation was taken directly from Diana Taylor’s 
statement that to “say something is a performance amounts to an ontological 
affirmation”, while “performance also constitutes the methodological lens that enables 
scholars to analyse events as performance” (2003: 3). Building on Taylor’s statements I 
deploy two performance paradigms as analytical strategies: one that theorises social 
phenomena as performance and one that proposes that a social phenomenon is 
performance by making it the subject matter in a performance. The secondary paradigm 
is enacted through a combination of the previous chapter (and performance piece), 
Three Interrupted Lives, and this final chapter. By drawing on Taylor’s notion of 
“ontological affirmation” and Kershaw’s understanding of “spectacles of 
deconstruction” (2003: 595) this chapter explores how a performance piece might 
encourage a nuanced reading of the issues surrounding moral panic and be read as a 
meaningful addition to the conceptual analysis of social phenomena in the twenty-first 
century.  
 
In this chapter I examine current and past performance practices that enact a critical 
intervention and/or social commentary of some kind. The chapter is also an overview of 
dramaturgical decisions I made as evidence to how I might have contributed something 
similar in writing about these specific events in performance. These decisions relate to 
notions of space, text, personae, media, visual imagery, soundscape and issues of truth 
and representation. I have tried to find ways to represent in performance the basic 205 
 
elements that each case study shares: the social event as mediatised spectacle, 
spectatorship, moral panic and the enactments of truth, discourse and power. This is not 
only to link back to the theoretical examination of moral panics in this context but also 
to speculate how these notions are critical to the ways in which performance might 
intervene in, and perhaps even abate, the outcomes of moral panics. Ronald N. Jacobs 
argues that it is in the world of fiction and theatre where a “moral empathy might be 
cultivated” to confront issues of suffering and disempowerment and that in the case of 
live theatre, “the moral sensibility is reproduced through a powerful sense of proximity 
and immediacy” (2004: 132-133). His final statement suggests that the intimacy and 
immediacy of live performance can help to frame a performative social commentary, as 
well as challenge the cultural sensibilities of the performer/audience relationship. We 
can achieve this commentary by locating those moments where this intimacy and/or 
immediacy are either embraced or interrupted. I view the two paradigms – social 
phenomonenon as and is performance – as complementary yet interconnected 
observations of the contemporary mediatised world. In addition, by conducting a close 
reading of how both paradigms are enacted, one can consider the potential role of 
performance as a vehicle for interrogating moral panic and the changing nature of 
spectatorship. In this sense this chapter attempts to identify where the research involved 
in examining these social events as performance influence and contribute to how these 
events can be understood in performance and vice versa. Or in other words, I ask how 
the performance speaks to the case studies and how the case studies speak to the 
performance. Ultimately, Three Interrupted Lives was intended to be a performance that 
enacts a social commentary by challenging audiences to question what makes 
individuals and communities define themselves when social normativity is perceived to 
be disrupted. 
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Performance as ontological affirmation and spectacle of deconstruction 
The case studies proposed that spectacle, spectatorship and moral panic in the twenty-
first century could be usefully interpreted as performance. I understand contemporary 
mediatised social events to be the focused manifestation of information that can lead to 
the production of spectacle and moral panic through the active engagement of spectators 
(both the mass media and the public). Gabriella Giannachi contends that globalisation 
“operates primarily at the level of information” (2007: 1) and with this in mind I have 
argued throughout the case studies that the transmission of information produces bodies 
of knowledge, which not only form and inform discourse but also create truth claims. 
Considering these statements, and following Giannachi’s claim that “the politics of 
information is also an aesthetics” (2007: 1; original emphasis), I contend that much can 
be gained through examining the same elements of the contemporary mediatised locale 
in performance. There is an aesthetic aspect to the exchange of information.
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 The 
conceptualisation of ‘information’ represented within an ‘aesthetic’ provided a primary 
motivation for enacting a secondary paradigm to complement the case studies: what can 
be said, and done, in performance can contribute an alternative (and perhaps 
interventionist) angle on what people say, do and think in a moral panic. 
Performance and performance studies continue to flesh out the possibilities for 
performance. At the same time theories of performance continually produce and contest 
claims about related concepts such as the nature of space, time, presence, technology, 
the body and the subject. When Diana Taylor suggests that declaring that something is a 
performance grants it an “ontological affirmation” (2003: 3), not only is she 
acknowledging the ‘real’ lived experience of a performance event, but her ‘naming’ the 
                                                           
54 See Jon McKenzie for a detailed exploration of the different manifestations of performance in the global arena. McKenzie, J. 
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performance also grants it another form of ‘being’, another kind of ontological 
existence. My position is that performance is about the ontological and epistemological 
questions of space and time, story and narrative, performer and audience, presence and 
absence, and not as a dichotomy but as ambiguous, liminal slippages in meaning. These 
elements can be fleshed out and played with according to the frame, style or intention 
the performance maker uses to produce meaning and significance accordingly. 
However, what I intend a performance to ‘mean’ may differ significantly from the 
meanings that an audience member may make. Rather than viewing this as a problem, I 
argue that different meanings actually create much of the ‘power’ of performance. In 
fact opening up opportunities for meaning-making can generate debate and have the 
potential to encourage an active and engaged spectatorship. The generative capacity of 
performative meanings can create myriad experiences for the performance maker and 
audience alike and these can be deeply significant. However, the many dramaturgical 
elements in a performance can, and do map the intentions of the performance maker. In 
this context, Three Interrupted Lives can be understood as the embodiment of what I see 
as the central issues in each case study and, more broadly, as the very nature of what it 
means to ‘be’ in the contemporary ‘mediated’ world. 
 
Kershaw has proposed that, “if spectacle is everywhere in the performative society, so 
much so that humans are constituted though it, then in theatre and elsewhere it gains 
new kinds of significance” (2007: 210). While his particular concern is the productive 
negotiations between performance and ecology as a way to confront the excesses of the 
twenty-first century, this quotation is helpful in understanding the spaces that are shared 
between the mediatised digital world and live performance. In an earlier article, 
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phenomena as “spectacles of deconstruction”: “spectacles that question and displace the 
nature of the ‘real’” (2003: 595) and suggests that such performances “open up new 
domains for radical revisions of the way things are” (2003: 599). The three case studies 
examined in this dissertation revealed moments when the structures of social 
normativity were genuinely believed to be under threat. Examining these events through 
the role of the spectator, the nature of mediatised spectacle and the conditions of a moral 
panic meant that the socio-historical circumstances of each event were also opened up 
for interpretation. To attempt to do this in performance is tricky and potentially risky (as 
I will describe throughout this chapter). Ultimately, I believe that there is everything to 
gain by doing so. By creating a performance about these specific events, their discursive 
conditions can be made ‘present’ and thus also challenged. In this sense, the ways in 
which societies manifest fear, crisis, belonging and identity have a significant place in 
artistic performance practice.  
 
Until this point, I have identified the spectator as the active participant in moral panic. 
In this chapter, I also refer to the ‘audience’ and in this sense, I mean the audience 
member to the performance piece. The significance of the three social events was 
largely to do with the responses of the active spectator. By introducing the spectator 
from the original three events as material in performance, I am able to acknowledge the 
role ‘they’ played in the social event whilst still leaving the performance open to 
interpretation.
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There are many ways to play with the concepts of moral panic, the media spectator and 
spectacle in performance. Essentially, I used juxtaposition and paradox to create a space 
where the audience was encouraged to reflect on the performance itself and their role 
within it. Using the example of Two Undiscovered Amerindians Visit by Coco Fusco 
and Guillermo Gómez-Peña, Kershaw writes about how this performance challenged 
colonial imaginings through creating the conditions for paradox and a direct exchange 
between the spectator and performer: 
In the moment of exchange the performer potentially can challenge the ethical 
assumptions of the spectator’s action, encouraging them to see the situation from 
two sides at once, transcending the contradictions and possibly perceiving the 
paradoxes in the event. … The spectacle of deconstruction has the potential to 
generate such reflexivity through paradox (2003: 610). 
In Three Interrupted Lives, I have attempted to create a “spectacle of deconstruction” 
through dramaturgical elements such as space, text, personae, media, visual imagery, 
soundscape, and raise issues relating to representation – whereby juxtaposition and 
paradox can confront the conditions of moral panic, spectacle and spectatorship, as the 
deconstructed material of live performance. Ultimately, I hope the performance 
encourages a more nuanced understanding of the issues surrounding these cases, and of 
moral panic in general, and thus, activates a critical spectatorship of its own.  
 
Space 
The first dramaturgical element I examine is space, by which I mean both the physical 
environment where the performance is staged and the socio-cultural meanings ascribed 
to those spaces. A creative reimagining of the three case studies might be well served by 
a site-specific location, such as an enclosed space resembling a prison, a museum or art 
gallery. Each of these spaces could be interpreted as symbolising a sense of observation 
and/or spectacle in some form. Incorporating an intermedial element such as live cyber 210 
 
interactivity could also be productive in drawing attention to mediatisation, as well as 
the distinctions among audience, performer, space, time and form. However, by staging 
the events in a ‘theatrical’ space I argue it is possible to deliberately invert theatrical 
conventions, disrupt the distance between the performer and audience and, in so doing, 
draw attention to the events themselves and the nature of the performer/audience 
relationship. Housing the performance as an installation or in another non-theatrical 
space would also play with the performer/audience relationship but in a manner where, 
from the outset, the audience is prepared for that kind of artistic expression. However, 
by setting the performance in a traditional ‘theatre’, and intentionally using the space to 
invert convention, audience expectations can be challenged.  
 
As the spectator plays such an integral role in the manifestation of a moral panic it is 
important to house the audience in such a way that their presence is acknowledged as 
critical to the performance process. Thus, I designed Three Interrupted Lives around a 
thrust stage that allows the performer to move into the depths of the audience, whilst at 
other times remaining distant. This staging was intended to engender moments of both 
intimacy and estrangement between the performer and the audience. For example, the 
audience enters the space by crossing the performance area and the performer gives 
each one, at random, a yellow ribbon and directions for audience interaction. 
Immediately, the audience members are made aware that they are encouraged to play an 
active role in the performance. The literal inscription of the performer on the space 
through a painted outline was included as a way to build the performance maker into the 
performance itself, while live video feed draws attention to the mediation of the 
performer’s ‘presence’: where the performer is able to look at herself and the audience 
being filmed in real time. At another point, a swinging light globe creates a sense of an 
interrogation room and later the impression of a television talk show, where the 211 
 
performer becomes the host of the show and enters the audience. Both the interrogation 
room and talk-show format are examples of how I wanted to represent the notions of 
surveillance, spectacle and the active spectator in performance. This is a reflection of 
how the research, and theoretical findings, involved in the case studies have directly 
influenced the performance. The nature of surveillance in performance needs to be 
acknowledged in the representation of the Corby case, just as the urban space needs to 
be for the Redfern riots or questions of the body in relation to Schiavo. In addition my 
intention in playing with the space between audience and performer was to raise 
questions about the role of the media spectator in producing ‘spectacle’ and the role of 
the audience member in a performance event. In relation to the work of Forced 
Entertainment Judith Helmer argues that:  
Despite their obsession with the play of proximity and distance between 
performers and audience, the group almost always worked in the simplest stage 
arrangement – audience at one end, actors at the other – often with a raise 
separating the two. In this way, traditional spatial opposition was maintained and 
even enhanced at times (2004: 64-72). 
 
It seems to me that the point of placing their work in conventional theatrical spaces is to 
acknowledge the tradition, history and discursive knowledge that go with this 
environment in order to deliberately play with the ways in which this arrangement can 
engage the spectator, challenge expectations and guide meaning. Helmer late quotes 
company member Cathy Naden when she writes that Forced Entertainment “wanted to 
infiltrate the mainstream theatre” and “stay in those spaces, saying that there is an 
alternative to the work that’s normally seen there” (Helmer 2004: 72). By doing so the 
performance makers are directly involved in creating a dialogue and a relationship, 
between space, performance/performer and the audience. Without speculating on how 
individual audience members made sense of the questions that I might pose in the 
representations of these events, by creating conditions of ‘discomfort’ about where the 
boundaries lie between audience and performance, I am able to highlight the complex 212 
 
issues stemming from each event in relation to the conditions of the actual live 
performance event. 
 
Text and truths 
In relation to ‘text’, I wanted the performance piece to have a non-linear, non-narrative 
form linked to other performative elements that challenge the role of the audience and 
inscribe the intentions of the performance maker. The piece plays with textual form and 
performance style through dramatic monologue, direct address, episodic structure, 
audience interaction, presentational forms of acting and verbatim quotation. When the 
Narrator says, “Now you see. The one. Two. Three. I wonder at how you take them. If 
you laugh, scoff, rebuke or nod off. Timing is golden when such panic ensues and 
history interplays with the lot” the audience is being asked to question their role in what 
they have just witnessed. In reference to the work of Frantic Assembly specifically, and 
of the theatre spectator more generally, Florian Malzacher argues that “the spectator is 
part of the event, existing within the same space and time. Active presence in a common 
situation” (2004: 124). The textual elements and performance style of Three Interrupted 
Lives were intended either to support the spoken text or to expose disjuncture in the 
dialogue and narrative flow of the piece. I utilise non-narrative and non-linear 
techniques, disjointed sound and strong visual statements in conjunction with a more 
traditional theatrical monologue to disrupt action, story and dialogue. When language is 
disrupted significance can be gained from drawing attention to the meaning of the 
language, or the issues that play at the heart of the language. In this sense, whether it is 
spoken text, written text used as a visual cue, or how this text is delivered, the case 
studies and the circumstances of moral panic in each instance can be used as the very 
material of performance. In this way, language – or at least non-linear, non-narrative, 
lyrical language – becomes a form of heterotopia: liminal and transgressive. 213 
 
A crucial area of analysis in each case study is the role of the contemporary spectator as 
an active participant in the spectacles with which they engage. As a performance maker, 
I take from those ideas the imperative to incorporate both the notion of the active 
audience member of the performance and the active spectator who contributes to the 
original event. I explore the role of the former through actual audience interaction whilst 
the latter is primarily approached by including the voices of the original spectator.  
 
Direct address and audience interaction are common in contemporary performance and 
deliberately challenge the roles of, and boundaries between, the audience and the 
performance.
 The Wooster Group is famous for meta-theatrical exposition. For example, 
their performance of Brace up! (1991 and 2003) began with the audience entering while 
performers were warming up and casually talking with each other. The ‘actual’ 
performance began with the recitation of stage directions from Three Sisters by Anton 
Chekhov. Direct address can be utilised in a similar capacity for exposing the artifice of 
the theatrical space and the activation of the spectator. Throughout Three Interrupted 
Lives the role of the Narrator uses what Marvin Carlson refers to as “a subversive and 
parodic self-consciousness” (2004: 189). Rather than eliciting similar judgments made 
in the original events, the Narrator asks the audience to question the nature and intensity 
of moral panic. The performer continually engages with the audience directly and thus 
breaks down the distance between audience and performer. The direct address is 
ultimately an invitation for the audience to reflect on the issues raised in the piece.  
 
The performance text is divided into three episodes, bookmarked with the performer as 
‘Narrator’ at the beginning and the end of the performance. Rather than following a 
linear and chronological narrative structure, the episodes appear to be isolated and 214 
 
distinct and are deliberately estranged from narrative flow or singular meaning. The 
connection between them is the notion of moral panic and mediatised spectacle alluded 
to at various points by the Narrator. The Narrator helps the audience understand that 
they should be questioning both the form and the content of the performance. Each 
episode is identified by a projected title. This is both a storytelling device and a meta-
theatrical technique to remind the audience of the artifice of their surroundings; the text 
becomes a literal sign post as to the direction of the piece. The episodic structure was a 
useful way to frame my commentary on each event and to play with moments where the 
audience might identify with the material and where they are deliberately kept at a 
distance. Elizabeth LaCompte suggests that her work at The Wooster Group, has been 
described as a ‘tapestry’: “where you might just see the pattern or the strand or 
something and then as you looked closer you discern the bigger images that made the 
story” (Quick 2007: 60). I align with this sentiment and suggest that greater than the 
specifics of the three events is a more significant story about how identity formation, 
mediatisation and moral panic are the core of the overall performance. The episodic 
structure allows for the non-narrative text to appear contained within meaningful 
segments helping to direct the audience toward the actual material within each episode 
and the projected text identifying each episode signals to the audience that this guidance 
is deliberate. 
 
In reference to text and dialogue, the most prolific technique that I employed in the 
script is the use of verbatim quotations sourced from both the literal words of spectators 
to the original events, as well as excerpts from historical text. At the beginning of the 
performance, the audience is given a program noting the use of verbatim dialogue, a 
history of the events and other notes regarding the research and creative process. The 215 
 
verbatim dialogue is also referred to in the opening speech (and at other points in the 
performance) and quotations are prefaced with the name of the individual who made the 
statement. In addition to the verbatim quotations, the script is also interspersed with 
excerpts from various literary sources providing a form of historical context. These 
excerpts can be ‘read’ as a form of quotation raising interesting questions about how 
reproducing history can act to disturb notions of time and place.  
 
I proposed in the case studies that the three events became spectacles because of the 
intervention of spectators. Therefore, it is both relevant and conceptually significant to 
incorporate the words of the individuals who were involved as a way in which to 
position these events in performance. This is where the research of the case studies 
directly informs the performance. The contentious issues pertinent to each case were 
what propelled the spectators to engage, respond and further contribute to the 
mediatised spectacle and persistent moral panic. In many ways these issues were 
consumed by an active media spectatorship driven to consume a heightened spectacle of 
the ‘real’. To involve the ‘real’ within a performance representation of these events 
focuses these issues; to document the ‘real’ in performance draws unequivocal attention 
to what makes the real real. Carol Martin argues that theatre and performance “that 
engages the real participates in the larger cultural obsession with capturing the “real” for 
consumption even as what we understand as real is continually revised and reinvented” 
(2010: 1). Martin’s argument is particularly relevant when representing moral panic in 
performance because of the shifting web of discourses surrounding truth claims inherent 
in any moral panic. Documenting the real in performance creates an interesting slippage 
between fact and fiction, and by using the ‘real’ (excerpts from newspapers, blogs, 
magazines and radio) words of the people associated with the events, the polarisation of 216 
 
‘truths’ that exist in a moral panic can be represented, and thus, questioned. The 
performance cannot be categorised as exclusively verbatim theatre because I 
deliberately use fictional dialogue in conjunction with verbatim dialogue however, 
intentionally incorporating both ‘fact’ and ‘fiction’ helps to destabilise any sense that, 
when retelling social events, truth is stable or fixed.
56
 
 This point, I believe, is critical to 
both the success of ‘theatre of the real’ and to the representation of moral panics in 
performance because the nature of truth is already found to be intensely problematic. 
Carlson points out that, “emphasizing the instability of repetition has provided a 
particularly important part of modern resistant political performance” and it is in the 
variation of codes, tools and traditions of the dominant social order where these very 
issues can be subverted (2004: 189). By focusing on and repeating the language that 
was used to stage and reproduce the events through media, the nature of the three events 
is called into question. In this sense, the verbatim quotation is a form of interruption: 
interrupting a text’s context to highlight the content of the text. At a certain point in the 
performance, the audience is asked to “stand up and look left” and “stand up and look 
right”. Thus at a particular point in the performance, where I use actual language from 
the three cases, some members of the audience will be separated from the rest of the 
audience by standing and looking directly at each other. These devices effectively 
implicate the audience in the performance by asking them to participate and, by doing 
so, draw their attention to the words that are actually spoken. The concepts of repetition 
and interruption are deliberately used to highlight the performance material at that very 
moment, which hopefully guides the audience to reflect upon the context and content of 
                                                           
56 Carol Martin identifies various terms for this kind of performance and the importance of the work: “Theatre of the real, also 
known as documentary theatre as well as docudrama, verbatim theatre, reality-based theatre, theatre of witness, tribunal theatre, 
nonfiction theatre, and theatre of fact, has long been important for the subjects its presents” (Martin 2010: 1)  
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the performance. However, there are some risks involving ‘repetition’ and ‘interruption’ 
in relation to the use of verbatim quotation and the concept of representation. 
 
In reference to Anna Deavere Smith’s prolific performance work of retelling ‘real’ 
stories, Alice Rayner argues that: “To grasp the work means letting go of categorical 
differences such as news and fiction, or imitation and reality. The tension between those 
categories leads to calling the work ambiguous” (2002: 365 original emphasis). This is a 
useful concept in regard to Three Interrupted Lives. Verbatim material in performance 
is framed according to the intentions of the performance maker, and therefore, the 
conditions of these intentions need to be considered. Martin suggests: “What is real and 
what is true are not necessarily the same. A text can be fictional yet true. A text can be 
nonfictional yet untrue” (2006: 15). In the case studies, my interest was the 
manifestation of certain truth formations, rather than attempting to extricate the ‘truth’ 
myself. In a similar way, I use verbatim dialogue to tell the story of moral panic in each 
instance, rather than to retell the mechanics of the event itself. In an interesting parallel, 
Martin, in reference to Deavere Smith’s work, argues that:  
The “raw texts,” if simply read on a page, often reveal hatred and intolerance 
(along with humor, warmth, and personal, value-derived opinion); but Smith’s 
performance clearly signals that racial and gender hatred cannot be accepted as 
the end of the story (1996: 83).  
This quotation suggests that merely retelling hate-driven and intolerant behaviour does 
not necessarily subvert it. It might, in fact, reinforce the sentiment. Thus, it is integral 
that the way it is repeated and the way it is framed, are brought into the equation. Martin 
argues that the use of verbatim text must be about opening up debate rather than being 
pitched as the “end of the story”. For ‘theatre of the real’ to be successful there must be 
an understanding of the dramaturgy involved in staging fact, and how the shaping of the 218 
 
real can be both powerful and dangerous. Martin argues that there is currently “an 
emerging theatre of the real that directly addresses the global condition of troubled 
epistemologies about truth, authenticity and reality” (2010: 1). A similar approach is 
integral to Three Interrupted Lives. Verbatim text is taken as raw material and crafted in 
a way that allows it to disrupt or to blur the distinctions between fact and fiction. In this 
sense what is documented, the real, is intentionally directed in a way as to encourage 
debate around the events rather than help sustain the moral panic that each event 
produced. Martin writes of the Argentinean performance maker Vivi Tellas and her 
approach to the theatricalisation of ‘real’ lives:  
Regular people and the real worlds to which they belong are her subject. These 
worlds are for Tellas living archives articulated in daily rituals, images, ways of 
being, habits of interacting, experience, knowledge, and texts. These living 
archives housed in individuals use theatrical elements such as repetition, the 
construction and use of space, scenes, storytelling, spectator, and entrances and 
exits in ways the verge on the theatrical ... The fascination of this work is its 
articulation of how the ordinary is extraordinary and how the extraordinary is, in 
fact, often part of the ordinary (2010: 11-12). 
The construction of personae, at times more allegorical than character based, the 
theatricalisation of the everyday and the spectacular, and the inclusion of the verbatim 
text taken directly from the three social events depicted in the case studies, illustrates 
how moral panic can be depicted in performance as a type of archive. This also 
indicates on another level how the central elements of the active spectator, spectacle and 
contested truth claims can be made present performatively; how in this context the 
extraordinary reveals the underlying discourses that exist as an undercurrent to the 
everyday and the ordinary. Martin argues: 
Even as documentary theatre typically tries to divide fabrication from truth by 
presenting enactments of actual people and events from verifiable sources it is 
also where the real and the simulated collide and they depend on each other 
(2010: 2). 
In this way, the use of verbatim quotations interspersed with dramatic and historical text 
and other dramaturgical framing devices teases out questions about the notion of ‘truth’ 219 
 
itself. I do so by asking several questions: what is different between the historical source 
and the event; why might anxieties exist in relation to socio-historical origins of 
contemporary phenomena; and how does the fictional material contextualise the events 
and its origins? 
 
Representations 
One of the consequences of contemporary mediatised spectacles that result in moral 
panic is that the individuals are, to a certain extent, rendered ‘absent’. Hence, it seems 
appropriate that this notion of ‘absence’ be included in the performance’s reimagining 
of moral panic. In fact, in each episode I deliberately refrain from actually depicting the 
principal individuals involved in the original case. However, this absence can lead to 
another potentially problematic situation: the misinterpretation of why the people 
directly involved in the original event are excluded from the performance piece. The 
aim of Three Interrupted Lives was to engender a critical response to the representation 
of moral panic. The issue of appearing to reinforce this anxiety was one of the risks in 
representing these events in performance. 
 
While researching the nature of moral panic and contemporary spectacle, I was 
reminded of a comment by Kershaw regarding the controversial responses to the 
performance already briefly mentioned, Two Undiscovered Amerindians Visit by Coco 
Fusco and Guillermo Gómez-Peña.
 Kershaw writes that by the “simple stratagem of 
refusing to signal clearly the ontological status of its codes, this spectacle risked 
reinforcing the very forces it aimed to subvert” (2007: 234). What began as a satirical 
commentary on colonialism resulted in responses ranging from indignation to the 220 
 
genuine belief that the performers were in fact recently ‘discovered’ natives. However, 
the contested meanings only contributed further to the debate with which Fusco and 
Gómez-Peña were wishing to engage: “while withholding any indication that it was 
indeed a pretence, it implicated spectators in its reduced spectacle of human degradation 
in challenging and highly contradictory ways” (Kershaw 2007: 234). In relation to the 
case studies the very thing that enables the global transmission of information is also 
what reinforces the objectification of the individual subjects involved in these events. 
The notion of objectification becomes a central theme in the performance, while it 
remains another risk, in terms of reinforcing this objectification, in the representation of 
the events. One of the principal ways I confronted this issue was by directly utilising 
theatrical convention and contemporary performance techniques.  
 
Martin suggests that contemporary ‘theatre of the real’ is often influenced by 
postmodernism in the embracing of fragmented text, the representation of personae over 
character and realism and “especially in asserting that truth is contextual, multiple, and 
subject to manipulation” (2010: 3). She also suggests that the documenting of fact in 
verbatim performance is about acknowledging the interconnection of societal forces; 
“that history is a network of relationships” (Martin 2010: 3). It is in this context that I 
have created a range of personae (who at various stages directly address the audience) 
and are deliberately symbolic in order to represent issues, elements or themes associated 
with the events. Similarly I embrace the potential for performance to be a dynamic 
space for critical reflection for audience and performance maker alike by placing the 
‘real’ within an obviously theatrical environment, hence calling attention to the 
ambiguities of representation. Thus, critical to the negotiation of representing absence 
without reinforcing it is positioning what happens on stage and framing how this might 221 
 
then be interpreted by audience members.  
 
It is in the representation of the Redfern riots where these questions relating to 
representation are the most apparent. Describing an exhibition of photographs of 
prisoner torture in Abu Ghraib Prison called Inconvenient Evidence and the 
documentary theatre performance Guantánamo, Wendy S. Hesford argues that ‘trauma’ 
can be acknowledged and countered through the notion of repetition (2006: 39). Yet, as 
Hesford recognises, there is also a risk of reinforcing trauma through the repetition and 
reproduction of instances of oppression and domination. I felt that it was imperative 
(when negotiating the complexities of the Redfern riots) to acknowledge the traumatic 
injustices associated with past Australian government policies, as well as the social, 
economic and political circumstances experienced by many Indigenous Australians 
today. However, it is equally as important to acknowledge survival and empowerment. 
The representation of trauma is complex and potentially problematic. Hesford suggests 
that the risk of the misrepresentation of trauma can be avoided only through the 
acknowledgement of framing and the role of the audience (2006: 39). Thus, framing 
becomes particularly important in relation to the representation of the Redfern riots 
because of the potential trauma associated with the reproduction of stories about 
Aboriginal people. 
 
In the days immediately after the riots, the historical context and the perspectives of the 
rioters were largely absent from the mainstream media. This absence suggests that 
dispossession, poverty and inequity were silenced in favour of generalisations about 222 
 
widespread criminality.
57
 
 The performance draws attention to this silencing through the 
inclusion of verbatim material from the media and historical text, indicating an 
oppressive history and purely allegorical representations of the notions of dispossession 
and hope. By not having an actual character representing the ‘rioter’ and having instead 
a persona representing a state of being or a concept, I avoid misrepresentation because I 
never attempt to speak for the individuals involved in the actual case. By creating at 
times symbolic characterisation and at other times neutral personae, I am attempting to 
draw attention to the possible causes of conflict, rather than repeat or reinforce it, and to 
argue that one cannot underestimate the power of both dispossession and hope. In this 
sense, I deliberately use Hesford’s notion of ‘repetition’ (2006: 39) by situating 
historical text (interspersed with verbatim responses to the riots and fictional dialogue) 
to both acknowledge the objectification of the rioters and frame the riots in an historical 
context. Through these devices I hope to expose the very real and often traumatic 
experiences of both dislocation and survival. 
Martin describes how the traumatic experiences ‘recounted’ through the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission were represented in the opera Rewind: Cantata 
by Phillip Miller. In this production memory is transformed through image, dance and 
music whilst breathlessness, sighs and pauses become powerful “aural enunciations of 
physical realities overburdened with painful memories” (Martin 2010: 6). Thus, in this 
context the notion of dramaturgical framing and the utilisation of theatrical conventions 
become incredibly important in relation to the representation of moral panic. In relation 
to the Redfern riots the potential trauma associated with generalising or misrepresenting 
the lives of Aboriginal people is something that must be considered carefully. There is 
                                                           
57 With the exception of comments by Lyall Munro, Aden Ridgeway and the anonymous girls interviewed in the Four Corners 
interview by Liz Jackson, the mainstream media’s immediate reporting on the events is my major sources here. The newspapers also 
carried images and articles about ‘TJ’ Hickey and his family but I am principally concerned here with the representation of the riots. 223 
 
the potential, through these framing devices, to produce something significant and 
powerful that, like Rewind: Cantata, might in fact encourage critical self-reflection in 
audience members.
58
 
  
Martin argues that much of “today’s dramaturgy of the real uses the frame of the stage 
not as a separation, but as a communion of the real and simulated; not as a distancing of 
fiction from nonfiction, but as a melding of the two” (2010: 2). I find this notion helpful 
in the representation of moral panic, the role of the media and the formation of personae 
for both the Terri Schiavo and Schapelle Corby cases. In the case of Terri Schiavo I 
refer to her by name several times but within the context of a television talk show, 
which also involves audience participation. This format was intended to establish the 
role of the media in this case specifically but also as a satirical commentary on the 
larger debate surrounding the right-to-life/death movements and the intervention of the 
US government in the case. The performance artist Karen Finley writes of the Schiavo 
case that Terri became “a national pastime, a place for us to act out as an uneasy, 
confused society” (2006: 184). Her inspiration for the performance, The Passion of 
Terri Schiavo, performed as a double bill with The Dreams of Laura Bush, was the 
extraordinary ‘passion’ from the media and public and the disparity between these 
responses and reactions to the war in Iraq and Afghanistan. As Finley explains, “There 
are daily suicide bombings. Yet Terri Schiavo transfixed a nation with her one 
individual life. Maybe that is the point. The real interest is on one’s own individual life 
worth” (2006: 184). Finley embraces the responses to the Schiavo case and creates 
various personae, including the depiction of a ‘mother’ to Schiavo, who speaks at length 
in descriptive monologues. However, there is a risk in portraying specific individuals 
                                                           
58 It should be noted that for some audience members Rewind: Cantata was a painful experience in itself 
and that this is a risk when retelling the traumatic experiences of real life situations. 224 
 
from “real-life events” in case it is misunderstood that the performance is intended to 
speak on behalf of them. In fact the notion of Schiavo reduced to “bare life” because of 
how she came to represent larger issues relating to the right-to-life/death debate and the 
very notion of liberty further supports this idea that she is almost entirely absent from 
her own performative representation. Thus, I was concerned with presenting the 
relationship between the media and the possible social and political conditions that 
produced the moral panic surrounding Schiavo rather than the individuals in the case. 
As much as possible I wanted to present these issues through satire so as to reveal the 
underlying turbulent and at times virulent moral panic that was inspired by the case. For 
example, the President of the United States of America is presented in an ironic way, as 
a teenager, joined by two other personae, the ‘Guest’ and the ‘Host’, in an imaginary 
television talk show. The talk-show format is used as a parody of the role of ‘reality 
television’ as a media institution and the political spectacle surrounding the right-to-
life/death campaign that occurred in Schiavo’s name.  
 
Chapter two argues that Corby’s pursuit of agency is inextricably linked to the 
discursive forces that subjugate her. The interplay and hierarchy of discourses ranging 
from race, gender, sexuality and media essentially contribute to the tension between her 
surveillance and agency. The question then became how to represent in performance the 
objectification of Corby by the moral panic that both supports and subjugates her. The 
mediatised spectacle surrounding Corby created a tension between objectification and 
agency. In the performance Corby is alluded to but never directly mentioned. This is 
because the episode is really about the story of the fictional personae ‘the Fan’ – the 
manifestation of Australia’s obsession with Corby – rather than Corby herself. The Fan 
speaks of the treatment of a woman she never names and surrounds herself with 225 
 
newspaper clippings of Corby, which at times can be visible to the audience. The Fan 
expresses an innate fear and disgust about a landscape, culture and community of which 
she is ignorant. While she does not declare a sexual love for the woman she speaks of, 
she does imply resentment toward “a psychopathic lesbian”, a direct reference to the 
way Renae Lawrence was referred to by Corby and some members of the media. I 
include this quotation to draw attention to the perceived threat to social normativity that 
dominated the media and popular representation of Corby. To illustrate this ‘threat’, the 
performer moves between the Fan and Victoria (a nineteenth century character with 
verbatim historical text as dialogue) as a parallel between the subjugation of women of 
the nineteenth century and the media and popular surveillance of the woman that the 
Fan holds in such high esteem. The perception of Corby, as examined in both the case 
study and the performance, is informed by what, I argue, was a desire by some of the 
media and public to observe, exhibit and control her in ways that were at times 
(particularly during her trial) vitriolic, prejudiced and culturally insensitive. 
 
I argue that Three Interrupted Lives does not speak for others or discard the lived 
experience of individuals involved in the events. Instead, it highlights the issues of each 
case, including the notions of agency, the mass media and social crisis. Martin writes 
that: “How events are remembered, written, archived, staged, and performed helps 
determine the history that they become” (2006: 9). I frame these events in performance 
in order to reflect upon, and contribute to, a discussion about them. I argue that 
particular choices regarding text such as verbatim quotation, performance styles and 
personae reduce the risk of misrepresentation and instead can serve to open up issues 
surrounding these cases. 
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Media 
Media institutions, technologies and media audiences were shown to play a crucial role 
in each of the case studies discussed in this dissertation. The media, the very thing that 
enables the global transmission of information, are also what enable the objectification 
of the individual subjects involved in these cases. Thus, media is a central theme in the 
performance. Various media technologies – including print, television, the internet and 
new media – allow users to mobilise support, voice opinions and pass judgment on the 
spectacles with which they engage. I have already explored how these media and public 
responses were incorporated into the performance as a way in which to examine the 
nature of ‘truth’, the spectator and moral panic. To a lesser extent, I have also utilised 
multi-media performance devices to acknowledge the global media’s role in 
perpetuating moral panic. Both techniques are critical to the performance as ways to 
confront the nature, role and limits of mediatisation and manifestations of contemporary 
spectacle. Thus, the performance was designed to address the modes of communication 
that were so instrumental to the proliferation of spectacle and moral panic in each case. 
 
Performance studies and performance theory have for some time been concerned with 
the tension between live performance and mediatisation. However, the debate has 
moved on in recent years, reflecting the notion that performance is forever shifting and 
transforming and that the media plays a significant role in exploring the nature of 
performance today.
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59 For variations on the theme of mediatisation and live performance see: (Phelan 1993), (Auslander 1999), (Kershaw 1999), 
(Lehmann 2006) and (Giannachi 2007). 
 Thus, although there are some multi-media and intermedial 
elements in the performance, I ultimately decided that it needed to reflect the 
technology available at the time of the events: principally that of old and new media. 
Rather than construct a performance that was a media spectacle unto itself, my script 227 
 
aimed to acknowledge the role of the active media spectator in the perpetuation of 
spectacle and moral panic. Therefore, the performance incorporates text and images 
from print, radio and internet sources and film and soundscape made in response to the 
events.
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 At different points, I included a soundscape of various new media devices and 
a live video feed projection of the performer on stage. The live feed calls into question 
the temporal and spatial equation that is equally as slippery as placing fact and fiction 
together. Kershaw refers to the performative society, particularly the role of the media 
spectator, as “founded on narcissism: we are always looking for ourselves in the 
spectacle, both on and off the screens” (2003: 606). This suggests a dual role for the 
contemporary spectator: we may make the spectacle but we are also aware of the 
spectacle. The live feed is an attempt to place this issue in the performance: the video 
films the performer dancing while capturing images of the audience watching her, and 
themselves, in the live projection. In the performative society we have the potential for 
self-reflection: we are able to reflect on the notion of looking at ourselves looking 
(Kershaw 2003: 606). In this sense, in the shared physical space the spectator and 
performer face each other in a moment that is already about to disappear; not unlike 
Peggy Phelan’s notion that performance is always in a process of disappearance (Phelan 
2003: 295). In this moment I am encouraging the audience to reflect on their role in the 
performance, to think about what has been left behind and how they feel about the 
issues presented before them, in the present.  
The use of multimedia was intended to draw attention both to the environment it refers 
to, whilst also acknowledging technology itself as a form of mediation, particularly the 
kind that embraces the notion of looking and being looked at in return. Martin argues 
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that with the “growth of the virtual world, the real is no longer a simple assertion of 
presence” (2010: 2) Thus, in the representation of moral panics it is critical that media 
(in myriad forms) has a place in this performance. Whether it is by presenting verbatim 
text that was originally produced through the mass media (old and new media) or by 
mediating the performance with various forms of technology both the form and content 
of the piece can be utilised to complicate the relationship between performance and the 
representation of the ‘real’. 
 
Visual imagery and soundscape 
Hans Belting writes of the capacity of the image to bear witness when he suggests that: 
“Iconic presence still maintains a body’s absence and turns it into what must be called 
visible absence. Images live from the paradox that they perform the presence of an 
absence or vice versa” (2005: 312 original emphasis). Several visual and sound motifs 
are repeated throughout the performance to create either a sustained link between the 
episodes or to distil particular issues in simple yet decisive theatrical moments. Frances 
Guerin and Roger Hallas refer to the capacity of the image to engage with its viewer in 
a “personal encounter”, where “images are still perceived to have a power and an 
agency to bring to life – to bring into a particular kind of presence” (2007: 10). The 
primary examples in this context, where presence is the paramount meaning, are the 
music box, the sand and the paint. The music box symbolises the presence of the 
‘Narrator’. In the first episode, the Narrator unscrews the music box and lets a handful 
of sand fall through her fingers. Later, in Episode two: May the streets rest in peace, the 
sand is moved into an inscription of RIP on the floor of the performance space. In this 
instance, the image is intended to represent the memorial of graffiti and the heterotopic 
performance enactment of displacement. Finally, in Episode three: Nobody talks about 229 
 
death, the performer destroys the RIP message and repeats the first gesture of running 
the sand through her fingers. In this sense, the sand becomes a visual link between the 
episodes. 
 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the paint represents both the literal and symbolic 
inscription of the body on the performance space. In the second episode, the performer 
paints her exposed skin red and lies on the sofa covered in white material. In episode 
three, she simulates a cardiac arrest falling from the sofa to the floor. The painted 
outline of her body on the white material is thus made visible to the audience. This final 
image represents both the lingering inscription of the performer on the performance 
space and the ambiguities inherent in Schiavo’s subject/object status. I felt that this was 
a necessary inclusion in the performance in representing the conflicted nature of the 
moral panic surrounding Schiavo and how she was rendered an object of a much larger 
debate surrounding the right-to-life/death. Both the sand and the paint are links between 
the episodes and permanent inscriptions of the performer, Narrator and the events on the 
performance landscape. 
 
In Episode one: Has anybody seen my gal, the performer takes back the yellow ribbons 
that were handed out at the beginning and ties her hands and feet, eventually binding her 
entire body. At this point there is a movement sequence to the song Blame it on Mame 
originally sung by Rita Hayworth in the movie Gilda. According to Mary Anne Doane, 
this song: “attributes various types of natural and other disasters to female sexuality” 
(Doane 1991: 104). In this context, I have constructed an intentional parallel between 
Corby and Gilda – linking patriarchal perceptions of female sexuality and notions of 
imprisonment. This image is further complicated by the performer’s outfit of yellow 230 
 
ribbons, which under the orange light are intended to resemble the uniform of a prisoner 
at Guantánamo Bay. This action is intended to situate notions of imprisonment in 
relation to the ‘war on terror’, mediatised representations of gender and the ‘foreign’ 
racial Other in the Corby case. 
 
In chapter two, I explore the mediatised and popular responses to the Corby case as a 
form of panoptic surveillance. Although this notion of surveillance is partly represented 
in the performance through dialogue – repetition of the words ‘trapped’, ‘exhibited’, 
‘locked’, etc. – I use some visual devices to further this sense of surveillance. 
Throughout the episode, a swinging light casts shadows over the performer. At times, 
this light also shines on the newspaper clippings that the Fan suspends from the string 
that encircle the stage. Together, these devices were intended to show the extent of the 
Fan’s obsession with Corby, symbolising the surveillance of her by the media and 
public. 
 
The memorial of graffiti is the final filmic image of episode two, which testifies to the 
notion that written and visual texts are involved in ‘remembering’ historical events. In 
relation to a comment by Susan Sontag, that the “photograph is like a quotation”, James 
Polchin argues that: “as quotations, photographs act as metonyms, carving out a split 
second of time as a signifier of larger events or historical experience” (2007: 214). By 
including the image of the memorial of graffiti I attempt to draw attention to the 
absence of the official commemorative plaque and to the heterotopic space of the 
memorial of tags as displaced and transgressive. Guerin and Hallas write that: “Images 
are considered not simply to evoke the violence and trauma of the event, but to re-
present it, to make it present again (and in some cases, consciously make it present for 231 
 
the first time)” (2007: 9). While the audience may not be aware of the facts, they are 
confronted with a memorial of sorts made obvious by the volume of messages stating 
‘rest in peace’. This is both the memorial of Hickey’s death site and a memorial that 
occurs in the performance space. The tags are transgressive not simply because the 
graffiti is illegal but also because it comes from Hickey’s community in a geo-political 
inscription. Peggy Phelan writes of an “ethics of the invisible”, of finding a way to 
embrace that which cannot be seen or, like performance, that which is continually in a 
process of disappearance (2003: 295). In a way, the footage of the feet is an attempt to 
render visible that which can only partially be seen. One can never entirely know the 
extent of grief or the lingering transgression of heterotopia. 
 
I conclude this episode with a personal experience. While walking through the streets of 
Redfern with my family over a period of three days in 2006, I passed through a park 
where several Aboriginal children from the local area were playing and building 
structures out of milk crates. On the first day, we remarked on their skill when they 
constructed a pyramid out of the crates. On the second day, they were building another 
structure. We asked if they could build a pyramid again so we could take some 
photographs. On the third day, the children were gone but the pyramid remained. A 
sense of celebration was imprinted on my memory. I chose to read the activity and the 
repetition of the game as a metaphor for the radical and transgressive qualities of 
innocence and hope. 
 
The visual image and sound is very important in Episode three: Nobody talks about 
death. The performer lists the findings of Schiavo’s autopsy while draped in the sheet 
with the red paint outline of her body, while Mozart’s Ave Verum Corpus (loosely 232 
 
translated to “Hail, true body”) plays (interspersed with a loop of recorded hysterical 
laughter). During this sequence, there is also a projection of human cells rapidly 
multiplying and reproducing. The projection covers the entire performance space, 
including being particularly visible over the white material covering the performer’s 
body. I conclude the episode with the performer miming the words to the Nina Simone 
song, I’ve Got Life. These devices as enactments of visual and aural symbolism situated 
alongside quotations and dramatic monologue help to address issues about the body, 
agency and biopower. 
 
Conclusions 
These three events can be read as not only performance but also as an invitation to see 
how performance as a practice can become a forum for critical exploration and social 
commentary within creative practice. Three Interrupted Lives is not only another way of 
looking at spectacle, the contemporary media spectator and moral panic. It also offers 
an opportunity to see what can happen through the intimate and dynamic presence of the 
performer/spectator relationship. As a performance maker, I take elements of a social 
performance and place them within the theatre in the hope that this transformation is 
able to provoke debate. By using dramaturgical devices that utilise space, text, media, 
personae, visual imagery and soundscape –that raise notions of representation and truth 
– a performance reimagining of social phenomena can potentially contribute to a unique 
social enquiry. Kershaw writes that spectacles of deconstruction are “celebrations of the 
equivocal” and I attempt to do something similar with Three Interrupted Lives: to create 
a meaningful and challenging reimagining of three unique events that suggested 
something significant about the ways in which individuals and communities interact in 
the globalised media environment. 233 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It remains to be seen whether the time of postmodernity will go down 
in history as the twilight, or the renaissance, of morality 
(Bauman 1993: 3). 
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Conclusions: Looking back and beyond 
Liquid modernity is partly produced through evolving information and communication 
technologies. Thus, it is also the product of fractured and transient mediatised 
experiences. Ronald N. Jacobs suggests that:  
The vision of life as a coherent project and a singular narrative … no longer 
resonates with the personal biographies of most people. In its place is a life 
strategy oriented around fragmentary episodes and ever-new beginnings. … A 
commitment to transience has replaced the value of durability (2004: 127).  
The notion of the transient subject – shaped by a multiplicity of ‘narratives’ and 
influenced by discourses of mediatisation and consumerism – feeds directly into how 
one might come to understand the contemporary spectator of media, and thus also the 
manifestation of a moral panic today.  
 
Throughout this dissertation I have explored how and why, within the context of 
discourse and power, moral panic occurs in relation to spectacle and spectatorship. My 
detailed analysis of the three case studies revealed that, in each instance, moral panic 
had an active spectatorship and a mediatised spectacle to enable its production. The 
events contained divergent, and sometimes extreme, responses that led to myriad claims 
to truth and a perception that normativity was, in some manner, under threat. Chapter 
two analysed the Corby spectacle and explored how it raised issues concerning gender, 
sexuality and race. Chapter three examined the polarised views on the value of life and 
the role of self and state governance in the Schiavo case. Chapter four investigated the 
racialist response to a community suffering from generations of implicit and explicit 
discrimination in the 2004 Redfern riots. The modes of communication involved in each 
of these cases were a mix of ‘new’ media (blogs, online news forums and websites) and 
‘old’ media (talk-back radio, newspapers, magazines and television). Together, this 235 
 
information created a discursively constructed spectacle of competing truth formations. 
In this section I make some final conclusions about the findings of the case studies and 
the relationship between the research and the performance text. I then position this 
research in relation to media technologies found today and the impact they may have on 
the changing role of the global media spectator and the nature of moral panic. In this 
instance I briefly explore several examples of how new new media has been used to 
mobilise both individuals and critical debate surrounding important social issues and to 
ask how moral panic may be impacted by new new media. Whereas the case studies 
examined each event via a specific set of socio-political circumstances at a particular 
point in history, this section allows me to explore what this might mean for the study of 
performance today. 
 
Looking back and beyond 
Taylor contends that, “Looking entails a responsibility, a risk, and a danger” (1998: 
184). By examining social events that lead to moral panic, there is an inherent risk in 
relation to representation and the personal experiences of individuals involved. 
‘Looking’ does entail both a risk and also a responsibility to pursue debate. This 
dissertation is a discursive enquiry, that is, an examination of the socio-historical 
conditions from which mediatised spectacle emerged in these particular circumstances. 
By acknowledging the ways in which truth claims are formed and how individuals and 
communities identify themselves and engage with each other, I argue that this risk can 
be turned into debate.  
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The frenzy surrounding Corby’s situation may have waned over the years since her 
incarceration, the rebellion of the ‘riots’ somewhat dispelled and the political spin of the 
right-to-life movement lost some of its force following Schiavo’s death. Similarly, new 
new media has transformed how social events are seen and understood and these 
technologies and processes continue to transform the role of the contemporary spectator. 
Nevertheless, each event reflected a powerful moment where social normativity was 
understood to be under threat, resulting in a significant impact on the representation of 
the individuals involved and how the events were received. Was Corby the performer of 
her own story or was she completely objectified by her audience and rendered ‘absent’ 
by a mediated representation? Was the performance act the riot or the aftermath where 
the statements issued replaced the ‘rioting’ subject with the criminal object? Was Terri 
Schiavo the performer – without functional body or mind – or was the performer, in 
fact, the religious right, the United States government or perhaps even the ‘war on 
terror’? Such questions are useful in reflecting on the implications and significance of 
each event by looking beyond to larger questions of mediatisation, representation and 
subject formation. 
 
Chapter one examined the thesis argument: that social phenomena can be examined as 
performance through a theoretical analysis while the same enactment is a performance 
when represented in performance. By drawing from theorists such as Bauman, Debord, 
Baudrillard, Kellner, Kershaw, Agamben and Foucault I explored the mediatised and 
technologised world as a complex matrix of contested truth claims, discourse and 
power. The key to reading each event as performance was to understand the events as 
constituted through the elements of mediatised spectacle, spectatorship and moral panic 
in relation to a discursive undercurrent. Each element participates in furthering the 237 
 
mobilisation of the active spectator and the moral panic resulting in both the 
subjectification and objectification of subject(s) involved. Ultimately, the examination 
of these intertwined elements reveals the myriad performances of discourse, power, and 
truth in the twenty-first century. 
 
Chapter two examined how the mediatised spectacle surrounding Schapelle Corby was 
a form of panoptic surveillance constituted through discourses of race, gender and 
sexuality. Because of intense media attention, Indonesia as a nation was demonised and 
Corby’s capacity to perform to social norms relating to sexuality and gender was 
scrutinised. However this case was also an example of the coexistence of spectacle and 
surveillance. Through a self-awareness of the spectacle, Corby contributed to the 
production of a tension between herself as the ‘docile body’ and her pursuit of real and 
lasting agency. Ultimately, the tools for subversion available to her were still the 
mechanics of her subjugation. Thus, the discourses of the media, race, gender and 
sexuality thwarted any sustained transformation. 
 
Chapter three examined how the legal, ideological and political battle surrounding the 
Terri Schiavo case involved contested truth claims and hearsay testimony as evidence 
within an overriding discourse of biopower. At the time of Schiavo’s death in 2005, 
President Bush was actively pursuing a “culture of life” (Bush 2005). As an advocate of 
the right-to-life movement, Bush reinforced his personal opposition to stem cell 
research, abortion and euthanasia. However, the discourses involved in the “culture of 
life” extend well beyond his personal belief systems into the wider machinations of 
global politics, religion and bioethics. This chapter drew upon the understanding that 
biopower involves the administration, regulation and control of populations and the 238 
 
shaping of the subject in relation to the value of life. Informed by Agamben’s notion of 
“bare life”, I situated the mediated representation of Schiavo (and what she came to 
mean for so many) in opposition to the concept that other people are rendered powerless 
in a “state of exception” (Agamben 1998: 159). Finally, in contrast to Susan Torres, 
Schiavo came to represent the power of visuality in an explosive period of American 
history complete with competing truths, ideologies and discourses. 
 
In Chapter four I examined how visual and linguistic mediatised representations 
positioned the Redfern riots, and rioters, as inherently inferior and criminal. However, 
explosions of grief and trauma triggered new spaces of belonging and transgression, 
exposing the limits – or limitlessness – of power and the subject within it. The riots and 
the memorial of graffiti were (and to a certain extent remain) heterotopic because, 
according to Hetherington, they produced “spaces for the means of alternative ordering 
through their difference and Otherness” (1997: 46). Therefore, I argue that the 
performance of the Redfern riots and the memorial of graffiti are heterotopic sites of 
marginality, displacement and the pursuit of sovereignty. 
 
Chapters five and six addressed some of the foregoing issues in a very different format. 
They situate the three events in performance. By using Taylor’s concept of the 
“ontological affirmation” of declaring that something is a performance, I created a 
secondary and complementary model by using the case studies as material in 
performance. Chapter five, the performance piece, Three Interrupted Lives, attempted to 
open up the many issues in each case, whilst also exploring how the contemporary 
performance maker can contribute to a ‘spectacle of deconstruction’. Chapter six raised 
questions about the possible limitations of this approach and the reasons behind certain 239 
 
dramaturgical decisions. By drawing inspiration from other performance practitioners 
and theorists I examined the possibilities of a performance style that uses the 
documentation of ‘real life’ as a form of social enquiry.  
 
The case studies and Three Interrupted Lives examined how moral panic existed as and 
in performance by concentrating on three events that took place several years ago – 
when many of the social networking devices and processes considered to be new new 
media were not available (Levinson 2009: 1). Thus, the key issue for me in reviewing 
the research and concluding this discussion is locating moral panic, spectatorship and 
spectacle in relation to the current landscape of emergent technology, new new media 
and increasingly fluid and temporary social connections. 
 
The spectator, spectacle and moral panic in the liquid modern era 
New new media has helped facilitate the celebritisation and mediatisation of everyday 
regular activities. Reality television continues to commodify the lives of “ordinary 
people” or further the spectacle surrounding already famous individuals. There are 
Internet sites for anything from cooking to alternative health treatments and Ebay 
enables consumption without engaging in direct contact with anyone else. Google 
Maps, Google Earth and GPS navigation systems allow us to locate ourselves in relation 
to almost any landscape, street or streetscape in the world, while the many 
manifestations of the mobile phone enable us to be contacted almost anywhere at any 
stage. Facebook, YouTube, MySpace and Twitter facilitate an immediacy of 
information previously unknown and allowing us to exist in a state of perpetual tourism. 
As Bauman explains, “most of us are on the move even if physically, bodily we stay 240 
 
put” (1998: 77). New new media allows us to observe, consume and participate within 
social phenomena without ever having to necessarily physically encounter it. 
 
Navigating this new terrain, the spectator is capable of pursuing endless possibilities for 
consumption and sensation: the user has the capacity to be somewhere or to be someone 
else by continually buying, consuming, observing, producing and performing. The 
newness of new media means it always has the potential to become something else, 
something better, something different. In reference to the consumer society, Bauman 
argues that the consumer is “constantly greedy for new attractions and fast bored with 
attractions already had” (1998: 84). This society relies on a desire for the experience 
(and sensation) of consumption, as opposed to the consumer product itself (Bauman 
1998: 83). Therefore, consumerism links with new new media in the need to continually 
produce innovative technologies and services to satiate a consumer that ultimately 
cannot be satisfied. According to Bauman, “to increase their capacity for consumption, 
consumers must never be allowed to rest” (1998: 83). Thus, consumerism must have an 
impact on the nature of its users (and hence spectatorship), mediatised spectacle and the 
discursive interplay of both. This impact will influence how moral panic might emerge 
if, and when, it does. I argue that it is important to explore the dimensions of the 
spectator, the spectators’ engagement with new new media in creating spectacle and 
moral panic as they exist today. 
 
How is one to think of the liquid modern subject engaging with the liquid modern 
mediatised world? Operating in a landscape of spectacle, one can witness war, poverty 
disease, natural disasters and ecological destruction at the click of a switch. Or, as 
Sontag expressed it, being “a spectator of calamities taking place in another country is a 241 
 
quintessential modern experience” (2004: 16). Therefore, how can one confront or 
engage with the Other? This matter becomes even more fraught when we consider the 
inequities in the world and our exposure to the suffering of others? Should one feel pity, 
indignation or find some other critical mode of engagement in a situation where we are 
confronted by the Other in pain? (Boltanski 1999: 114-115) I raise these questions 
because, with the advent of new new media, there is no end to what the user is able to 
witness. 
 
While observing spectacles was also the case with old and new media, the speed and 
intensity of the ways in which one can access and/or contribute to this information has 
rapidly developed in the past decade. I argue that as the vessels for viewing these 
mediatised spectacles evolve (with the accompanying impact on identity and 
community formation), so too does the nature of spectatorship and how the spectator 
responds to the material that he or she witnesses. This is not to say that spectators are 
always faced with a moral dilemma or that the nature of morality in the age of 
information is even of primary importance to my conclusions. However, so much of this 
dissertation has focussed on spectatorial engagement that it is important to explore – 
even in a tentative way – what this might mean in the current context. It is critical, I 
believe, when analysing social performance to engage continually with the ways in 
which the subject, and the spectator, are shaped by and respond to an increasingly 
technologised world.  
 
Urry argues that virtuality leads to a new modality, a dichotomous lived experience of 
fluid encounters. He claims that virtual travel produces “a kind of strange and uncanny 
life on the screen, a life that is near and far, present and absent, live and dead” (2002: 242 
 
267). This kind of journey requires only a single click online to enable one to pass 
through borderless territories (alongside other hyper real visitors), where notions of 
proximity, intimacy and actual live engagement are called into question. Social 
networking devices ensure that networks are formed through virtual human encounters. 
Bauman contends that in virtual proximity, “Each connection may be short-lived, but 
their excess is indestructible. Amidst the eternity of the imperishable network, you can 
feel unthreatened by the irreparable fragility of each single, transient connection” (2003: 
60; original emphasis). Connections might be made but the subject can decide on the 
level of engagement and the duration of the encounter, thus allowing for the 
development of a multitude of temporary and potentially transient human connections. 
This may have been the case with the kinds of technologies of new media that were 
involved in the original three events (blogs, websites, etc.). However, new new media 
takes the interactivity and engagement of the spectator to a whole new level.  
 
The question then arises, what does this virtuality bring to the ways in which subjects 
think of themselves in relation to others? I raise this question because in each of the case 
studies a moral panic emerged as a result of ‘concerned’ spectators responding to and 
engaging with other interested people. Does virtuality increase, diminish or alter this 
dynamic in any way? Bauman argues that: 
[virtual] proximity renders human connections simultaneously more frequent 
and more shallow, more intense and more brief. ... Virtual proximity can be, 
both substantively and metaphorically, finished with nothing more than the press 
of a button” (2003: 62). 
In the context of virtual proximity, it becomes increasingly important to explore how 
these technologies and processes influence spectatorship in order to understand the 
possibilities and/or limitations of a technologically mediated subject.  243 
 
The active spectator is critical to the constitution of spectacle surrounding an event and 
in the propagation of responses that lead to moral panic. It appears that in opening up 
such social phenomena for analysis, we can raise questions about how these elements 
might function in light of new new media. Fluid and fractured virtual encounters not 
only influence subject formation; they also influence the ways in which spectacle is 
produced and responded to and the ways in which spectatorship is transformed. One of 
the most interesting aspects of new new media is the role of the ‘user’ as both the 
consumer and producer of information. As mentioned this shift in spectatorship was 
only beginning to emerge at the time of the case studies, particularly in the form of 
blogs (Levinson 2009: 1). There have also been significant changes in the social, 
economic and political circumstances of both Australia and the USA since these events 
took place and these changes have an impact on how the media might be used and as a 
result on the constitution of spectacle and moral panic.
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 The perception of a deviation 
from social normativity was at the core of moral panic in the three case studies, which 
leads to the question of how new new media might influence an individual or a 
community when social norms are challenged. The question also arises as to how new 
new media might impact on the subject as user, consumer, observer and performer, and 
how this is both cause and effect of power and discourse. 
Since September 11 2001, the subsequent attacks on the London Underground, the 
bombings in Bali and Madrid and the attacks in Mumbai, the surveillance and 
                                                           
61The global economic situation was irrevocably influenced by the onset in late 2008 of the most severe financial crisis since the 
Great Depression. The Australian Federal Government led at the time by former Labor Prime Minister Kevin Rudd and in the USA, 
the administration of President Barack Obama introduced economic stimulus packages. The elections of Rudd in 2007 (and the 
replacement of Prime Minister Kevin Rudd with the first female Prime Minister Julia Gillard in June 2010 and her subsequent 
election in September 2010), and Obama in 2008 heralded a shift away from the neo-liberal socially conservative administrations of 
the John Howard Liberal government in Australia and Republican President George Bush in the USA to one in which social welfare 
had a (small) place in the socio-political landscape of both countries. However, I argue that regardless of these shifts, and even after 
such a significant financial crisis, the demand for consumption and commodification, foundational elements in the success of 
globalisation, continues to run deep. With globalisation come the commercialisation, commodification and politicisation of new new 
media and other associated technologies.  244 
 
monitoring of subjects is a common occurrence. This surveillance includes the 
observation of information on the Internet, email and phone usage, CCTV images, bank 
account transactions and so on. With technological advances in the sourcing and sharing 
of information comes the potential for enormous commercial profit and this market-
driven commercial imperative is not separate from the political sphere, global media or 
security technologies. Kiyoshe Abe argues that the “information society is at the same 
time the surveillance society (2006: 265).
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 While the panoptic surveillance of current 
new new media can at times make George Orwell’s 1984 appear as child’s play, I argue 
that the very nature of these technologies has an ambiguous relationship to surveillance 
strategies. If the panoptic system is to be successful the object of surveillance must be 
aware of the observation and in compliance to the system monitor their behaviour 
accordingly. However new new media lends itself to the surveillance/spectacle 
paradigm – where those watched are also watching back.  
The new new media user actively contributes to the production and exchange of 
information which means that the panopticon of contemporary global media is to some 
extent disseminated. In this sense the user is an agent in control of his or her own 
surveillance. The changing role of the spectator indicates that the mediatised panoptic 
observation of Schapelle Corby that triggered a moral panic was in some ways a stand-
alone event – a unique mediatised spectacle – and that the mechanics of creating and 
sustaining spectacle have shifted since her incarceration in 2005. The spectator to the 
original three events was also a producer of information via their engaged response to 
the spectacle. However, the spectator (and user) of new new media is both consumer 
                                                           
62 Google admitted in May 2010 that it had unwittingly collected digital information through unencrypted networks via WiFi 
collection devices attached to their Street View cars (Albanesius 2010). The recent scandal surrounding Google exemplifies Abe’s 
assertion about how these technologies and processes serve in producing a surveillance society, while ‘Wikileaks’ continue to make 
headlines with using new new media to facilitate an agenda for political and institutional transparency (Wikileaks 2010). 245 
 
and producer without necessarily needing an event to respond to. This means that in 
addition to the new new media spectator’s self-awareness of their role in watching and 
being watched in return they must contribute to the entire watching process for these 
systems and processes to work at all. Although I would not go as far to say that the 
panopticon is not present in the current context, I do argue that locating the panopticon 
is a more complex process in new new media than it was in older media. Because the 
user is an active agent within these technological media, there is even more reason to 
explore issues surrounding media-based technologies in the twenty-first century and the 
role both play in relation to spectacle, spectatorship and potential instances of moral 
panic.  
 
How is one to think of moral panic in an increasingly globalised, technologised and 
interconnected world? Does liquid modernity help foster or disseminate moral panic? 
Or are the social, historical and political conditions of a mediatised spectacle ultimately 
what determine moral panic? The productive capacity of the user of new new media and 
the fluid and transient nature of liquid modernity do not mean that spectacle and/or 
moral panic do not and will not occur. In fact, the cult of celebrity requires the 
immediacy and proliferation of sensationalist information that new new media can 
provide. However, if a moral panic responds to the underlying issues of a community 
and is sustained by perceptions of a threat to social normativity, new new media has the 
potential to either reinforce this sense of panic in an enormous force of mobilisation or 
dispel it before the simmering moral panic has much chance of developing. The active 
spectator is just as likely to engage, respond and contribute to multiple media events – 
moving from one to another, as quickly and as often, as is presented to them. I suggest 
that these factors may contribute to a social event being ‘quelled’ before there is much 246 
 
chance of a moral panic being created. However, there is always the potential for new 
new media to facilitate moral panic both rapidly and fiercely, just as new new media 
may be a vehicle for mobilising political activism. 
 
In many ways, the advent of new new media is emblematic of heterotopic space – in 
that each technology and network system possesses qualities of an ambiguous temporal 
and spatial displacement. Downes argues that virtual environments “draw our attention 
to new ways of creating heterotopic temporality” (2005: 133). By examining the fluid 
and transient nature of virtual space, and by seeing new new media as heterotopic, the 
circumstances surrounding the emergence of a mediatised event can be challenged, and 
thus, can become the ideal vessel for social commentary and political mobilisation. The 
death of Neda Soltan and the 2008 Obama Presidential campaign are two events that 
deployed new new media to raise awareness of certain social and political 
circumstances and therefore are useful in describing how an active and engaged 
spectatorship can be mobilised today. 
 
On 20 June 2009, the death of Iranian woman, Neda Soltan, was filmed and posted on 
YouTube. Very quickly, the images went viral and triggered an enormous response. 
Soltan, dubbed the “Angel of Freedom”, became a symbol for the tyranny of repression 
in Iran.
63
                                                           
63 Neda Soltan, an Iranian university-educated woman, was travelling to attend a rally in Tehran to protest against the alleged 
discrepancies in the Iranian Presidential elections. Stepping out of a car, she was shot in the heart and died in the arms of her friends. 
The moment of her death was a fiercely powerful image, with some commenting that it might become as symbolic as the image of 
the unarmed man standing in front of a tank in Tiananmen Square (McElroy 2009) or how the “naked, napalmed girl running down 
the road has come to encapsulate the Vietnam war” (Jardine 2009).   
 Provocative iconic images can exist in the collective consciousness as a 
reminder of suffering and tragedy. Heterotopias direct attention to the normative social 
order by being in opposition to it. In this sense, Soltan’s videotaped death was an 
example of how an image (or series of images) can be read as heterotopic because the 247 
 
image draws explicit attention to a ‘real’ space of tyrannical hegemonic order. The fact 
that the footage went ‘viral’ on the Internet also lends itself to the concept of a virtual 
fluid space that thrives on disruption.  
 
Barack Obama and his campaign team during the 2008 US Presidential election fully 
capitalised on the needs and desires of a new generation of consumers seeking active 
political citizenship through a skilled use of social networking devices and an 
unprecedented usage of new new media.
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 Obama secured the support of over 70 
percent of voters aged under 25, the highest rate of votes for that age group since exit 
polls began in 1976 (Fraser and Dutta 2008). The Obama campaign built in momentum 
by drawing from a growing communication, information and technological sector, 
whilst also acknowledging that they, and the campaign itself, were a product of this new 
world order. Arianna Huffington of The Huffington Post stated: “[Were] it not for the 
Internet, Barack Obama would not be president. Were it not for the Internet, Barack 
Obama would not have been the nominee” (Miller 2008). The campaign activated an 
audience who felt underrepresented and misunderstood, broke new ground in 
maintaining the support of the primary Democratic base and accumulated vast private 
donations by tapping into the social and technological phenomenon of new new media. 
The utilisation of new new media exposed an ambiguous and at times transgressive 
space surrounding the situations discussed above. The ‘Angel of Freedom’ and the 
Obama campaign are examples of new new media’s capacity for short explosive bursts 
                                                           
64 Although the Internet – particularly news websites, email and blogs – had been utilised in the 2004 election the usage of new new 
media in the 2008 election was unprecedented. There were two main points as to why this was the case. Firstly, the technologies and 
social networking devices such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube were not available during the earlier campaign and secondly the 
Obama campaign team completely embraced these new media when they became readily available. However, all candidates were in 
some way involved in new new media. Hilary Clinton announced her candidacy through her website, Republican Mitt Romney was 
the first to have a Facebook account and by the time of the primaries all candidates had some form of social network site (Rawlinson 
2008). 248 
 
of political activism. The question becomes whether this kind of media can mobilise 
effectual political action or genuine engagement or if this connection is as superficial or 
short-lived as the fluid interaction of its users. Nevertheless, the make-up of 
spectatorship in the twenty-first century has changed with the differing requirements of 
these technologies and systems. Thus, mediatised spectacle and the moral panic it may 
or may not trigger must also be transformed in some way. New new media deliberately 
engender some kind of interactive engagement with their user and as a result influence 
the production and reception of information, and identity and community formation. 
Just as blogs, television, mobile phone messages and print media were critical to the 
significance of the original three events so too is new new media crucial to the 
construction of current social performances and to what future mediatised spectacle 
might look like.  
 
To engage with these events – the Schapelle Corby trial, the case of Terri Schiavo and 
the Redfern riots – via two interconnected models is to not only explore underlying 
power formations that provoke moral panic but also to unpack and retell the complex 
and ambiguous nature of these three social events. The mediatised representations of 
each case raised many questions about agency, subjectification and objectification 
processes and the performance of truth, discourse and power in the global media. In 
addition, arguably, one of the central elements of performance is that artist and audience 
alike can be involved in social inquiry: to exist in a shared space where performance can 
be a tool for social commentary. Inspired by this tradition I wanted Three Interrupted 
Lives to open up debate about the conditions from which each event emerged and the 
nature and impact of moral panic as a particular kind of social phenomena. Just as the 
three elements of the spectator, spectacle and moral panic were interwoven in the 249 
 
original three events, for moral panic to exist today, these factors would again have to 
respond to and inform each other. These notions are even more apparent with the advent 
of new new media and the transient fluidity of contemporary spectatorship and 
subjectification processes. While a tension definitely exists between how the mass 
media might be used to propagate moral panic and how it can be used to increase social 
awareness the mutually informing nature of the active spectator and mediatised 
spectacle is fundamental to the constitution and proliferation of moral panics today. 
This dissertation produced two performance paradigms that contribute to the wide 
terrain of social and performance analysis. The opportunities for this kind of critical 
pursuit regarding other social performances, cultural activities and discursive 
enactments are endless. Similarly, I am confident that the capacity to make, and critique 
performance that extends the debate about the nature of the subject, spectacle and the 
general mediatised and technologised landscape is limitless.  
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